Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs developed tardive dyskinesia as a result of use of generic metoclopramide, a drug prescribed for treatment of gastroesophageal reflux disease. They filed individual suits against manufacturers, alleging failure include adequate information on product labels concerning the risks of taking the drug long-term. They also named as parties manufacturers of the name-brand form of metoclopramide, alleging fraud and tortious misrepresentation. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' tort claims against the generic defendants on preemption grounds, finding conflict with federal regulation of generic drugs. The court also dismissed claims against name-brand defendants for failure to allege that they had ingested Reglan, a threshold requirement for a products-liability action under Kentucky law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that name-brand manufacturers have no duty to individuals who have never taken the drug they manufacture. View "Morris v. Wyeth, Inc." on Justia Law

A 1993 Ford Explorer, struck by another car near the left rear wheel, rolled over. Plaintiffs, driver and passenger, were injured. At the close of discovery in their case against the manufacturer, plaintiffs had not designated an expert on the subject of the vehicle's design. The magistrate judge concluded that the suit could not proceed without expert testimony and granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Consumer expectations are just one factor in the inquiry whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. A jury unassisted by expert testimony would have to rely on speculation. The record did not show whether the vehicles are unduly (or unexpectedly) dangerous, based on: under what circumstances they roll over; under what circumstances consumers expect them to do so; whether it would be possible to reduce the rollover rate; and whether a different and safer design would have averted this particular accident. View "Show v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff had no adverse reaction to receiving the hepatitis B vaccine in 1997 until after her third dose. At that time, her chest pain was not attributed to the vaccine. Plaintiff saw other doctors for various symptoms and, in 1998, doctors identified "post vaccine syndrome." Plaintiff has had unrelated medical problems, suffered the loss of a child, and has had jobs that involved working with chemicals and bodily fluids. Her 1999 claim for compensation under the Vaccine Act (42 U.S.C. 300aa-1) was denied. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that if was an "unfortunate case," in which plaintiff suffered a multitude of symptoms but could not prove they were caused by the vaccine. View "Lombard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, left paralyzed from the chest down after an accident at work, sued the company that built a specialized trailer for his employer. A jury rejected negligence and implied warranty of merchantability claims. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion when it instructed the jury that a defendant who manufactures a product according to buyer specifications could not be liable under either a negligence or implied warranty theory unless the design defect was so obvious it would not have been reasonable for the defendant to manufacture according to the design.View "Hatch v. Trail King Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, left paralyzed from the chest down after an accident at work, sued the company that built a specialized trailer for his employer. A jury rejected negligence and implied warranty of merchantability claims. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion when it instructed the jury that a defendant who manufactures a product according to buyer specifications could not be liable under either a negligence or implied warranty theory unless the design defect was so obvious it would not have been reasonable for the defendant to manufacture according to the design.

A class action suit against tobacco-related entities, first filed in 1998, alleged that for years the tobacco companies conspired to conceal the facts about the addictive and dangerous nature of cigarettes by intentionally using incomplete, misleading, or untruthful marketing and advertising. The putative class consists of Illinois residents who bought or smoked cigarettes, seeking disgorgement of profits on an unjust enrichment theory. After extensive proceedings, the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mere violation of a consumer's legal right to know about a product's risks, without anything more, cannot support a claim that the manufacturer unjustly retained the revenue from the product's sale to the consumer’s detriment. Plaintiffs did not allege that they suffered any harm, that they relied on the marketing, or that they would have acted differently had the defendants been truthful. View "Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc." on Justia Law

Shortly after Plaintiff Mark Rimbert's father began taking Prozac, he killed his wife and himself. Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against Defendant Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of Prozac. Defendant moved for summary judgment on various grounds and to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff's sole expert witness on the question of causation. The motions were denied by the district judge initially assigned the case. Once the case was reassigned, Defendant moved for reconsideration. The second district judge granted Defendant's motion to exclude Plaintiff's expert witness. The court then entered summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that without the expert's testimony, Plaintiff had no case. Plaintiff brought this appeal to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred by excluding the testimony of his expert. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order excluding the testimony, but reversed the order granting summary judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co." on Justia Law

Shortly after Plaintiff Mark Rimbert's father began taking Prozac, he killed his wife and himself. Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against Defendant Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of Prozac. Defendant moved for summary judgment on various grounds and to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff's sole expert witness on the question of causation. The motions were denied by the district judge initially assigned the case. Once the case was reassigned, Defendant moved for reconsideration. The second district judge granted Defendant's motion to exclude Plaintiff's expert witness. The court then entered summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that without the expert's testimony, Plaintiff had no case. Plaintiff brought this appeal to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred by excluding the testimony of his expert. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order excluding the testimony, but reversed the order granting summary judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Debbie and Max Walters appealed from a district court judgment that dismissed their petition for the issuance of a turnover order. In 1990, the Walters' thirteen-year-old son was killed on a hunting trip with his father when a Chinese-manufactured rifle the boy carried allegedly misfired. The Walters sued China and several entities allegedly controlled by China in the U.S. District Court on theories of products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty in connection with the manufacture of the rifle. The Walters eventually won a $10 million default judgment, and sought to enforce it by collecting China's assets in the possession of the respondent banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., Bank of China, Ltd. and China Construction Bank Corporation. Citing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), the district court dismissed the petition with prejudice. Without filing a new petition, the Walters argued on appeal that the Banks lacked standing to assert foreign sovereign immunity on behalf of China, and that China waived any immunity by its conduct underlying the default judgment and by its failure to appear. Upon review of the submitted briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Second Circuit found Plaintiffs' arguments were without merit, and affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss their case. View "Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Debbie and Max Walters appealed from a district court judgment that dismissed their petition for the issuance of a turnover order. In 1990, the Walters' thirteen-year-old son was killed on a hunting trip with his father when a Chinese-manufactured rifle the boy carried allegedly misfired. The Walters sued China and several entities allegedly controlled by China in the U.S. District Court on theories of products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty in connection with the manufacture of the rifle. The Walters eventually won a $10 million default judgment, and sought to enforce it by collecting China's assets in the possession of the respondent banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., Bank of China, Ltd. and China Construction Bank Corporation. Citing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), the district court dismissed the petition with prejudice. Without filing a new petition, the Walters argued on appeal that the Banks lacked standing to assert foreign sovereign immunity on behalf of China, and that China waived any immunity by its conduct underlying the default judgment and by its failure to appear. Upon review of the submitted briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Second Circuit found Plaintiffs' arguments were without merit, and affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss their case.