Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

After Dr. Brian Howard received a knee implant manufactured by Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc. that failed to bond properly, Howard and his wife filed suit against Sulzer alleging negligence per se. Following the completion of earlier consolidated litigation, the district court dismissed the Howards' negligence per se claim, predicting that it would not be cognizable under Oklahoma state law. The Tenth Circuit stayed the Howards' appeal pending the resolution of a question of state law certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. That question was answered, and the Tenth Circuit now reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The Oklahoma Court held that Oklahoma law allowed private individuals to maintain a parallel claim for negligence per se based on violation of a federal regulation whose enforcement lies with a governmental entity. The court further concluded that "[t]he existence of a provision in federal law providing that all enforcement proceedings 'shall be by and in the name of the United States' did not prohibit a state law claim for negligence per se based on violation of the federal regulation." Noting that Howard did not claim he should have been entitled to bring a private action under the FDCA, but rather brought a state claim based on duties that "parallel, rather than add to, federal requirements," the court determined that Howard's negligence per se claim should have been allowed to proceed. View "Howard, et al v. Zimmer, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Crouch was piloting his Piper Lance II single-engine airplane with Hudson as passenger. After losing engine power at an altitude of 5000 feet, and finding it impossible to reach an airport, Crouch made a forced landing in a field near Bardstown. The plane’s engine was manufactured in 1978 and overhauled in 2005, with installation of a rebuilt magneto that allegedly detached, causing the crash. Both occupants survived but suffered serious permanent injuries, including paraplegia. The district court dismissed, on summary judgment, their allegations that the aircraft engine manufacturer was liable for negligently failing to warn airplane owners and operators, and failing to notify regulatory authorities, of defects in the engine and its components, finding that the allegations failed to make out a claim in avoidance of the applicable period of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act, 49 U.S.C. 40101. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs did not show or even allege that a revised overhaul manual contained a substantive alteration that caused harm and the evidence did not support a theory that defendants withheld information. View "Crouch v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries, filed a product liability and wrongful death action against defendants. At issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court's recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro rendered the court's stream-of-commerce approach to personal jurisdiction improper. The court found that the application of the stream-of-commerce approach in this case did not run afoul of McIntyre's narrow holding and, therefore, affirmed the district court's interlocutory order finding personal jurisdiction and denying dismissal. View "Ainsworth v. Moffett Engineering, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their claims in connection with the design, manufacture, and sale by Philip Morris of cigarettes that allegedly contained unnecessarily dangerous levels of carcinogens when smoked by humans, and plaintiffs' independent equitable claim seeking to require Philip Morris to fund a program of medical monitoring for longtime smokers of Marlboro cigarettes who have not been diagnosed with, but were at risk for, lung cancer. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims for negligence and strict products liability as time barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Further, the implied warranty of merchantability was not breached if the cigarettes were minimally safe when used in the customary, usual, and reasonably foreseeable manner and, therefore, summary judgment dismissing these claims was appropriate. With respect to the claim seeking medical monitoring, the court certified a question of law to the New York Court of Appeals. View "Caronia v. Philip Morris USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's hands were injured when a battery-operated toy purchased at a Wal-mart store in Aberdeen, South Dakota exploded after he picked it up to see why it was malfunctioning. With the three-year statute of limitations about to expire and the toy manufacturer bankrupt, plaintiff filed this tort action in state court against Wal-Mart. The district court granted Wal-mart's motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process, concluding that plaintiff failed to comply with the applicable South Dakota service of process statute. Because plaintiff initiated the action in state court and attempted to serve Wal-mart prior to removal, South Dakota law governed whether service was sufficient. The record clearly supported the district court's finding that the assistant manager was not the person in charge of the Aberdeen store when service was attempted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Sommervold v. Wal-Mart, Inc." on Justia Law

Bayside installed hurricane-resistant windows manufactured by Viracon and supplied by EFCO. Shortly after installation, cracking and delamination occurred in some of the windows. Bayside filed suit against Viracon and EFCO nine years after it noticed the defect. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Viracon and EFCO, concluding that Minnesota's two-year statute of limitations applied to Bayside's breach of warranty claims and therefore, these claims were time-barred. View "Bayside Holdings, Ltd., et al v. Viracon, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Fulgenzi was prescribed the generic drug metoclopramide (FDA approved in 1980), sold originally under the brand name Reglan, a drug approved for short-term treatment of patients suffering from gastroesophageal reflux disease. In her suit, claiming failure to adequately warn of risks, she alleged that taking the drug caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia, an often-irreversible neurological disorder that causes involuntary movements, especially of the lower face. In 2009, the Supreme Court held that with respect to branded drug manufacturers, state failure-to-warn suits were not preempted by the federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act , 21 U.S.C. 301. In 2011 the Court held that such suits could not go forward against generic drug manufacturers, as it is impossible to comply simultaneously with their state duty to adequately warn and their federal duty of sameness (federal law requires generic drug labels to be the same as their branded counterpart). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that after the branded-drug manufacturer of metoclopramide strengthened warnings on its label, the generic manufacturer failed to update its label as required by federal law, rendering compliance with both federal and state duties no longer impossible. View "Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Merck and the dismissal of her products liability claim for failure to provide an adequate warning regarding the risks associated with Fosamax. Fosamax has allegedly been linked to osteonecrosis of the jaw and plaintiff claimed that Merck should have known of a possible link between the drug and the condition. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting Merck's summary judgment motion after discrediting expert testimony from plaintiff's treating physician. Because the physician's expert testimony contained contradictions that were unequivocal and inescapable, unexplained, arose after the motion for summary judgment was filed, and were central to plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim, the court held that the district court did not err in determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact raised by the later testimony. View "In Re: Fosamax Products Liability Litigation" on Justia Law

Between 1994 and 1997 Wyeth’s predecessor sold fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine, prescription weight loss drugs. After the drugs were linked to valvular heart disease and an FDA public health advisory, Wyeth withdrew the drugs from the market in 1997. Thousands of individuals filed suit; the cases were consolidated. In 1999, Wyeth entered into a Settlement Agreement; in 2000, the court certified the class, approved the Agreement, and retained jurisdiction. The Agreement enjoins class members from suing Wyeth for diet drug-related injuries, but allows class members to sue Wyeth if they can demonstrate that they developed PPH (a condition that deprives the lungs of oxygen) at a specified level through the use of the diet drugs. In 2011, Cauthen sued, alleging that she developed PPH. She produced a pulmonary consultation prepared by Fortin, a cardiologist. Because Cauthen’s report showed that lung capacity of less than 60 percent of predicted at rest, Wyeth sought to enjoin the state court lawsuit for failing to satisfy the precondition provided by the Agreement. Dr. Fortin asserted that comparing individual lung capacity with average capacity of persons having a similar demographic profile is not determinative in diagnosing PPH. The district court enjoined the suit. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "In Re: Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig." on Justia Law

United Fire, as subrogee for Robert and Theresa Corral, brought a strict products liability suit against Whirlpool, alleging that a Whirlpool-manufactured clothes dryer caused a fire in the Corrals' home. United Fire appealed the district court's orders excluding the proffered testimony of two expert witnesses, Mr. Arms and Dr. Clarke, and granting Whirlpool's motion for summary judgment on United Fire's sole claim of relief. The court held that excluding the part of Mr. Arms' testimony regarding the physical origin of the fire was an abuse of discretion where the testimony was based on a widely accepted methodology and grounded in the available physical evidence. While Dr. Clarke's ultimate conclusions could be contested, it was an abuse of discretion to conclude that the basic methodology applied to analyze the metal dryer duct lacked minimum scientific reliability. Applying the "Cassisi inference," the court held that there were genuine issues as to whether a manufacturing defect within the dryer caused the fire. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the exclusion of Mr. Arms' expert testimony; reversed the exclusion of Dr. Clarke's expert testimony; reversed the grant of summary judgment; and remanded for further proceedings. View "United Fire and Casualty Co. v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law