Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Randy Mace, as personal representative of the estate of Kathy Mace, appealed from an order of the circuit court dismissing his wrongful death lawsuit on the basis of forum non conveniens. Applying the forum non conveniens statute, the circuit court concluded that North Carolina, the state in which the action accrued, was a more convenient forum for Mace's claims. Mace argued, however, that he was unable to try his claims in North Carolina because they were barred by that state's statute of limitations. Thus, he argued, the circuit court erred in dismissing the case because it misinterpreted the forum non conveniens statute as permitting dismissal despite the lack of an alternate forum in which the claims may be tried. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Finding the language of the statute ambiguous, the Court construed the statute in a manner consistent with the Court's prior case law and the federal common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. Under this construction, the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the statute.View "Mace v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Evelyn Nye sought compensation for the death of her husband caused by exposure to asbestos at his workplace. The widow sued the company that sold products containing asbestos to her husband's employer, basing her claim on strict liability and alleging the seller failed to warn her husband of the products' health risks. The jury found the seller was at fault but that the husband's employer was the sole cause of his injury. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the seller could not be held liable for failure to warn if the jury found that the consumer, identified as the employer, was already aware of danger in connection with the use of the products or if the employer had been given adequate warnings. The instruction was erroneous because (1) it incorrectly applied the learned intermediary doctrine, and (2) it misidentified the consumer as the employer when the consumer who was required to be warned was the employee, Mr. Nye. Because the error more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury, the case was remanded.View "Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s Mazda3 sedan caught fire one month after Plaintiff purchased the vehicle. Plaintiff brought this product liability action against Mazda Motor of America, Inc. and Cartwright Auto, LLC, claiming that a defect in the car’s fuel system caused the fire that, in turn, caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants on the basis that Plaintiff failed to produce competent expert testimony to support his claim of defect. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he could prove his case based on an unspecified defect under the malfunction theory of products liability and without expert testimony. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding (1) Plaintiff failed to raise the malfunction theory in the trial court and thus did not preserve it for appellate review; and (2) Plaintiff’s specific defect claims required expert testimony, and Plaintiff failed to produce this evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not properly preserve his malfunction theory of liability claim for appellate review, and therefore, the Appellate Court did not err in declining to review the malfunction theory claim on appeal. View "White v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Ferraro suffered serious burns after falling asleep next to the power adapter of her newly purchased laptop computer. She filed a product liability suit, alleging a design defect that allowed the power adapter to overheat, that HP failed to include adequate warnings about the power adapter’s propensity to overheat, and that HP breached an implied warranty of merchantability. The district court granted HP summary judgment, reasoning that Ferraro would be unable to show that the adapter was “unreasonably dangerous,” as required for her design defect claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Illinois law provides two alternative methods of establishing unreasonable danger: the “consumer-expectations test” and the “risk-utility test.” Ferraro appealed with respect to the consumer expectations test, but, under Illinois law, the risk-utility test “trumps” in design defect cases if the two methods of establishing unreasonable dangerousness have conflicting results. The district court’s finding that Ferraro could not succeed under the risk-utility test furnished an independent, unchallenged ground for its decision. View "Ferraro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit against Vital for its distribution of ZERO IMPACT protein bars that were erroneously marketed and labeled as having little to no impact on blood sugar. On appeal, Vital challenged the district court's sua sponte order remanding the suit to state court for failure to establish the amount in controversy requirement under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1). The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the undisputed Cimino declarations were sufficient to establish that CAFA's $5 million amount in controversy requirement was met. View "Watkins v. Vital Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

From 1981 to 1989, Schultz worked painting equipment, floors, walls, ceilings, and pipes at AMC company plants. In 2005 he was diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia (AML). He died 2006. His wife sued paint companies, alleging that the companies produced or distributed the paint Schultz used at work and that benzene from the paints caused his disease. She offered reports from two experts: Stewart, an industrial hygienist, who reconstructed Schultz’s work with the paints to quantify his benzene exposure, and Gore, an oncologist, who testified that benzene is generally known to cause AML and specifically was a substantial factor in the development of Schultz’s disease. The district court granted the companies summary judgment on the ground that Gore’s testimony was scientifically unreliable; without that evidence, Schultz had no way of linking his disease to the paints. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in excluding Gore’s testimony. View "Schultz v. Glidden Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought claims of negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, misrepresentation and fraud, and negligence per se against defendants, alleging that she developed tardive dyskinesia after taking generic metoclopramide manufactured by Defendant Teva for a period of greater than 12 weeks, contrary to administrative guidance issued by the FDA. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Teva as preempted by federal law and because, preemption aside, the learned intermediary doctrine prevented her from stating a claim upon which relief could be granted under Florida law; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Brand Manufacturers because Florida law did not permit an injured consumer to recover from the brand manufacturer of a prescription drug if the consumer is known to have ingested only the generic form of that drug; and noted that, insofar as plaintiff sought redress for her injuries, such redress lies with Congress or the Florida legislature. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Guarino v. Wyeth, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged various causes of action against the maker of the generic drug (Pliva), brand defendants, and others after she was injured by the prescription medication metoclopramide. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of brand defendants and dismissal of her claims against Pliva. The court denied plaintiff's motion to supplement the record, finding no compelling reason to allow plaintiff to do so; the district court did not err in determining plaintiff's claims against brand defendants failed as a matter of law because she stipulated that she had not ingested a product manufactured by brand defendants; reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's non-warning design defect and breach of implied warranty claims and remanded for further consideration; and because there was no causal link between Pliva's failure to incorporate the 2004 labeling change and plaintiff's injury, the district court's dismissal of that claim was not error. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bell v. Pfizer, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the wife and children of the decedent, filed suit against defendants after the decedent died in the hospital after being administered a transdermal pain patch. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's joinder of several non-diverse defendants and the district court's remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(e). The court joined its sister circuits and held that section 1447(d) precluded appellate review of a remand order issued pursuant to section 1447(e). Moreover, appellate review of the district court's joinder ruling was barred. Accordingly, the court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Fontenot, et al. v. Johnson & Johnson, et al." on Justia Law

The 12 plaintiffs are represented by CVLO, which serves as counsel in approximately 2000 cases pending in multidistrict asbestos litigation. The CVLO cases represent the second largest land-based group of cases to remain in the litigation. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ cases, for failure to comply with orders requiring submission of medical reports and histories of exposure to asbestos in compliance with “generally accepted medical standards [that] call for information regarding duration, intensity, time of onset, and setting of exposure to asbestos.” The Third Circuit affirmed, characterizing the court orders as “typical … in the context of the management of multidistrict litigation.” In dismissing plaintiffs’ cases, the court considered and weighed the relevant factors, viewing the dilatory and prejudicial aspects as outweighing all others. The flaw in the submissions went to the very heart of the “meritorious” aspect, making the weighing of that factor impossible. View "In re: Asbestos Prod Liab. Litig." on Justia Law