Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs installed shingles manufactured by Owens Corning (debtor). They discovered leaks in 2009; shingles had cracked. Each sent warranty claims, which were rejected. They filed a class action alleging fraud, negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. In 2000, the debtors had filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions; the Bankruptcy Court set a claims bar date in 2002 and approved a notice that appeared in multiple publications. Notices of the confirmation hearing for the Plan, in 2006, included generic notice to unknown claimants. At the time they filed the class action plaintiffs did not hold “claims” under 11 U.S.C. 1101. The Third Circuit subsequently established a rule that a claim arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product or other conduct giving rise to an injury, which underlies a right to payment under the Bankruptcy Code. Based on that holding, the district court held that plaintiffs’ claims were discharged. The Third Circuit affirmed in part and remanded, agreeing that plaintiffs had “claims.” Both were “exposed” to the product before confirmation of the plan. Plaintiffs were not afforded due process by published notice, however, because they could not have known they had claims at the time of confirmation. View "Wright v. Owens Corning" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs are Ohio residents who purchased front-loading washing machines manufactured by defendant. Within months after their purchases, the plaintiffs noticed the smell of mold or mildew emanating from the machines and from laundry washed in the machines. One plaintiff found mold growing on the sides of the detergent dispenser, another saw mold growing on the rubber door seal, despite allowing the machine doors to stand open. They filed suit, alleging tortious breach of warranty, negligent design, and negligent failure to warn. The district court certified a class comprised of Ohio residents who purchased one of the specified machines in Ohio primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and not for resale (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3)). The Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification, with proof of damages reserved for individual determination. Plaintiffs’ proof established numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. Common questions predominate over individual ones and class action is a superior method to adjudicate the claims.View "Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. 300aa, for injuries to their children allegedly caused by the Diptheria-Tetanus-acellular Pertussis vaccine. The children suffer a seizure disorder, known as Severe Myoclonic Epilepsy of Infancy. The same special master presided over both cases and determined that plaintiffs failed to show entitlement to compensation because evidence showed that a gene mutation present in both children was the sole cause of their injuries. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting considerable evidentiary support for the conclusion. View "Stone v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

This case required the court to address the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over suits against non-debtor third parties, as well as the scope of a stay issued pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 524(g)(4). Pfizer and Quigley appealed from a judgment in the district court reversing the Clarifying Order of the bankruptcy court and holding that the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos (Angelos) could bring suit against Pfizer for claims based on "apparent manufacturer" liability under Pennsylvania law. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue the Clarifying Order; and that the Clarifying Order did not bar Angelos from bringing the suits in question against Pfizer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In re: Quigley Company, Inc." on Justia Law

While working for plaintiff, Hashman was standing in the open compartment, driving a forklift manufactured by Raymond when she either fell or stepped from the open side of the compartment. Her foot was trapped. She suffered severe injuries resulting in partial amputation. After settling Hashman's workers' compensation claim, plaintiff sought subrogation from Raymond, claiming that a design defect, failure to include a rear guard door on the forklift, caused the injuries. The district court granted summary judgment for Raymond, finding that plaintiff could not sustain a design defect claim without expert testimony and that the methods of its proposed expert were not sufficiently reliable to support the proffered opinions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There were at least four problems with the expert's methodology: anecdotal evidence, improper extrapolation, failure to consider other possible causes, and lack of testing. Although plaintiff could argue a "consumer expectations" theory without expert testimony, there was insufficient evidence to support the claim. View "Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Raymond Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a products liability action against CNH based on injuries he sustained while operating a CNH-manufactured bulldozer. A jury returned a verdict in favor of CNH and defendant appealed. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the manufacturing defect claims where plaintiff had not pointed to sufficient evidence in the record that would support his claim that the product manufactured by CNH "departed from its intended design" and did not meet its "design specifications." The court also held that there was no error in the jury instructions regarding the "sophisticated user," "premature wear" instruction, "safety code" instruction, and "manufacturer expert in its field" instruction. Finally, because plaintiff was unable to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's dismissal of a prospective juror, the jury verdict must be upheld. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Linden, Jr. v. CNH America" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit consolidated two cases involving transfer to courts in another country. One is an appeal from an order to transfer cases involving vehicular accidents allegedly caused by tires installed on vehicles in Latin America, from the Southern District of Indiana to the courts of Mexico. Its i a suit by Mexican citizens arising from the death of another Mexican citizen in an accident in Mexico. The second involves transfer, to Israel, of suits against manufacturers of blood products used by hemophiliacs, which turned out to be contaminated by HIV; it was brought by Israeli citizens infected by the products in Israel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the transfers. Noting the existence of apparently dispositive precedent, the court referred to "ostrich-like tactic of pretending that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant's contention does not exist." View "Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

After falling from a three-foot-high mini-scaffold and injuring his hand and knee, plaintiff brought a product liability action against the manufacturer of the scaffold. The district court granted defendant's motion to bar the trial testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness and granted summary judgment after concluding that plaintiff could not prove his case without expert testimony. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After concluding that that the expert's education and experience rendered him qualified to testify, the district court properly focused on methodology, and was within its discretion in concluding that it fell short under the Daubert factors. Summary judgment was appropriate; plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence that the mini-scaffold was defective at the time it left defendant' control. View "Bielskis v. Louisville Ladders, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a hand injury while operating a hand saw manufactured by defendant, while working at a construction site. A jury awarded plaintiff $1.5 and, although it found plaintiff to be 35 percent at fault, the finding did not reduce the award because it also found breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and rejecting an argument that plaintiff had argued impermissible "categorical liability" rather than presenting an alternative, safer design. Statements by plaintiff's counsel, about "sending a message" and corporate earnings, did not mandate a new trial. View "Osorio v. One World Techs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pipefitter, worked with asbestos-containing gaskets made by defendant from 1962 until 1970. From 1962 until 1975, he also sustained significant exposure to asbestos insulation. He died in 2008, of mesothelioma, a cancer of the lining of the lung. Before his death, plaintiff sued under theories including strict liability and negligence. Defendant does not dispute that asbestos-containing products likely caused the mesothelioma, but argues that the mesothelioma was caused by exposure to asbestos insulation, and that its own gaskets were not a substantial factor. A jury awarded plaintiff $516,094. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Given that plaintiff failed to quantify the exposure to asbestos from defendant's gaskets and concedes that plaintiff sustained massive exposure to asbestos from non-defendant sources, there was insufficient evidence to infer that defendant's gaskets probably, as opposed to possibly, were a substantial cause of plaintiff's mesothelioma. View "Moeller v. Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC" on Justia Law