Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Merck and the dismissal of her products liability claim for failure to provide an adequate warning regarding the risks associated with Fosamax. Fosamax has allegedly been linked to osteonecrosis of the jaw and plaintiff claimed that Merck should have known of a possible link between the drug and the condition. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting Merck's summary judgment motion after discrediting expert testimony from plaintiff's treating physician. Because the physician's expert testimony contained contradictions that were unequivocal and inescapable, unexplained, arose after the motion for summary judgment was filed, and were central to plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim, the court held that the district court did not err in determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact raised by the later testimony. View "In Re: Fosamax Products Liability Litigation" on Justia Law

Between 1994 and 1997 Wyeth’s predecessor sold fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine, prescription weight loss drugs. After the drugs were linked to valvular heart disease and an FDA public health advisory, Wyeth withdrew the drugs from the market in 1997. Thousands of individuals filed suit; the cases were consolidated. In 1999, Wyeth entered into a Settlement Agreement; in 2000, the court certified the class, approved the Agreement, and retained jurisdiction. The Agreement enjoins class members from suing Wyeth for diet drug-related injuries, but allows class members to sue Wyeth if they can demonstrate that they developed PPH (a condition that deprives the lungs of oxygen) at a specified level through the use of the diet drugs. In 2011, Cauthen sued, alleging that she developed PPH. She produced a pulmonary consultation prepared by Fortin, a cardiologist. Because Cauthen’s report showed that lung capacity of less than 60 percent of predicted at rest, Wyeth sought to enjoin the state court lawsuit for failing to satisfy the precondition provided by the Agreement. Dr. Fortin asserted that comparing individual lung capacity with average capacity of persons having a similar demographic profile is not determinative in diagnosing PPH. The district court enjoined the suit. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "In Re: Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig." on Justia Law

United Fire, as subrogee for Robert and Theresa Corral, brought a strict products liability suit against Whirlpool, alleging that a Whirlpool-manufactured clothes dryer caused a fire in the Corrals' home. United Fire appealed the district court's orders excluding the proffered testimony of two expert witnesses, Mr. Arms and Dr. Clarke, and granting Whirlpool's motion for summary judgment on United Fire's sole claim of relief. The court held that excluding the part of Mr. Arms' testimony regarding the physical origin of the fire was an abuse of discretion where the testimony was based on a widely accepted methodology and grounded in the available physical evidence. While Dr. Clarke's ultimate conclusions could be contested, it was an abuse of discretion to conclude that the basic methodology applied to analyze the metal dryer duct lacked minimum scientific reliability. Applying the "Cassisi inference," the court held that there were genuine issues as to whether a manufacturing defect within the dryer caused the fire. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the exclusion of Mr. Arms' expert testimony; reversed the exclusion of Dr. Clarke's expert testimony; reversed the grant of summary judgment; and remanded for further proceedings. View "United Fire and Casualty Co. v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of wrongful death and survival actions she filed against her son's employer and two pharmaceutical companies. Plaintiff's son committed suicide using a gun provided by his employer while he was taking prescribed medication manufactured and distributed by the pharmaceutical companies. The court held that the district court did not err in ruling that plaintiff failed to state a claim of negligence against the employer when the district court invoked, sua sponte, District of Columbia law that suicide was an intervening and independent cause of death subject to limited exceptions that were inapplicable. The court declined to certify questions of negligence-liability to the D.C. Court of Appeals. The court also held that the district court did not err in ruling that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim of products liability against the pharmaceutical companies and in denying her leave to amend. View "Rollins v. Wackenhut Services, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Whirlpool after a fire destroyed their home, alleging that the fire was caused by a defective refrigerator Whirlpool designed, manufactured, and sold. Whirlpool appealed the jury's finding in favor of plaintiffs. The court concluded that the fire investigator did not employ National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 921 in his investigation and therefore, his testimony could not be excluded for failure to reliably apply its contents; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the challenged testimony of the investigator where the jury weighed the conflicting evidence and credited the investigator's testimony in spite of Whirlpool's challenges; the district court did not err when it denied Whirlpool's motion for judgment as a matter of law where the circumstantial evidence was strong enough to allow the jury to infer that the refrigerator contained a defect at the time it left Whirlpool's control and that caused the fire; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Whirlpool's motion for a mistrial for violation of an in limine order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Russell, et al v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

Robinson marketed and sold camouflage products that, according to Robinson, would eliminate human scent so that wild game, with their acute sense of smell, would not be able to detect a hunter's presence. Consumers who had purchased these products brought class action lawsuits against Robinson, claiming that Robinson's products did not actually eliminate human odor (collectively, "the underlying lawsuits"). Robinson sought defense and indemnification from it's insurer, Westfield, but Westfield declined coverage. Instead, Westfield brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy did not cover the underlying lawsuits. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Westfield where Westfield was under no obligation to defend or indemnify Robinson in the underlying lawsuits and where Robinson waived its argument premised on the reasonable-expectations doctrine. View "Westfield Ins. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc." on Justia Law

The underlying suits arise from alleged defects in Kenmore-brand Sears washing machines sold in periods beginning in 2001 and 2004. One asserted a defect that causes mold; the other asserted a defect that stops the machine inopportunely. The district court denied certification of the class complaining of mold and granted certification of the class complaining of sudden stoppage. The Seventh Circuit affirmed certification of the stoppage claims and reversed denial of certification for the mold claims. Rule 23(b)(3) conditions maintenance of a class action on a finding “that the questions of fact or law common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The basic question in the litigation is: were the machines defective in permitting mold to accumulate and generate noxious odors? The question is common to the entire mold class, although the answer may vary with the differences in design. The individual questions are the amount of damages owed particular class members. It is more efficient for the question whether the washing machines were defective to be resolved in a single proceeding than for it to be litigated separately in hundreds of different trials View "Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." on Justia Law

After an airplane was damaged in a runway accident, USAU indemnified the owner of the aircraft and brought a subrogation claim against Nabtesco. USAU alleged that the accident resulted from a defective component part, an actuator, manufactured by Nabtesco. The court affirmed the district court's order and held that the eighteen-year statute of repose set forth in the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. 40101, began to run from the date that the component part, along with the aircraft in which it was installed originally, was delivered to its first purchaser. View "United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Nabtesco Corp., et al" on Justia Law

Genentech manufactured and sold the psoriasis medication Raptiva, approved by the FDA in 2003. Raptiva works by suppressing T-cells ; because T-cells help fight infections, suppression has the potential to cause potentially life-threatening side effects. Following reports of adverse health effects, including a rare brain infection, Genentech voluntarily removed Raptiva from the market in 2009. Marsh began using Raptiva in 2004 and subsequently suffered viral meningitis and a collapsed lung. She sued in 2011, alleging strict products liability under design-defect and failure-to-warn theories, negligence, breach of warranty, and fraud. She claimed that, before and after FDA approval, Genentech knew of dangerous side effects that it concealed and did not include in the drug’s label. The district court dismissed, holding that Genentech was immune from suit because neither statutory exception to immunity for drug manufacturers applied. Marsh argued that immunity does not apply because failure to submit updated information rendered Raptiva noncompliant with FDA approval when it left Genentech’s control and that her claim was not preempted because it was premised on non-compliance rather than fraud or bribery. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Allegations underlying Marsh’s argument that immunity does not apply are essentially the type of claim that is preempted.View "Marsh v. Genetech Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Norfolk Southern, stating claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., and the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA), 49 U.S.C. 20301 et seq. Plaintiff claimed that he suffered a shoulder injury as a result of a faulty handbrake during his work shift. Without addressing the sufficiency of plaintiff's testimony, the district court granted summary judgment to Norfolk Southern. The court found that the district court applied the wrong standard for summary judgment and that, even if it had applied the correct standard, summary judgment was improper. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law