Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Steven Funkhouser, administrator of the estate of Emily Funkhouser, brought this products liability action against Ford Motor Company and Obaugh Ford, Inc. (collectively "Ford") after his daughter, Emily, died from severe burns she suffered when the family's Ford Windstar minivan caught fire. The circuit court ruled that evidence of seven other Winstar van fires was inadmissible. The parties then entered into an agreed final order wherein Funkhouser stipulated that absent evidence of those fires, he would be unable to prove his failure to warn claims, and therefore, entry of summary judgment was proper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in its application of Virginia law governing admissibility of other similar occurrences and in excluding evidence of four of the other Windstar van fires; and (2) the evidence of three of the Windstar van fires was inadmissible. Remanded.View "Funkhouser v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The civil action underlying this appeal was selected as a test case for the admissibility of expert opinion evidence to the effect that each and every fiber of inhaled asbestos is a substantial contributing factor to any asbestos-related disease. The inquiry has proceeded under principles derived from 'Frye v. United States' (293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). Upon its consideration of the evidence presented by both sides, the trial court sustained the Frye challenge and precluded the plaintiffs from adducing the 'any exposure' opinion. Focusing upon methodology, the judge found no support for the any exposure theory of specific causation in any of the sources upon which the expert relied. The Superior Court majority was very critical of the trial court's treatment of the Frye challenge on several fronts. While finding error in the threshold determination, the Superior Court nevertheless proceeded to review the trial court's finding as to general acceptance, concluding that the judge had abused his discretion. At the outset, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's decision to conduct a Frye hearing concerning the any-exposure opinion to be appropriate. While the Superior Court was correct that the trial court judge did not embellish his opinion with specific citations to the record, his findings and conclusions were 'amply supported throughout that record nonetheless.' The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in its Frye assessment. The order of the Superior Court was reversed, and the case was remanded for consideration of whether there were remaining, preserved issues on appeal which were obviated by the intermediate court's approach to the common pleas court's ruling.View "Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC" on Justia Law

In March 2007, Plaintiff Joseph Trascher filed a petition in the district court seeking an ex parte order to perpetuate his testimony, alleging that he had been diagnosed with asbestosis in August 2006, and that it was unlikely that he would survive more than another six months. Plaintiff also alleged he sustained occupational exposures to asbestos while working as a tack welder at the Avondale Shipyard from 1960 to 1964, and at the Equitable Shipyard from 1965-1974. He requested service on these parties and a number of other parties he identified as expected defendants in his anticipated suit for damages.The district court granted the ex parte order and the videotaped perpetuation deposition was scheduled for April 3, 2007, at Plaintiff's home. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court concerned the admissibility of the video deposition where the deposition was halted due to the deponent’s failing health and fatigue, and the deponent died before his deposition could be continued and before he could be cross-examined by opposing counsel. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court found that while most of the video deposition was inadmissible, parts of the deposition were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. View "Trascher v. Territo" on Justia Law

Henry Morgan, Sr. filed a personal-injury suit against eighty-eight defendants, claiming injuries related to silicosis. Morgan, Sr., died while the personal-injury case was pending, and the case eventually was dismissed. More than three years after Morgan, Sr.'s death, his son, Henry Morgan, Jr., filed a wrongful-death suit individually and on behalf of all wrongful-death beneficiaries of Morgan, Sr. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion. Because the wrongful-death suit was filed more than three years after the death of Morgan, Sr., the statute of limitations barred any wrongful-death and survival claims. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and render judgment in favor of the defendants.View "Empire Abrasive Equipment Corp. v. Morgan" on Justia Law

A couple and their boy and girl were riding in the family's Ford Taurus when the car began to accelerate rapidly and slammed into a light pole. The children received serious injuries. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued Ford Motor Company, claiming that the Taurus's seat belt system caused their enhanced injuries. After evidence was presented showing the children's father placed the girl's seatbelt behind her back, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Ford. At issue on appeal was the product alteration or modification defense provided to manufacturers and sellers in products liability actions by N.C. Gen. Stat. 99-B-3. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to a directed verdict on Ford's affirmative defense under section 99B-3, reasoning that section 99B-3 gives a manufacturer or seller no defense when the product modifier is not a party to the action at the time of trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the General Assembly did not limit the use of this defense to those occasions when the one who alters or modifies the product is a party to the action at the time of trial. Remanded.View "Stark v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Kenneth Schwering and his wife were driving a Ford when they were involved in a traffic accident. Schwering's wife was killed and Schwering was injured. Both were wearing their seatbelts. Schwering filed a complaint against Ford Motor Company and TRW Safety Systems, asserting products-liability and negligence claims. After the case proceeded to a jury trial, the trial judge declared a mistrial. Before the second trial began, Schwering filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 41(A)(1)(a). Schwering subsequently filed a lawsuit in the U.S. district court, asserting the same claims against the same defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss the federal action, arguing that Schwering's voluntary dismissal of the state action did not occur "before the commencement of trial" as required by Rule Civ. R. 41(A)(1)(a), and thus the dismissal could not have been "without prejudice." The Supreme Court accepted certification from the U.S. district court and held that a plaintiff may not voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(A)(1)(a) when a trial court declares a mistrial after the jury has been empaneled and trial has commenced.View "Schwering v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a medical-device product liability action in which a strict liability, design-defect theory was asserted. Given that the surgical instrument at issue was said to have multiple applications, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the trial court's threshold risk-utility analysis should have been limited to the particular one alleged to have caused the decedent harm. Additionally, the appeal was allowed to consider the degree to which an appellate court is bound by such weight and credibility determinations as may be made by a trial court in a risk-utility assessment. The decedent Sandra Selepec, underwent gastric bypass surgery in August 2002. The surgeon used a product manufactured by Appellee Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. known as an ETS-Flex45 Articulating Endoscopic Linear Cutter, or an "endocutter." Appellee also marketed its product as being useful in more traditional surgery, in which larger incisions are made to expose organs to open view and accessibility. Mrs. Selepec's surgery was of this latter kind. During recovery, Mrs. Selepec experienced complications, and surgeons reentered her abdomen to discover that two of the bypass staples failed. On the merits, Appellee argued that courts applying the risk-utility analysis have always considered the risks, benefits, and design constraints associated with all intended uses of a product; to artificially limit the risk utility analysis to the particular use to which a plaintiff put a product in a particular case would be to ignore the inherent, essential characteristics that informed the design; and to hold multi-use products to the same standard as single-use products would be tantamount to requiring the sale of multiple single-use products, which would be inefficient and impractical, if not impossible. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that trial courts are not restricted to considering a single use of a multiuse product in design defect, threshold, risk-utility balancing. The Court also declined to disturb the Superior Court's legal determination as to the appropriate risk-utility calculus.View "Beard v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this product liability/breach of warranty case was whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the defendants' motion to transfer venue when the plaintiff sued in the county where the product was located when the alleged defects first appeared and not where the product was purchased or repaired. Finding that the general venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a) (Rev. 2004), requires that the case be brought in the county where the product was purchased and/or repaired, the Court reversed and remanded the case for transfer to the proper venue. View "Laurel Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Blakeney" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jacklyn and Donald McMahon sued Defendants Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A.; Yamaha Motor Manufacturing Corporation of America; Yamaha Motor Co., LTD. ("the Yamaha defendants"); and Montgomery Outdoor Power Products, Inc., d/b/a Montgomery Yamaha-Honda. They asserted a products-liability claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD"), as well as negligence, wantonness, breach-of-warranty, and loss-of-consortium claims. Jacklyn was injured in July 2007 when the 2007 Yamaha Rhino 660, a two-passenger off-road utility vehicle that the McMahons had purchased from Montgomery Yamaha-Honda, rolled over while she was driving it, resulting in injuries to her arms and legs when she extended them out of the vehicle in an attempt to support herself and/or the vehicle during the rollover. At the close of evidence, the McMahons withdrew their breach-of-warranty claim and the Yamaha defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the remaining claims. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Yamaha defendants, the McMahons appealed the judgment on the negligence and wantonness claims. Upon further review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found that the McMahons produced substantial evidence to support their wantonness claim and that the trial court accordingly erred by entering a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Yamaha defendants on that claim. However, any error the trial court may have committed in entering a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Yamaha defendants on the McMahons' negligence claim was harmless because the jury's verdict on their AEMLD claim established that their negligence claim would have been unsuccessful. View "McMahon v. Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A., et al. " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Plaintiff Kaime Kendall's lawsuit against the developers and marketers of the prescription drug Accutane, Hoffman-LaRoche, was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff was first prescribed Accutane in January 1997, when she was twelve years old. By that time, the information provided to physicians began to warn of a possible link between Accutane and irritable bowel syndrome (IBD). The information provided to patients warned to stop taking the drug and consult a doctor if stomach pain, diarrhea and rectal bleeding occurred. In 1998 and 2000, the physician warnings were strengthened with regard to IBD. When Plaintiff was first prescribed Accutane, her doctor did not mention the risk of IBD because he was not aware of it. In 1999 at a period in which Plaintiff had stopped taking Accutane, she was hospitalized for abdominal pain later diagnosed as ulcerative colitis. Plaintiff filed suit against the company in 2005, alleging that Hoffman-LaRoche was liable because the warnings were inadequate. The Company moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that the statute of limitations had expired. The trial court noted that at the time Plaintiff began taking Accutane, warnings focused primarily on preventing pregnancy and suicide. The judged then concluded that by December 2003, Plainitff did not know her ulcerative colitis would be caused by Accutane, and that a reasonable person in her circumstances would not have known either. Hoffman-LaRoche appealed the jury verdict in Plaintiff's favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because a reasonable person in Plaintiff's situation would not have known by 2003 of the relationship between Accutane and ulcerative colitis, her lawsuit against the drugmaker was timely.View "Kendall v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc." on Justia Law