Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this product liability/breach of warranty case was whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the defendants' motion to transfer venue when the plaintiff sued in the county where the product was located when the alleged defects first appeared and not where the product was purchased or repaired. Finding that the general venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a) (Rev. 2004), requires that the case be brought in the county where the product was purchased and/or repaired, the Court reversed and remanded the case for transfer to the proper venue. View "Laurel Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Blakeney" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jacklyn and Donald McMahon sued Defendants Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A.; Yamaha Motor Manufacturing Corporation of America; Yamaha Motor Co., LTD. ("the Yamaha defendants"); and Montgomery Outdoor Power Products, Inc., d/b/a Montgomery Yamaha-Honda. They asserted a products-liability claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD"), as well as negligence, wantonness, breach-of-warranty, and loss-of-consortium claims. Jacklyn was injured in July 2007 when the 2007 Yamaha Rhino 660, a two-passenger off-road utility vehicle that the McMahons had purchased from Montgomery Yamaha-Honda, rolled over while she was driving it, resulting in injuries to her arms and legs when she extended them out of the vehicle in an attempt to support herself and/or the vehicle during the rollover. At the close of evidence, the McMahons withdrew their breach-of-warranty claim and the Yamaha defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the remaining claims. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Yamaha defendants, the McMahons appealed the judgment on the negligence and wantonness claims. Upon further review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found that the McMahons produced substantial evidence to support their wantonness claim and that the trial court accordingly erred by entering a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Yamaha defendants on that claim. However, any error the trial court may have committed in entering a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Yamaha defendants on the McMahons' negligence claim was harmless because the jury's verdict on their AEMLD claim established that their negligence claim would have been unsuccessful. View "McMahon v. Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A., et al. " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Plaintiff Kaime Kendall's lawsuit against the developers and marketers of the prescription drug Accutane, Hoffman-LaRoche, was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff was first prescribed Accutane in January 1997, when she was twelve years old. By that time, the information provided to physicians began to warn of a possible link between Accutane and irritable bowel syndrome (IBD). The information provided to patients warned to stop taking the drug and consult a doctor if stomach pain, diarrhea and rectal bleeding occurred. In 1998 and 2000, the physician warnings were strengthened with regard to IBD. When Plaintiff was first prescribed Accutane, her doctor did not mention the risk of IBD because he was not aware of it. In 1999 at a period in which Plaintiff had stopped taking Accutane, she was hospitalized for abdominal pain later diagnosed as ulcerative colitis. Plaintiff filed suit against the company in 2005, alleging that Hoffman-LaRoche was liable because the warnings were inadequate. The Company moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that the statute of limitations had expired. The trial court noted that at the time Plaintiff began taking Accutane, warnings focused primarily on preventing pregnancy and suicide. The judged then concluded that by December 2003, Plainitff did not know her ulcerative colitis would be caused by Accutane, and that a reasonable person in her circumstances would not have known either. Hoffman-LaRoche appealed the jury verdict in Plaintiff's favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because a reasonable person in Plaintiff's situation would not have known by 2003 of the relationship between Accutane and ulcerative colitis, her lawsuit against the drugmaker was timely.View "Kendall v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the Supreme Court considered whether the "separate disease" rule (also referred to as the "two-disease" rule) allows an individual to bring separate lawsuits for more than one malignant disease which allegedly resulted from the same asbestos exposure. The matter arose from Appellee Herbert Daley's 1989 diagnosis of pulmonary asbestosis and squamous-cell carcinoma in his right lung. He filed suit against several defendants seeking compensatory damages for work-related injuries and settled. In 2005, Appellee filed suit against US Supply, Duro-Dyne and A.W. Chesterson alleging that a late diagnosis of mesothelioma was caused by the same exposure that resulted in his lung cancer. The companies argued that Pennsylvania had not adopted the two-disease rule, and that his mesothelioma diagnosis was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review, the Court concluded that the rule did apply, and, accordingly, the Court affirmed an order of the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Supply Co. and Duro-Dyne Corp.View "Daley v. A.W. Chesterton" on Justia Law

In 2009, Plaintiff Charles McGraw filed a personal-injury action against four sand suppliers: Clark Sand Company, Inc.; Mississippi Valley Silica Co. Inc.; Precision Packaging, Inc.; and Custom Aggregates and Grinding, Inc. Plaintiff alleged the four defendants’ sand caused his lung disease. On the day of the trial, after the jury heard the parties’ opening statements, the court recessed, and the parties reached a settlement agreement. A few months later, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add his wife as a plaintiff and to add additional defendants. In early 2010, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s amended motion and allowed him to add the five new defendants to the complaint. However, shortly after the court granted his leave to amend, Plaintiff added a sixth defendant without the court’s permission. All six defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal concerning the trial court’s order that denied the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint and Dismiss First Amended Complaint. The defendants argued that, because the original parties settled with Plaintiff prior to his motions for leave to amend, the trial court improperly allowed the filing of the First Amended Complaint to add new parties. The defendants also argued that because Plaintiff did not seek court approval in filing his Second Amended Complaint, that complaint should be struck. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Plaintiff to file his Second Amended Complaint, because he was required to obtain court approval. However, the trial court did comply with procedural rules when it allowed Plaintiff to file his First Amended Complaint, because McGraw filed his motion before all of the original parties were dismissed with prejudice. View "Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. McGraw" on Justia Law

Defendants, makers of valves and pumps, were sued for a wrongful death allegedly caused by asbestos released from external insulation and internal gaskets and packing, all of which were made by third parties and added to the pumps and valves post sale. This case involved the limits of a manufacturer's duty to prevent foreseeable harm related to its product. At issue was when was a product manufacturer liable for injuries caused by adjacent products or replacement parts that were made by others and used in conjunction with defendant's product. The court held that a product manufacturer could not be held liable in strict liability or negligence for harm caused by another manufacturer's product unless defendant's own product contributed substantially to the harm, or defendant participated substantially in creating a harmful combined use of the products. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment of nonsuit in favor of defendants.View "O'Neil, et al. v. Crane Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product liability claims against Appellants, manufacturers of an anethestic drug that may have exposed patients to serious diseases. Before the beginning of the trial, Appellants filed a motion to change venue from Clark County to Washoe County, arguing that the adverse pretrial publicity reasonably prevented Appellants from receiving a fair trial in Clark County. The district court concluded that a change of venue was not warranted at that time and reserved ruling on the motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made. After the jury was empaneled, Appellants renewed their motion for a change of venue, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court must apply a multifactor test to determine whether there is a reason to believe that the party seeking a change of venue will not receive a fair trial in the community where the case originated; and (2) because Appellants did not demonstrate that the circumstances in this case presented a reasonable belief that a fair trial could not be had in Clark County, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' motion for a change of venue.View "Sicor, Inc. v. Hutchison" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product liability claims against Appellants, manufacturers of an anethestic drug that may have exposed patients to serious diseases. Before the beginning of the trial, Appellants filed a motion to change venue from Clark County to Washoe County, arguing that the adverse pretrial publicity reasonably prevented Appellants from receiving a fair trial in Clark County. The district court concluded that a change of venue was not warranted at that time and reserved ruling on the motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal because the district court had not issued a final ruling on the change of venue motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court order deferring a final ruling on a change of venue motion based on adverse pretrial publicity until after jury selection begins does not finally decide the motion; and (2) because the court did not finally rule on the motion in this case, the matter was not ripe for appeal.View "Sicor, Inc. v. Sacks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who had purchased a truck from an automobile dealership, filed a products liability suit in 2007 against the manufacturer and the dealership, as Seller. Later, Plaintiff entered a voluntary nonsuit as to Seller and proceeded only against the manufacturer. Over one year later, the manufacturer declared bankruptcy. In 2009, Plaintiff again sued Seller, alleging negligence and strict liability in tort. Seller filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals denied the appeal. The Supreme Court granted Seller's application for permission to consider the application of the saving statute to the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff could proceed under the strict liability claim because that cause of action did not accrue until the manufacturer was judicially declared insolvent; and (2) because the second suit alleged acts of negligence on the part of Seller, an exception to the statutory rule prohibiting products liability suits against sellers, and could have been brought in 2007, the statute of limitations was a bar to recovery under that theory. Remanded for trial.View "Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Kia Motors America, Inc. unsuccessfully defended a class action lawsuit for breach of express warranty. It appealed a superior court's decision to affirm certification of the class by the trial court, and the amount of damages and litigation costs awarded to the class. Costs included a significant legal fee, entered pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act (MMWA). Appellee Shamell Samuel-Bassett, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated filed this class action lawsuit in January 2001, alleging that her Kia had an unsafe manufacturing defect in the braking system. In 2005, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the class for breach of express warranty, and awarded damages in the amount of $600 per class member. The court molded the verdict to account for the 9,402 class members to which the parties had stipulated and recorded a $5.6 million verdict. Represented by new counsel, Kia filed an unsuccessful post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the class was properly certified; (2) whether evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict and whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (3) whether the jury’s verdict was properly molded to account for the 9,402 members of the class; (4) whether the trial court had authority to award attorneys’ fees after Bassett entered judgment on the class verdict; and (5) whether the risk multiplier was properly applied to an award of counsel fees under the MMWA. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the trial court's decision. The Court reversed the trial court to the extent that its order provided for enhancement of the attorneys' fees award beyond the amount permitted in the MMWA.View "Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law