Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

This case returns to the Supreme Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court (USSC) for reconsideration in light of its decision in "Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.," (131 S.Ct. 1311 (2011)). In the South Carolina Court's previous decision, it concluded Appellant's state-law products liability claims against Ford Motor Company were preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") 205. The Court reaffirmed its previous decision. Appellant filed a products liability claim against Respondent Ford Motor Company premised on the allegation that its 1997 Ford F-150 pick-up truck was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it did not incorporate laminated glass in the vehicle's side and rear windows. In connection with implied conflict preemption, "Williamson" revisited the Supreme Court's decision in "Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.," (529 U.S. 861 (2000)). "We construe the key language in Williamson to hold that manufacturer choice among alternatives operates to preempt a state law claim only where the state law stands as an obstacle to a significant federal regulatory objective. Similarly, our previous decision was not based upon the notion that the mere presence of manufacturer choices in FMVSS 205 preempted Appellant's state tort suit. We adhere to the view that the manifest purpose of the federal regulatory scheme underlying FMVSS 205 would be frustrated if these state claims were allowed to proceed. Assuming implied conflict preemption remains a viable part of preemption, we believe it applies here to preclude Appellant's state law claims." View "Priester v. Cromer" on Justia Law

Appellant and Appellee jointly petitioned the Supreme Court for rehearing following the dismissal of Appellant's appeal without prejudice due to lack of a final order. In the dismissal, the Supreme Court denied Appellee's motion to nonsuit her claims against another defendant because no order dismissing the defendant from the case was entered. In their petition, Petitioners contended that, pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 3, the order in the appeal was final because they abandoned any pending but unresolved claim in their notices of appeal and cross-appeal. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) Rule 3 requires appellants and cross-appellants to abandon pending and unresolved claims, but it does not permit appellants and cross-appellants to dispose of parties in the same fashion; and (2) in this case, the voluntary nonsuit was effective only upon entry of court order dismissing the action.View "Ford Motor Co. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendant Ford Motor Company appealed from the judgment of the circuit court reflecting the jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages in favor of Plaintiff, individually and as administratrix of her husband's estate, and as parent and legal guardian of the couple's child. Plaintiff's action arose out of an automobile accident that killed her husband. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ford, the manufacturer of the automobile the couple was driving, and Freeway Ford Lincoln Mercury, the dealer that sold the vehicle. At trial, Plaintiff moved to nonsuit her claims against Freeway. Although the circuit court granted the motion orally, no written order to that effect was in the record. Because no order dismissing Freeway from the case was entered, there was no final judgment as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice because the failure to comply with Rule 54(b) deprived the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.View "Ford Motor Co. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jamie and Rebecca Gannon, maintained that plaintiff Jamie Gannon developed a form of brain cancer because of a series of polio vaccines he was given as a child. Plaintiffs pursued various forms of relief in both federal and state courts. In the federal court action, they sought relief from the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, contending that the federal government was negligent in permitting the polio vaccine to be sold to the public. Plaintiffs' federal action was dismissed following a partial bench trial, based on the government's motion for judgment on partial findings, and that judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Proceeding on a parallel track, plaintiffs sought relief in New Jersey state courts. In the state court action, they raised product liability claims against defendants American Home Products, Inc., American Cyanamid Company, Lederle Laboratories, and Wyeth-Lederle Vaccines, which they asserted were the entities that had manufactured or distributed the polio vaccine given to plaintiff Jamie Gannon. In the state court litigation, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on two grounds: (1) the trial court concluded that plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence to prove the identity of the manufacturer of the polio vaccine that plaintiff Jamie Gannon was given; (2) the trial court concluded that plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from bringing the cause of action based on the prior judgment entered in federal court. The Appellate Division reversed both aspects of the trial court's judgment and remanded the matter for further discovery and for trial. The panel first concluded that the trial court had utilized an incorrect standard in evaluating the sufficiency of the product identification evidence because it failed to afford plaintiffs the benefit of the inferences to which they were entitled as the non-moving parties in the context of a summary judgment motion. The panel then concluded that there were equitable considerations that militated against granting collateral estoppel effect to the judgment of the federal court, including the status of discovery in the state court matter and the pendency of similar state court litigation involving other plaintiffs. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Appellate Division’s collateral estoppel analysis was in error, the Court reversed. View "Gannon v. American Products, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, Billie Cornett received a drug-eluting stent to treat coronary artery disease. Five months later, a blood clot formed near the site of the stent and Cornett suffered a subacute stent thrombosis. Eleven days later, he died. In 2008, his widow, Vonnie Cornett, filed suit in New Jersey seeking damages for the injuries suffered by her husband and his estate. The issue presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether Vonnie Cornett filed her complaint within the statute of limitations, which required the New Jersey Court to determine whether the law of Kentucky or New Jersey applied to this case. The stent used in this case is a Class III medical device that was subject to the rigorous pre-market approval (PMA) process of the Food & Drug Administration (FDA). Therefore, another issue for the Court to decide was whether the various state statutory and common law claims are preempted by federal law governing approval of this medical device. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Kentucky statute of limitations governed this case and that Kentucky applies a discovery rule to product liability actions involving latent injuries and illnesses, but Cornett did not timely file her complaint. The Court also concluded that the great bulk of the state statutory and common law claims were preempted by federal law. View "Vonnie Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

India Graves, a six-month-old girl, died while being monitored by one of CAS Medical Systems' products. India's parents, Kareem and Tara Graves, subsequently filed a products liability lawsuit against CAS, contending the monitor was defectively designed and failed to alert them when India's heart rate and breathing slowed. The circuit court granted CAS's motion to exclude all of the Graves' expert witnesses and accordingly granted CAS summary judgment. The Graves appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of the Graves' computer experts. While the court did err in excluding one doctor's testimony, the Graves were still left with no expert opinions regarding any defects in the monitor. In the absence of this evidence, CAS was entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly the Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Graves v. CAS Medical Systems" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured at work, filed a product liability complaint, identifying himself as “Juan Ortiz,” the name he used at work. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, naming additional defendants, identifying himself as “Juan Ortiz.” Plaintiff identified himself as “Juan Ortiz” in discovery documents. In a deposition, plaintiff stated that his birth name was “Rogasciano Santiago,” but that he had also used the name “Juan Ortiz.” The trial court allowed a second amended complaint to identify plaintiff as “Rogasciano Santiago, f/k/a Juan Ortiz.” The appellate court held that, when a plaintiff intentionally files a complaint using a fictitious name, without leave of court pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-401, the court may dismiss with prejudice and that amendment, after expiration of the limitations period, to correct plaintiff’s name, requires dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A court has discretion to dismiss with prejudice a complaint filed using a fictitious name without leave of court. Dismissal is justified only when there is a clear record of willful conduct showing deliberate and continuing disregard for judicial authority and a finding that lesser sanctions are inadequate to remedy harm to the judiciary and prejudice to the opposing party. The original complaint is not a nullity, per se, and an amended complaint correcting the name may relate back to initial filing. View "Santiago v. E.W. Bliss Co." on Justia Law

Parents of a young man killed in a helicopter accident in British Columbia appealed an Indiana trial court's dismissal of their complaint in favor of the Canadian forum, arguing that their claim should be tried in Indiana because they would only be entitled to nominal damages under British Columbia law. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment after adopting the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, holding that British Columbia provided an available and adequate forum under applicable law, and the trial court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens.View "Otieno v. Rolls-Royce Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a products liability action brought by Jesus Hurtado and John Reitsma, d/b/a J & J Calf Ranch (J & J), against Land O'Lakes, Inc. (Land O'Lakes). J & J alleged that the Land O'Lakes milk replacer it used to feed its dairy calves was defective and caused the death of more than one hundred calves. A jury found in favor of J & J and awarded damages. Land O'Lakes appealed, arguing that the district court improperly admitted expert testimony and that J & J failed to prove both liability and damages. Land O'Lakes petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate the judgment of the district court and enter judgment in its favor or, alternatively, to vacate the judgment and order a new trial. J & J cross-appealed the district court's award of attorney fees, arguing that the court abused its discretion by excluding fees incurred before and during previous litigation in this matter. J & J petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate the award of attorney fees and remand with instructions to include attorney fees accrued in the first trial in its calculation of reasonable attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Land O'Lakes waived issues regarding expert testimony. The Court affirmed the jury verdict because it was supported by substantial competent evidence and affirmed the district court's award of attorney fees because it properly exercised its discretion. View "Jesus Hurtado v. Land O' Lakes, Inc." on Justia Law

The Estate of Stanley Pinkham appealed a superior court judgment granting Cargill, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment on the Estate’s complaint. In 2004, Mr. Pinkham consumed a boneless turkey sandwich that contained a piece of bone. The turkey was "manufactured" by Cargill, Inc. The bone caused an esophageal tear requiring surgery (Mr. Pinkham died several years later after sustaining his injury. He did not sue for wrongful death). Three affidavits that the Estate relied on to defeat Cargill's motion for summary judgment were held inadmissible at trial. After consideration, the trial court granted Cargill's motion noting that Maine had not established the requisite test to use when evaluating a strict liability claim for allegedly defective food pursuant to its strict liability statute. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Estate argued that it provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, thereby rendering summary judgment inappropriate. The Estate further argued that the court erred in concluding that the Estate failed to meet its burden of proof to establish facts from which a fact-finder could infer that Cargill’s boneless turkey product was defective. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that summary judgment was not proper given the facts presented in this case, and vacated the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Stanley Pinkham v. Cargill, Inc." on Justia Law