Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

In 2010, P&G began marketing Pampers disposable diapers with “Dry Max technology.” Two months later, the Consumer Product Safety Commission began investigating whether the diapers caused severe diaper rash. The district court consolidated several law suits. In August 2010, the CPSC and Health Canada released reports, finding no connection between the diapers and diaper rash. Despite a pending motion to dismiss and before any formal discovery, the parties reached a settlement agreement, under which they agreed to seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(2), so that absent class members could not opt out. P&G agreed: to reinstate a refund program; to add to its label a sentence suggesting that consumers consult Pampers.com or call; to add basic diaper rash information to its website; and to contribute $300,000 to a pediatric resident training program and $100,000 to fund a program “in the area of skin health.” Named plaintiffs would release all of their Pampers-related claims and receive $1000 “per affected child.” Unnamed class members would not receive any award, would benefit only from the one-box refund, but would release “equitable” claims against P&G, and be permanently barred from future class actions against P&G. Class counsel would receive $2.73 million. The district court certified the class. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the per-child payments provided a disincentive for named plaintiffs to care about the adequacy of relief afforded unnamed class members. View "Greenberg v. Procter & Gamble Co." on Justia Law

PETCO sought a declaration that ICNA had to defend and indemnify PETCO in an underlying litigation with Medtronic. Medtronic sued PETCO after an aquarium heater it had purchased from PETCO malfunctioned and started a fire at a Medtronic plant. The district court granted ICNA's motion for summary judgment and PETCO appealed. At issue was whether the aquarium heater satisfied a condition precedent to coverage under the policy. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the ground that PETCO failed to identify any mandatory or voluntary safety standard with which the heater complied.View "PETCO Animal Supplies Stores, et al. v. Ins. Co. of North America" on Justia Law

Elliot, which provides construction and maintenance services, owns and leases bucket trucks. In 1996, Elliot entered into a lease with TECO, a manufacturer of such trucks, agreeing agreed to hold TECO harmless from liability arising from injuries resulting from use, operation, or transportation of the vehicle or its location or condition. In 2000, Large was injured while operating a truck, which his employer, Elliot, had leased from TECO. Large sued TECO. TECO’s successor in interest (Mobile) filed a third-party complaint against Elliot, seeking defense and indemnification pursuant to the lease. Mobile later settled with Large without Elliot’s participation, leaving the third-party complaint against Elliot as the only outstanding issue. After a change in Virginia law, Mobile again moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, holding Elliot responsible to defend and indemnify Mobile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Elliot’s argument that a later invoice superseded the terms of the lease, eliminating Elliot’s duty to defend and indemnify except in the case that Elliot violated obligations under the invoice by failing to either adequately train Large in the use of the truck or to provide him with copies of the truck’s operation and maintenance manuals. View "Large v. Mobile Tool Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved long-running multidistrict litigation concerning contamination of groundwater by the organic compound MTBE, which was used as a gasoline additive by Exxon and others. The court concluded that the state law tort verdict against Exxon was not preempted by the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401; the jury's finding that the MTBE levels in Station Six Wells will peak at 10ppb in 2033 was not inconsistent with a conclusion that the City had been injured; the City's suit was ripe because the City demonstrated a present injury and the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations; the jury's verdict finding Exxon liable under state tort law theories was not precluded by the jury's concurrent conclusion that the City had not carried its burden, in the design-defect context, of demonstrating a feasible, cost-reasonable alternative to MTBE available to satisfy the standards of the now-repealed Reformulated Gasoline Program; Exxon's demand for a retrial because of an incident of juror misconduct was unavailing; the jury properly offset the gross damages award by amounts it reasonably attributed to cleanup of contaminants other than MTBE; and the City was not entitled to a jury determination of Exxon's liability for punitive damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety.View "In re: MTBE Products Liability Litig." on Justia Law

Tennessee resident Lombard acquired a 1997 Lincoln Town Car in 2004. The car was partially manufactured, and its final assembly completed, in 1996 at Ford’s Wixom, Michigan plant. In March 2007, the Lincoln, which was licensed, registered, and insured in Tennessee, allegedly caught fire in Lombard’s driveway, causing damage to the car, Lombard’s residence, and personal property. Lombard’s insurers reimbursed Lombard for his losses and, as subrogees, sued Ford, asserting products liability, breach of warranty and negligence claims, alleging that the fire was due to a defective cruise control system. The district court dismissed, finding that Tennessee law governed and that Tennessee’s statute of repose for products liability actions bars the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, after examining Michigan choice of law rules. The conclusion that Michigan’s interests do not “mandate” that Michigan law be applied despite Tennessee’s interests was not erroneous.View "Std. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In this product liability suit against the manufacturers of the prescription drug Reglan and its generic equivalent (metoclopramide), plaintiff appealed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment to Brand Defendants and its dismissal of her claims with prejudice against Generic Defendants. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Brand Defendants where plaintiff's claims were not viable under Arkansas law because she stipulated that she never used Reglan manufactured or distributed by any of the Brand Defendants. In regards to the claims against the Generic Defendants, the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's non-warning breach of implied warranty claims and remanded for further consideration as to whether they adequately stated viable claims under Arkansas law and if so, whether the Generic Defendants could nonetheless establish preemption. It was not immediately clear whether Arkansas offered generic drug manufacturers an opportunity, consistent with federal obligations to somehow alter an otherwise unreasonably dangerous drug. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's failure to warn and failure to update claims; reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's non-warning design defect and breach of implied warrant claims; and remanded for further proceedings.View "Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when nineteen plaintiff families sought to file a single complaint, raising products liability and negligence claims against the Pharmaceutical Companies. On appeal, the Pharmaceutical Companies challenged the district court's decision to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to the Circuit Court of Wayne County, West Virginia. The court concluded that it did not have the authority to review the remand order because the Pharmaceutical Companies have failed to establish that an exception should apply here, and because the plain language of 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) barred the court's review of the case.View "E.D. v. Pfizer, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Brink, and others, claiming that he was raped while in jail when he was nineteen years old and that the rape occurred as a result of ineffective locks on cell doors. Brink argued on interlocutory appeal that the district court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations began running against plaintiff at the moment the torts occurred. The court concluded that the Mississippi Code clearly distinguished between the concepts of emancipation and the disability of infancy, as well as the implications of each, and Mississippi cases did not illustrate an intent to deviate from this clear distinction. Therefore, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against plaintiff until he reached the age of majority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Baker v. RR Brink Locking Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

This is a products liability case arising from the sale of allegedly defective drywall from a Chinese manufacturer, TG, through a Virginia distributor, Venture, to plaintiffs. The court applied the Fourth Circuit, three-party inquiry to determine whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction over TG comported with Due Process. The court concluded that TG purposefully availed itself to Virginia; TG's contacts with Virginia formed the basis for this suit; and it was constitutionally reasonable for the district court to have personal jurisdiction over TG. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court had personal jurisdiction over TG with regard to Plaintiff-Intervenors, and all Original Plaintiffs who have met their burden in proving that their claims arose out of TG's contacts with Virginia. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by refusing to vacate the Default Judgment against TG where the district court weighed several relevant factors, including the merit of TG's asserted defense, before concluding that vacatur was unwarranted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In Re: Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liability Litig." on Justia Law

Shirley Gross filed suit against PLIVA after her long-term use of the generic drug metoclopramide, produced by PLIVA, caused her permanent injuries. On appeal, plaintiff, as the personal representative of the estate of Gross, challenged the district court's denial of Gross's request to amend her complaint and her state common law tort claims against PLIVA for injuries sustained as a result of her use of a drug it manufactured. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's denial of leave to amend and held that none of plaintiff's claims regarding PLIVA's alleged failure to update its warnings were before the court on appeal; the court found that the complaint did not allege any violation of the federal misbranding laws or parallel state duties, and to the extent these claims were made on appeal, they were waived; and all of Gross's causes of action were preempted by the FDCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc." on Justia Law