Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

This case arose when 702 plaintiffs from 26 different states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed twelve nearly identical product liability actions against the defendants in the District Court of Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma. The defendants are manufacturers of transvaginal mesh medical devices. The plaintiffs were women who were implanted with the devices and their husbands, who assert loss-of-consortium claims. None of the individual actions contained 100 or more plaintiffs. Each of the actions included at least one New Jersey resident plaintiff. Each complaint specifically disclaimed federal question and federal diversity jurisdiction, and included provisions that admitted the claims had been joined for the purpose of pretrial discovery and proceedings but disclaimed joinder for trial purposes. All twelve actions were assigned to the same state court judge. The defendants, corporate residents of New Jersey, removed the actions to the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, relying on both diversity jurisdiction and Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) removal jurisdiction, arguing that complete diversity existed between the parties because in each action, the New Jersey citizen plaintiff had been fraudulently joined and should therefore be disregarded for diversity purposes. They further contended that jurisdiction was available under CAFA’s "mass action" provision because, by filing all of the suits in the same court before the same judge, plaintiffs had proposed a joint trial of claims involving more than 100 plaintiffs. Plaintiffs moved to remand eleven of the actions, involving 650 plaintiffs, to state court. The district court granted their motion. It declined to adopt the procedural misjoinder doctrine raised by the defendants, and concluded that plaintiffs had not in fact proposed a joint trial of their claims. Defendants appealed that order to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the remand of those cases to state court. View "Teague, et al v. Johnson & Johnson, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Novartis, manufacturer of Zometa, alleging products liability, negligent manufacture, negligent failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranty, and loss of consortium. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court erred by excluding the causation testimony offered by her expert when it found the testimony to be irrelevant and unreliable. The court concluded that the expert's testimony was relevant because it indicated that plaintiff's bisphosphonate use was a substantial factor in her development of bisphosphonate-related osteonecrosis of the jaw. The court also concluded that the expert's testimony was reliable where he used a differential diagnosis grounded in significant clinical experience and examination of medical records and literature. Accordingly, the court concluded that the expert's testimony created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the specific causal link between plaintiff's bisphosphonates treatment and her development of osteonecrosis of the jaw. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Novartis and remanded. View "Messick v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the city and several police officers after her son was shot in the chest with an electronic control device (ECD). After the case settled, plaintiff filed suit against TASER for products liability and negligence. The court concluded that plaintiff's failure to warn claim failed as a matter of law because she did not establish on the record that an additional warning would have changed the behavior of the officers involved; the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding plaintiff's expert's testimony on the issue of whether a different or additional warning would have altered the officer's actions under the existing circumstances; even if the court were to conclude that there was a legitimate jury question as to whether the officer had been made aware of the specific risk of cardiac danger when the ECD was fired directly at the subject's chest, such a conclusion would be rebuttable by undisputed evidence in the record that he had not been instructed on available warnings and did not heed the limited training he had received; there was no genuine dispute on the record that the officer would not have read any additional warning TASER may have added as to the cardiac danger of the ECD in any of its product warnings or bulletins, or in any training materials prepared after January 1, 2005; even if an adequate warning had appeared, the officer would not have heeded it; and therefore, TASER was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's negligence and failure to warn claims where she failed to establish that an additional warning would have altered the behavior of the officer. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to present evidence that the ECD device used by the officer was unreasonably dangerous as designed. Plaintiff's design defect claim failed as a matter of law where plaintiff failed to demonstrate any "specific design choices" that rendered the model unreasonably dangerous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and dismissed plaintiff's remaining claims as moot. View "Bachtel v. TASER Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old Jessica Bowers sustained severe injuries when she was dragged into the rotating driveline of a tractor-driven post hole digger that was operated by her stepfather, who had borrowed the digger from Peter Smith. Smith had previously removed a plastic safety shield from the machine after years of use had left the shield damaged beyond repair. Plaintiff sued the digger’s seller, distributor, manufacturer, component maker, and others, asserting claims sounding in negligence and strict products liability. Defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment based on the substantial modification defense articulated in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Company because Smith made post-sale modifications to the digger that rendered the digger defective and proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Supreme Court denied summary judgment with regard to the design defect claims. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff raised triable issues of fact regarding the defective design of the safety shield that were sufficient to defeat summary judgment based on substantial modification. View "Hoover v. New Holland N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Andrea Ruiz was driving a Kia Spectra when she was involved in an automobile accident in which the driver’s-side frontal air bag failed to deploy. Andrea died from dislocated vertebrae in her neck. The Ruiz family filed a products liability action against Kia Motors Corporation and Kia Motors America, Inc. (collectively, “Kia”), and the trial court entered judgment against Kia. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the presumption of nonliability in Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 82.008 did not apply in this case; (2) the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s design-defect finding; but (3) the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence of other, dissimilar incidents, and the error was harmful. View "Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Saul Morales was fleeing from the police when one of the police officers left his Ford vehicle, then pursued and apprehended Morales. The officer’s vehicle began rolling backward toward the pair while the officer attempted to handcuff Morales. The vehicle ran over and came to rest on top of Morales, injuring him. Morales sued Ford Motor Company and the car’s seller (collectively, “Ford”), alleging that the vehicle had a design defect. After deposing two of Ford’s expert witnesses, Morales sought to depose a corporate representative of each expert’s employer to expose potential bias. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that on the facts of this case, the Rules of Civil Procedure did not permit such discovery. View "In re Ford Motor Co. & Ken Stoepel Ford, Inc." on Justia Law

M.L. was born in 2003. At his 15-month well-child visit, his pediatrician noted that M.L. was walking and generally developing normally but did not “want to talk.” In 2005, M.L. received several immunizations, including the DTaP vaccination. Hours later, M.L. allegedly began experiencing an abnormally high fever and swelling. He was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of “vaccine adverse reaction with secondary fever, angiodema, and anaphylactoid reaction.” The morning after his discharge, M.L.’s mother called an ambulance because M.L. was exhibiting signs of hypothermia and seizure-like episodes. In the months that followed, M.L.’s vocabulary allegedly decreased. An MRI of M.L.’s brain with and without contrast was normal. After observing M.L.’s developmental delays and repetitive behaviors, a pediatric neurologist placed M.L. in the autism spectrum disorder category. A special master rejected claims under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to -34, and the Claims Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. While the DTaP vaccination likely caused the initial anaphylactic reaction, there was no reliable medical theory that the M.L.’s anaphylaxis caused a focal brain injury. View "LaLonde v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Decedent's family (the Kings) sued Toyota and the local Toyota dealership after Decedent lost control of his Toyota, which rolled over several times. The Kings asserted that the Toyota's allegedly defective seat belt system caused Decedent's ejection from the car and his subsequent death. The jury returned a verdict in Toyota's favor, and the trial court signed a corresponding judgment. The Kings moved for a new trial, alleging that Toyota's counsel had violated the trial court's limine rulings. The trial court granted the Kings' motion. Toyota subsequently filed an original proceeding in the Supreme Court. At issue was whether an appellate court may, in an original proceeding, determine whether the reasonably specific and legally sound rationale of the trial court for ordering a new trial was actually true. The Court conditionally granted relief, holding (1) an appellate court may conduct a merits review of the basis for a new trial order after a trial court has set aside a jury verdict, and if the record does not support the trial court's rationale for ordering a new trial, the appellate court may grant mandamus relief; and (2) in this case, the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial. View "In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Susan and Steven Schrock filed suit against manufacturers of the drug metoclopramide, alleging that Susan's use of the generic drug caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia. In a series of orders, the district court dismissed all claims in favor of the manufacturer. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the dismissal of their claims against PLIVA USA, Inc., Qualitest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Schwarz Pharma, Inc., and Wyeth, Inc. The Tenth Circuit abated this appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in "Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett" (133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013)). In light of "Bartlett," the Tenth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' breach-of-warranty claims against PLIVA and Qualitest were preempted by federal law. The Court also agreed with the district court that plaintiffs' non-warranty claims against the generic manufacturers were barred by Oklahoma’s two year statute of limitations. With respect to the plaintiffs' claims against Schwarz and Wyeth, the Court agreed with the district court’s determination that Oklahoma tort law would not provide a remedy. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs' notice of appeal was untimely as to certain orders they sought to appeal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court.View "Schrock, et al v. Wyeth Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Billie Jo Major sued Security Equipment Corporation (SEC) alleging that the company failed to provide adequate warning to her employer, the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC), on the risks of its oleoresin capsicum pepper spray. Plaintiff alleged that the use of the spray in a training exercise worsened existing bronchial difficulties and caused her permanent injury. The district court granted partial summary judgment to SEC on the grounds that plaintiff failed to create a material issue of fact on whether her injuries were a known or foreseeable risk prior to March 2008 (the date of sale to IDOC). In a motion to reconsider, plaintiff submitted a second affidavit from her expert which was declared a sham affidavit by the district court in its denial of the motion. The district court later granted summary judgment to SEC on the sole remaining issue, the viability of plaintiff's claim under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA). Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the district court, vacated its judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Major v. Security Eq Corp" on Justia Law