Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

In early June of 2007, Karrin Massey consumed at least one, but perhaps several, poultry pot pies that were manufactured by ConAgra Food, Inc. and sold under the Banquet brand name. Soon after, Karrin, who was six months pregnant at the time, developed salmonellosis. After an outbreak of salmonella was linked to Banquet pot pies, it was discovered that Karrin's strain of salmonella matched the strain of salmonella found in the contaminated pot pies. Karrin, her husband, Mark Massey, and their daughter Emma filed suit against ConAgra, alleging claims of product liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. The district court eventually granted ConAgra's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Masseys had failed to establish the pot pies in question were defective. The Masseys filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The Masseys then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred: (1) in determining that the Masseys failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the pot pies were defective; (2) in granting summary judgment on the issue of negligence; (3) in concluding the Masseys waived their right to challenge the district court's denial of their motion to reconsider; and (4) in finding that the Masseys' failure to warn claim was not adequately pleaded. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Massey v. Conagra Foods" on Justia Law

Petitioner 5 Star, Inc. is a lawn maintenance and pressure washing company owned by Stan Shelby. In February 2005, 5 Star purchased a used 1996 Ford F-250 pickup truck. Several months later, Shelby parked the truck for the weekend in 5 Star's North Charleston warehouse. Two days later, Shelby returned to the warehouse and discovered that a fire had occurred. The truck was destroyed, and the warehouse was severely damaged. The Chief Fire Investigator for the North Charleston Fire Department, performed an investigation and observed that the truck was located in the middle of the warehouse, where the most extensive damage occurred. The Chief noted the engine compartment of the truck was the likely origin of the fire. 5 Star filed a products liability action against Ford Motor Co. for negligent design of the speed control deactivation switch (deactivation switch), seeking actual and punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed a jury verdict awarding $41,000 in actual damages in a negligent design products liability action based on the failure of the trial court to grant a directed verdict. The trial court qualified petitioner-expert Leonard Greene as an expert in electrical engineering and fire origin and cause. The court of appeals, however, found that Greene was not "qualified as an expert in automotive design or any other area of expertise that would enable [him] to offer opinions as to whether Ford's conduct was negligent." 5 Star claimed that the court of appeals erred and that Greene's extensive qualifications in electrical engineering related to automobiles were sufficient to enable him to testify regarding Ford's exercise of due care. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "5 Star v. Ford Motor" on Justia Law

Schwarz Pharma Inc. was sued in seven individual actions by Plaintiffs, who filed suit in the St. Louis city court. Schwarz filed a motion to transfer venue in these seven individual actions under Mo. R. Civ. P. 51.045. The trial court ruled that the motions were untimely because they were not filed within the sixty-day period after Schwarz was served. Schwarz wrought writs of prohibition in the court of appeals, which denied relief. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that Schwarz’s motions to transfer venue were untimely; (2) Schwarz’s timely filed motions demonstrated that venue was improper in St. Louis city; and (3) therefore, the trial court was required to sustain the timely filed motions to transfer venue. View "State ex rel. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Judge Dowd" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, guardian ad litem for minor H.T.P., appealed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in this products liability case. Plaintiff alleged that Enfamil, an infant formula, was defective or unreasonably dangerous due to C.sak contamination. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow its experts' testimony under Rule 702. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiff's experts where the methodology employed by the experts was scientifically valid, could properly be applied to the facts of the case and was therefore reliable enough to assist the trier of fact. With the expert testimony proposed, plaintiff has created an issue of fact for a jury on the issue of the specific cause of H.T.P.'s C. sak infection and plaintiff was entitled to attempt to prove his claim for products liability under Minnesota law. Accordingly, the court reversed the orders of the district court excluding the testimony of plaintiff's experts, and granting summary judgment and costs in favor of Mead, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co." on Justia Law

The Administrators of the estates of two individuals killed in a single-engine airplane crash filed wrongful death actions against Honeywell International, Inc., the manufacturer of the plane’s autopilot system, alleging that Honeywell breached of the warranty of merchantability. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Honeywell. The Administrators appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erroneously admitted hearsay statements in testimony regarding an accident investigation report prepared by the Mooney Airplane Company describing its investigation of the crash, and their admission was not harmless error; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting certain opinion testimony and in allowing Honeywell’s counsel to make certain statements during closing argument. View "Harman v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

A 2006 class action against Pella, a window manufacturer, alleged that certain windows had a design defect that allowed water to enter behind exterior aluminum cladding and damage the wooden frame and the house itself. The district judge certified a class for customers who had already replaced or repaired their windows, seeking damages and limited to six states, and another for those who had not, seeking only declaratory relief nationwide. Initially, there was one named plaintiff, Saltzman. His son-in-law, Weiss, was lead class counsel. Weiss is under investigation for multiple improprieties. The Seventh Circuit upheld the certifications. Class counsel negotiated a settlement in 2011 that directed Pella to pay $11 million in attorneys’ fees based on an assertion that the settlement was worth $90 million to the class. In 2013, before the deadline for filing claims, the district judge approved the settlement, which purports to bind a single nation-wide class of all owners of defective windows, whether or not they have replaced or repaired the windows. The agreement gave lead class counsel “sole discretion” to allocate attorneys’ fees; Weiss proposed to allocate 73 percent to his own firm. Weiss removed four original class representatives who opposed the settlement; their replacements joined Saltzman in supporting it. Named plaintiffs were each compensated $5,000 or $10,000 for their services, if they supported the settlement. Saltzman, as lead class representative, was to receive $10,000. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reversed, referring to “eight largely wasted years,” the need to remove Saltzman, Weiss, and Weiss’s firm as class representative and as class counsel, and to reinstate the four named plaintiffs. View "Riva v. Pella Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners were two German limited liability corporations who were sued by a homeowners association for alleged construction defects in plumbing parts. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they had no direct connection to Nevada, did not manufacture or distribute the allegedly faulty plumbing parts, and had no responsibility or control over their American subsidiaries such that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. The district court asserted jurisdiction over Petitioners, determining that the companies’ American subsidiaries acted as Petitioners’ agents and concluding that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of prohibition challenging the validity of the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them. The district court granted the petition, holding that no agency relationship was shown in this case, and accordingly, the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in imputing the subsidiaries’ contacts to Petitioners. View "Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Novartis in the Western District of Texas, then the case was transferred by the Judicial Panel on MDL to the Middle District of Tennessee. Plaintiffs' compliant alleged, inter alia, that Novartis failed to notify the public and physicians of the possibility of suffering osteonecrosis of the jaw until 2004 and failing to notify dental professionals until 2005. The MDL court granted partial summary judgment to Novartis and ruled that: (1) Texas law applied to plaintiffs' case, and (2) Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 82.007(a) - which provides manufacturers a rebuttable presumption against liability for failing to warn - foreclosed plaintiffs' failure to warn claims. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' remaining claims. The court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) and Rule 60(b) motions; the remand court properly applied the law of the case when it refused to reconsider the MDL court's rulings that section 82.007 applied to plaintiffs' failure to warn claims; and the remand court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' warranty claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McKay, et al v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp." on Justia Law

In 2012, nineteen plaintiff families filed a single complaint alleging products liability and negligence claims against Defendants. In 2013, six plaintiff families filed a single complaint also alleging products liability and negligence claims against Defendants. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court referred Plaintiffs as two civil actions to the Mass Litigation Panel. The Panel entered an order that transformed the two civil actions into twenty-five separate actions. Plaintiffs sought a writ of prohibition to preclude enforcement of the order on the grounds that the Panel did not have the authority to alter their status as two civil actions. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the Panel did not have the authority to separate the cases. View "State ex rel. J.C. v. Judge Mazzone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-insurance company filed suit against Defendant-manufacturer, alleging various theories of products liability. Defendant raised the defense of a lack of personal jurisdiction in its answer but did not file a motion to dismiss the case on that basis. Twelve months after filing its answer to the complaint, during which time Defendant pursued litigation on the merits, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of a lack of personal jurisdiction. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding (1) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant, but Defendant waived this defense by litigating the merits of the case and thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the court; and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed as to the merits, which precluded the entry of summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) where a party raises the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in a responsive pleading, the party’s subsequent conduct may, in some circumstances, result in a forfeiture of that defense; and (2) the superior court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this case. View "Am Int’l Ins. Co. v. Robert Seuffer GmbH & Co. KG" on Justia Law