Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Ilan Brand appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants Hyundai Motor America and Allen Used Cars, LLC (Hyundai) after granting Hyundai's nonsuit motion on plaintiff's breach of implied warranty of merchantability lawsuit. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred in granting the motion on grounds that no reasonable jury could have concluded a new vehicle sunroof that spontaneously opens and closes while driving constituted a safety hazard in violation of the implied warranty. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff and reversed the judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Brand v. Hyundai" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a products liability suit against generic and brand-name manufacturers of the prescription drug metoclopramide, alleging that her long-term use of generic metoclopramide caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia and that manufacturers provided misleading and inadequate warnings. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings for the generic manufactures under Rule 12(c) on plaintiff's failure-to-warn, design-defect, and express-warranty claims because the claims were preempted by federal law; affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the brand-name manufacturers under Rule 12(b)(6) because the claims were barred by Louisiana state law where plaintiff never ingested Reglan manufactured by brand-name manufacturers; even if Louisiana law did not apply, plaintiff has not established that name-brand defendants owed her a duty of care; and denied plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Johnson v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Timothy Bostic died from mesothelioma, which can be caused by asbestos. Plaintiffs, Bostic’s family members, sued Georgia-Pacific Corporation and thirty-nine other defendants, alleging that Bostic had been exposed to asbestos as a child and teenager while using Georgia-Pacific drywall joint compound. A jury found Georgia-Pacific liable under negligence and marketing defect theories and awarded Plaintiffs $6.8 million in compensatory damages and $4.8 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals held that the causation evidence was legally insufficient and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the standard of substantial factor causation established in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, an asbestosis case, applies to mesothelioma cases; (2) Plaintiffs were not required to prove that but for Bostic’s exposure to Georgia-Pacific’s asbestos-containing joint compound, Bostic would not have contracted mesothelioma; and (3) the evidence of causation was legally insufficient to sustain the verdict in this case. View "Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff developed a neurological disorder from her prolonged use of metoclopramide, sold under the brand name Reglan and as a competing generic formulation. Plaintiff admitted she ingested only generic metoclopramide but sued both the manufacturer of the generic drug and the manufacturers of the branded formulation. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims, ruling (1) Plaintiff’s claims against the generic manufacturer were preempted by federal law that requires conformity with the brand manufacturers’ warning labels approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); and (2) Plaintiff’s claims against the brand manufacturers required proof that the brand defendants manufactured or supplied the product that caused Plaintiff’s injury. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the brand manufacturers and reversed in part summary judgment for the generic manufacturer, holding (1) Plaintiff’s state common law tort claims against the generic manufacturer based on inadequate warnings were not preempted to the extent that the generic manufacturer failed to adopt warning language approved by the FDA for Reglan; and (2) the brand manufacturers are not liable for injuries to those who used only the competing generic formulation. View "Huck v. Wyeth, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1994 Hartman’s father gave him a muzzle-loading rifle that was designed to use black powder as a propellant. The gun ignited newer, pelletized propellants erratically. In 2008, Hartman installed a kit on his gun. The kit was sold by KR Warranty, the maker of the rifle; it modified the muzzleloader and enabled it to ignite new propellants more reliably. The next day, Hartman was sighting in his “upgraded” muzzleloader when the gun unexpectedly discharged as he was trying to load it. The ramrod and a patched round ball passed through Hartman’s hands and arm, inflicting serious injury. Hartman sued KR for negligence and strict liability. The district court dismissed. Indiana has a 10-year statute of repose for products-liability actions and the gun was 14 years old. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There are exceptions to the statute, for “any reconstruction or reconditioning … which has the effect of lengthening the useful life of a product beyond what was contemplated when the product was first sold” and for situations where a manufacturer “merely … incorporat[es] a defective component into an old product.” Hartman cannot satisfy either exception. View "Hartman v. Ebsco Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Purchasers of organic asphalt roofing shingles in many states sued IKO and affiliated firms, contending that it falsely told customers that the shingles met an industry standard (ASTM D2250 and that compliance had been ascertained by use of a testing protocol (ASTM D228). What distinguishes an “organic” asphalt tile is inclusion of a layer made from felt or paper; tiles that include a fiberglass layer are not called organic, even though asphalt itself has organic components. In 2009 the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of the federal suits to the Central District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 1407. Plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class that would cover IKO sales in eight states since 1979. The court declined. After determining that subject matter jurisdiction existed despite the district court’s error in transferring the matter to a judge without approval of the Panel, the Seventh Circuit vacated, While not required to certify the proposed class, the district court denied class certification under a mistaken belief that “commonality of damages” is legally indispensable. View "Zanetti v. IKO Mfg Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against Volvo Cars of North America, alleging defective design of a product. The case proceeded to trial. At Plaintiff’s request, the trial court included a pattern jury instruction to charge the jury that was the same standard jury charge in malpractice actions. The instruction tells the jury that a defendant who has special skills in a trade or profession is required to use the same degree of skill and care that others in the same trade or profession would reasonably use in the same situation. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because this was not a malpractice case but a design defect case, the charge should not have been given, and the error required reversal and a new trial. View "Reis v. Volvo Cars of N. Am." on Justia Law

In 1957, the FDA approved propoxyphene for the treatment of mild to moderate pain, under the trade name Darvon. In 1972, the manufacturer obtained FDA approval to market another product combining propoxyphene with acetaminophen, under the name Darvocet. Because the new drug application (NDA) process is onerous, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, (Hatch-Waxman Act) to make available more low cost generic drugs. Generic drugs require an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) showing that the drug is equivalent to and that labeling proposed is the same approved for the brand-name drug. Several companies obtained approval to market generic versions of Darvon and Darvocet. Complaints about perceived risks associated with propoxyphene began in 1978; eventually the United Kingdom withdrew it from the market. Two FDA advisory committees recommended withdrawal from the market, but the FDA ordered the NDA holder to change the label to include “Black Box” warnings and to undertake a clinical trial to assess the risks of a particular cardiac complication. In 2010, the FDA determined that the risks of propoxyphene outweighed its benefits and ordered its removal from the market. Plaintiffs in 68 consolidated cases alleged that they ingested propoxyphene products prior to its withdrawal and that manufacturers continued marketing propoxyphene after they knew or should have known that risks exceeded benefits. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, except with respect to one plaintiff.View "Germain v. Teva Pharm, USA, Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband brought a products liability action against the Little Giant Ladder's manufacturer after she suffered injuries while using the ladder. The district court excluded plaintiff's expert testimony and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove the various theories of products liability. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to the manufacturer. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the compression tests on the grounds the tests were not conducted under conditions substantially similar to those surrounding the accident. Furthermore, because plaintiff had no admissible expert testimony to support her theories of product liability, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting the manufacturer's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Loomis, et al. v. Wing Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Ford Motor Company for injuries they sustained in a roll-over accident. The case was submitted to a jury. After the jury began its deliberations, the parties agreed to settle the case. Ford, however, later refused to pay the settlement amount to Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract. After hearing all of the evidence, the jury found the settlement agreement was invalid because of fraudulent inducement and mutual mistake. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s take-nothing judgment, concluding that the circumstantial evidence of fraud in the case was legally insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the circumstantial evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo" on Justia Law