Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Paul and Terri Broome purchased a 2010 Chevrolet Equinox from a Chevrolet dealership in April 2010. The vehicle came with a three-year or 36,000 mile warranty. According to the Broomes, the vehicle had various defects which they attempted to have repaired through the dealership. When the dealership was unable to fix the defects, in December 2011, the Broomes filed suit against General Motors, the manufacturer of the vehicle, for breach of written and implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act. This case was one of first impression to the Supreme Court: whether Mississippi Code Section 63-17-159(6) (Rev. 2013), the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, or Mississippi Code Section 75-2-101 (Rev. 2012), et seq. (the Uniform Commercial Code, the “UCC”) was the most analogous state statute to the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act for the purposes of determining the statute of limitations for Magnuson-Moss Act claims filed in Mississippi. The trial court found that the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act was the most analogous state law to the Magnuson-Moss Act and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim as barred by the statute of limitations. The Court held that Mississippi’s UCC was the most analogous state statute to the Magnuson-Moss Act. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim. View "Broome v. General Motors, LLC " on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wyeth, alleging that she developed breast cancer after using Wyeth's's hormone therapy medication, Prempro. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the the Eastern District of Arkansas as part of the ongoing In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation. After the district court subsequently dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to respond to discovery orders, her attorney filed a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to set aside the dismissal. Plaintiff's attorney had failed to register for the Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM-ECF) system and, consequently, did not receive electronic notices of the filings in plaintiff's case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b)(1) motion because the district court did not abuse its discretion where, on more than one occasion, the district court instructed all attorneys to register for the CM-ECF system and warned that those who did not would not receive electronic filing notices or hard copies of orders. View "Freeman v. Wyeth, et al." on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were driving a 2004 Jeep Cherokee in San Joaquin County, when the vehicle rolled over and the roof collapsed. Young sustained injuries, rendering her a permanent quadriplegic. Young’s daughter allegedly suffered physical and emotional harm. They filed suit, claiming that the roof and restraint systems were defectively designed. The vehicle at issue was designed, manufactured, and distributed by DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC), a former indirect subsidiary of Daimler. Among others, the complaint named Daimler and DCC as defendants. Daimler is a German public stock company that designs and manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and has its principal place of business in Stuttgart. Before 1998, DCC was known as Chrysler Corporation. After a 1998 agreement, Chrysler Corporation became an indirect subsidiary of Daimler and changed its name to DCC. DCC was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. It ceased to be a subsidiary of Daimler in 2007, changing its name to Chrysler LLC. Daimler is not a successor-in-interest to DCC or Chrysler LLC. Plaintiffs served Daimler with the complaint in accordance with the Hague Convention. The trial court quashed service for lack of personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG. The court of appeal affirmed, relying on the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. View "Young v. Daimler AG" on Justia Law

Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) was sued in a coordinated proceeding before the San Francisco Superior Court for alleged defects in Plavix, a drug BMS manufactures and sells throughout the country. BMS moved below to quash service of the summons regarding the complaints concerning plaintiffs who are not California residents, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied BMS’s motion, finding that California had general jurisdiction over BMS, and did not address the issue of specific jurisdiction. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) which limited the application of general jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, the California Supreme Court remanded to the court of appeals, which affirmed denial of the motion to quash. California does not have general jurisdiction over BMS in this case, but, applying the International Shoe Co. v. Washington test of “fair play and substantial justice,” the court reasoned that BMS has engaged in substantial, continuous economic activity in California, including the sale of more than a billion dollars of Plavix to Californians. That activity is substantially connected to claims by non-residents, which are based on the same alleged wrongs as those alleged by California-resident plaintiffs. BMS has not established that it would be unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over it. View "Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her kids filed a wrongful death action in state court against R.J. Reynolds and others after her husband died from throat cancer. Defendants removed to federal court, arguing that both of the nonmanufacturers had been fraudulently joined. The district court then granted defendants' motion to dismiss because the family's claims were barred by res judicata. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding fraudulent joinder, denying plaintiff's motion for remand, and then dismissing the nonmanufacturers from the case. The court also concluded that the "one recovery" rule of Missouri Revised Statutes 537.080 barred recovery against defendants in plaintiff's earlier suit for a wrongful death caused by the same conduct. Therefore, the district court was correct in dismissing the claims against the manufacturing defendants under the more demanding of the dismissal standards. As a result of the prior judgment, the husband no longer had a viable claim against the cigarette manufacturers at the time of his death, and his family is barred from bringing such a claim now. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Thompson, et al. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., et al." on Justia Law

Lee was injured while shooting a revolver made by Smith & Wesson. In his product liability suit alleging a defect in the firearm, the only expert evidence regarding how a defect in the firearm could have caused the injury was excluded because the expert’s theory was not consistent with aspects of plaintiff’s own memory of what happened. Lee reserved the right to challenge that evidentiary decision and stipulated to dismissal. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Smith & Wesson identified no judicial admission on the part of Lee in his represented status as plaintiff. Lee as a witness testified as to what he remembered. A tort plaintiff should be able to testify honestly to his memory of what happened and still have his lawyer argue that on the evidence as a whole it is more probable than not that the memory was faulty. If no jury could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff’s memory was faulty, dismissal would be warranted. View "Lee v. Smith & Wesson Corp." on Justia Law

In 1975, a pistol manufactured by MKEK malfunctioned, firing a bullet through Ohntrup’s hand while he loaded the gun. The court held the seller, Firearms Center and MKEK, which is wholly owned by the Republic of Turkey, jointly liable for $847,173.97 and required MKEK to indemnify Firearms Center. The Morgan law firm represented MKEK, but after appeal, sought to withdraw. The court permitted the individual lawyers to withdraw but required the firm to remain as counsel of record until MKEK hired substitute counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed, characterizing MKEK as an intractable litigant and stating that a communication gap would hamper post-judgment proceedings. The Ohntrups tried to collect their judgment; MKEK disregarded the Ohntrups’ discovery requests. The Ohntrups sought assistance from the State Department and pursued MKEK in Turkish courts, to no avail. In 2007, Ohntrup’s widow obtained a $16 million civil contempt judgment against MKEK that grows by $10,000 annually. Ohntrup’s judgments against MKEK are now worth about $25 million. In 2011, Ohntrup’s lawyers learned of a $16.2 million transaction in which a Minneapolis-based company. (Alliant), agreed to sell munitions manufacturing components to MKEK. Ohntrup obtained some discovery from Alliant, but the district court denied subsequent discovery requests. When Ohntrup renewed her post-judgment discovery efforts, Morgan was granted leave to withdraw. The Third Circuit affirmed the order granting leave to withdraw, but remanded the discovery order. The court erred when it relied upon the uncertainty surrounding the judgment creditor’s ability to attach the targeted property.View "Ohntrup v. Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kur" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant-cross-appellee R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc. appealed a Superior Court judgment on a jury verdict of $2,864,583.33 plus interest to Plaintiff-appellees-cross-appellant Darcel Galliher, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Michael Galliher. The decedent, Michael Galliher, contracted and died from mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos or asbestiform material while employed by Borg Warner at a bathroom fixtures facility. Vanderbilt provided industrial talc to Borg Warner, which was alleged to be the source of the substance that caused Michael's illness. At trial, Vanderbilt denied causation and claimed that Borg Warner was responsible because it did not operate the facility in a manner that was safe for employees like Michael. Vanderbilt argued: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the duty of care required of Borg Warner, as Michael's employer; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to grant a new trial based on the admission of unreliable and inflammatory evidence that previously was ruled inadmissible. Galliher argued on cross-appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it disallowed post-judgment interest for a certain period of months. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it failed to provide any instruction to the jury on Borg Warner's duty of care to Michael, despite Vanderbilt's request that it do so. The trial court also abused its discretion when it denied Vanderbilt's motion for a new trial based upon the substantial prejudice resulting from the admission of evidence, not subject to cross-examination, that it had engaged in criminal conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., v. Galliher, et al." on Justia Law

Gibson, sued former manufacturers of white lead carbonate pigments, which were used, before the federal government banned them in the 1970s, in paints, including paints applied to residences. Gibson claimed negligence and strict liability, but cannot identify which manufacturer made the white lead carbonate pigment that injured him. He relied on the “risk contribution” theory of tort liability fashioned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Thomas v. Mallet in 2005, under which plaintiffs are relieved of the traditional requirement to prove that a specific manufacturer caused the plaintiff’s injury. The district court held that risk-contribution theory violates the substantive component of the Due Process Clause and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting the broad deference that the Constitution grants to the development of state common law. The risk-contribution theory survives substantive due process scrutiny and the manufacturers’ other constitutional challenges. View "Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co." on Justia Law

Hardin suffered complete blindness and permanent, severe and painful scarring after she took Lamotrigine, the generic form of the medication Lamictal. Hardin sued the prescribing physician, the manufacturer, the store where she bought the prescription (Safeway), WKH, which produced the drug information pamphlet (monograph), and PDX, a software provider that distributes drug information to pharmacy customers. Unlike physician package inserts and patient medication guides, which are FDA-mandated, WKH monographs are not regulated or reviewed by the FDA, but are produced as part of a self-regulating action plan required under 110 Stat. 1593. The WKH monograph was the only information received by Hardin when she first filled her prescription for Lamictal. The abbreviated warning used by Safeway and provided to Hardin omitted the “Black Box” warning: “BEFORE USING THIS MEDICINE” that stated: “SERIOUS AND SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY WITH THE USE OF THIS MEDICINE. Hardin says that had she been provided this warning, she would not have taken the medication. WKH moved to strike Hardin’s claims against it under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the “anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation ) statute.. The trial court ruled that WKH’s production of drug monographs was protected speech concerning a public issue or an issue of public interest and that Hardin had no probability of prevailing because she could not establish that WKH owed her any duty. The court denied PDX’s motion to strike, finding that the activity underlying PDX’s alleged liability was the reprogramming of its software to permit Safeway to give customers an abbreviated, five-section monograph that omitted warnings instead of the full eight-section version that included those warnings. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Hardin v. PDX, Inc." on Justia Law