Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, two separate couples, brought suit seeking damages stemming from asbestos-caused diseases. Several Defendants in each case moved for summary judgment. In the first lawsuit, which led to two interlocutory appeals, the trial court denied Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In the second lawsuit, the trial court entered summary judgment for Defendants as a final judgment. At issue in each appeal was the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment asserting the ten-year statute of repose included in Indiana’s Product Liability Act. In all three appeals, which the Supreme Court consolidated, Plaintiffs requested reconsideration of the Court’s prior holding in AlliedSignal v. Ott. The Supreme Court (1) declined to reconsider Ott’s holdings with respect to statutory construction due to the principles of stare decisis and legislative acquiescence; but (2) concluded that the Product Liability Act’s statute of repose did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims, as the Act’s statute of repose does not apply to cases such as these where the plaintiffs have had protracted exposure to inherently dangerous foreign substances. View "Myers v. Crouse-Hinds Div. of Cooper Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a product liability suit against Remington after her husband, Kenneth Seamon, died from a gunshot wound while deer hunting alone. Plaintiff alleged that Mr. Seamon died as a result of a defect in his Remington Model 700 bolt action rifle. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's exclusion of the causation opinion of plaintiff's liability expert and the district court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment. In this case, the expert provided a reasonable explanation for why the defense's proposed alternative cause - trigger pull - was not in fact the cause of Mr. Seamon's death. In holding that the expert's opinion was based on speculation, rather than facts in the record, the court concluded that the district court also mischaracterized the evidentiary support for the expert’s opinion in several ways. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the motion to exclude, and consequently the motion for summary judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "Seamon v. Remington Arms Co." on Justia Law

ALL leased a crane to White Construction. Carson worked for White, providing general maintenance and serving as the “eyes and ears” of crane operator Dowell. Carson and Dowell were told to move the crane to a wind turbine platform several miles away. As the crane approached a road with overhead power lines. Carson signaled for Dowell to stop at the base of some wood matting placed to help the crane cross the road. Dowell stopped, but the crane began moving again, onto the matting where Carson was standing. As the crane pushed one end down, the other end rose. Carson slid down the slope. The crane’s treads crushed his foot, which had to be amputated. Dowell testified that he took the crane out of its “travel detent,” meaning that the crane should not have moved. The crane was inspected by Scholl, hired by White, and by a crane mechanic employed by ALL. Both concluded that the crane had moved forward because a malfunction in the controls caused the throttles to re‐engage without action by Dowell. The problem was intermittent and difficult to replicate and to detect. In his negligence suit, Carson argued that ALL had a duty to reasonably inspect the crane upon delivering it to White. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding no evidence that ALL’s alleged breach was the proximate cause of Carson’s injury. View "Carson v. All Erection & Crane Rental Co" on Justia Law

The underlying dispute in this case involved the repair of faulty windows and sliding glass doors in a condominium development, Shipyard Village Horizontal Property Regime (Shipyard Village), in Pawleys Island. Fifty co-owners of units in Buildings C & D of the development (Petitioners) appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the trial court's finding that the business judgment rule did not apply to the conduct of the Board of Directors of the Shipyard Village Council of Co-Owners, Inc., and the trial court's decision granting Petitioners partial summary judgment on the issue of breach of the Board's duty to investigate. Finding no reversible erro, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision. View "Fisher v. Shipyard Village" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was diagnosed with drug-induced lupus, allegedly a side effect from using Solodyn, a treatment for acne. Plaintiff sued Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation, which manufactures and distributes Solodyn, alleging that Medicis knowingly represented and omitted material facts in connection with the sale or advertisement of Solodyn in violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Plaintiff also alleged that Medicis failed to adequately warn her of the consequences of the long-term use of Solodyn. The superior court granted Medicis’s motion to dismiss. At issue on appeal was the learned intermediary doctrine (LID), under which a manufacturer satisfies its duty to warn end users by giving appropriate warnings to the class of persons who may prescribe or administer the product. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, holding (1) the LID does not prevent Plaintiff from suing Medicis; (2) Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to survive Medicis’s motion to dismiss with regard to her products liability claim; and (3) the CFA applies to prescription pharmaceuticals, and therefore, Plaintiff alleged an actionable claim under the CFA. View "Watts v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a products liability suit against Toyota, alleging that plaintiffs' accident occurred because their Toyota Tundra lacked electronic stability control (ESC), also known as vehicle stability control (VSC), and that the absence of this device or system was a design defect. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s denial of their motion in limine to exclude evidence that the custom of the automotive industry was not to include ESC as standard equipment in pickup trucks. The court held that evidence of industry custom and practice may be admissible in a strict products liability action, depending on the nature of the evidence and the purpose for which the proponent seeks to introduce the evidence. In this case, the trial court properly denied plaintiffs' motion in limine because plaintiffs moved to exclude all such evidence. The court also concluded that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and imposition of a time limit on the duration of rebuttal argument were not an abuse of discretion, and that the trial court properly refused plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions on federal safety standards and industry custom. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal stems from multi-district litigation involving transvaginal mesh medical devices used to treat pelvic organ prolapse and other pelvic issues. The jury awarded plaintiff $250,000 in compensatory damages, and the punitive damages award was split pursuant to a Georgia statute, with seventy-five percent going to the State of Georgia and twenty-five percent going to plaintiff. Both parties appealed. The court affirmed the district court's exclusion of evidence that Bard had complied with the FDA's 510(k) product safety process under F.R.E. 402 for lack of relevance; affirmed the district court's decision to admit evidence of a material data safety sheet pertaining to polypropylene, a material used in the construction of the Avaulta Plus implanted in plaintiff's body, as non-hearsay, finding that any use of the evidence by plaintiff that went beyond the limited purpose for which it was admitted as non-hearsay resulted in harmless error and was not prejudicial to Bard’s defense; and concluded that the district court did not err in giving the Georgia pattern jury instruction, in denying Bard’s request for a modified instruction, or in upholding the jury’s causation finding. The court also concluded that the punitive award was not constitutionally excessive. In regard to plaintiff's challenges, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Georgia's split-recovery statute garnishing seventy-five percent of any punitive damages award arising from a product liability judgment does not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cisson v. C. R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

Virl Birch died when the off-road vehicle in which he was riding flipped over and pinned him to the ground. His surviving family members sued Polaris Industries, the vehicle manufacturer, for strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Polaris argued there was no evidence Birch’s vehicle was defective at the time of sale, and moved for summary judgment. Well after the deadlines for amending the pleadings and for discovery had passed, Birch’s survivors filed motions: (1) to add new theories to their complaint; and (2) for additional discovery. A magistrate judge denied both motions as untimely, and the district court affirmed the magistrate’s ruling. Based on the allegations in the unamended complaint, the district court then granted summary judgment to Polaris on all claims. The survivors appealed the district court’s denial of their two motions and the grant of summary judgment. But finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Birch v. Polaris Industries" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a negligence and strict products liability action against E.F. Brady, alleging that asbestos-containing products it distributed caused Joel Hernandezcueva’s mesothelioma. On appeal, Jovana Hernandezcueva challenged the trial court's rulings on the motions for nonsuit and a new trial. In the published portion of the court's opinion, the court concluded that the trial court erred in granting a nonsuit on the strict products liability claim because the Hernandezcuevas’ evidence sufficed to show that E. F. Brady, while acting as a subcontractor in the construction of a commercial building, was in the stream of commerce relating to the asbestos-containing products, for purposes of the imposition of strict liability. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hernandezcueva v. E.F. Brady Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Dolores Hunter, the personal representative of the estate of Benjamin G. Francis, appealed a series of orders following a jury verdict in a wrongful death, products liability, and fraud action against Philip Morris USA Inc. resulting from Francis’s death from lung cancer. Following the verdict, Hunter moved for a new trial on the basis of evidentiary rulings at trial and on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The superior court initially granted Hunter’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence but then granted Philip Morris’s motion to reconsider, vacated its first order and denied Hunter’s motion for a new trial. Because the superior court’s orders applied a test that was inconsistent with the “weight of the evidence” new trial standard the Alaska Supreme Court previously established to guide trial courts, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration of Hunter’s motion. View "Hunter v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law