Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Robinson worked as a sandblaster for decades. Sand sometimes breaks down into silica dust, which, if inhaled, can cause the incurable lung disease silicosis. By 1997, Robinson knew that sandblasting could cause silicosis. In 1998, he saw Dr. Ragland, after coughing up white mucus. In 2002, he went to Ragland for bronchitis. In 2007, Robinson went to an emergency room for chest pain. The report listed three possibilities: tuberculosis, sarcoidosis, or a pneumonoconiosis disease (e.g., silicosis) caused by inhaling dusts. Medical notes reflect an “impression” of “silicosis related to sandblasting.” Robinson saw a respiratory specialist, to “follow up his silicosis.” Ridgeway’s notes, shared with Ragland, list an “impression” of silicosis. In 2011 Ridgeway biopsied Robinson’s lung. According to Robinson, Ridgeway then first told him he had silicosis. In 2012, Robinson sued entities that “sold, designed, manufactured, or marketed . . . silica related products.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the suit was time-barred. Arkansas’s three-year limitations period for product-liability actions applied, subject to a discovery rule: the period “does not commence running until the plaintiff knew or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the causal connection between the product and the injuries suffered.” Robinson should have known in 2007 that silica-related products had damaged his lungs. View "Robinson v. Mine Safety Appliances Co." on Justia Law

Robinson worked as a sandblaster for decades. Sand sometimes breaks down into silica dust, which, if inhaled, can cause the incurable lung disease silicosis. By 1997, Robinson knew that sandblasting could cause silicosis. In 1998, he saw Dr. Ragland, after coughing up white mucus. In 2002, he went to Ragland for bronchitis. In 2007, Robinson went to an emergency room for chest pain. The report listed three possibilities: tuberculosis, sarcoidosis, or a pneumonoconiosis disease (e.g., silicosis) caused by inhaling dusts. Medical notes reflect an “impression” of “silicosis related to sandblasting.” Robinson saw a respiratory specialist, to “follow up his silicosis.” Ridgeway’s notes, shared with Ragland, list an “impression” of silicosis. In 2011 Ridgeway biopsied Robinson’s lung. According to Robinson, Ridgeway then first told him he had silicosis. In 2012, Robinson sued entities that “sold, designed, manufactured, or marketed . . . silica related products.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the suit was time-barred. Arkansas’s three-year limitations period for product-liability actions applied, subject to a discovery rule: the period “does not commence running until the plaintiff knew or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the causal connection between the product and the injuries suffered.” Robinson should have known in 2007 that silica-related products had damaged his lungs. View "Robinson v. Mine Safety Appliances Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a products liability suit, alleging that defendants are liable for the their injuries after using the medical device known as Infuse. At issue was whether the presence of a so-called “nominal defendant” can prevent the remaining defendants from obtaining a forum non conveniens dismissal when, in the absence of the nominal defendant, the action can and should be pursued in alternative forums. The court concluded that the presence of a nominal defendant cannot defeat a forum non conveniens dismissal which should otherwise be granted. In this case, the trial court correctly granted the forum non conveniens dismissal in favor of all other defendants, but erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ action against the nominal defendant. Instead, the court should have severed the action against the nominal defendant and allowed it to proceed in California. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "David v. Medtronic, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants challenged a district court order requiring that they add two statements to their cigarette packages and advertisements: an announcement that a federal court has ruled that they “deliberately deceived the American public” about the dangers of cigarettes; and a declaration that they “intentionally designed cigarettes” to maximize addiction. The court concluded that given its earlier decisions in this case, the manufacturers’ objection to disclosing that they intentionally designed cigarettes to ensure addiction is both waived and foreclosed by the law of the case. Those decisions make equally clear that the district court, in ordering defendants to announce that they deliberately deceived the public, exceeded its authority under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, to craft remedies that “prevent and restrain” future violations. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a). The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

GE manufactures Omniscan, an FDA-approved gadolinium-based contrast agent that has been associated in some patients with development of nephrogenic systemic fibrosis (NSF), a rare and deadly condition that leads to the hardening (fibrosis) of the kidneys. Omniscan was administered to Wahl for two MRIs she received in Nashville in 2006. About one year later, she displayed the first symptoms of NSF. She was officially diagnosed with NSF in 2010. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all pre-trial litigation of Omniscan-related cases in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. In 2011, Wahl filed a complaint in that court. With the agreement of Wahl and GE, the MDL judge transferred the case, in 2013, to the Middle District of Tennessee, the “proper venue.” GE then moved for summary judgment, arguing that all Omniscan doses produced from 2004 to 2006 were marked with expiration dates two years after manufacture, so the Omniscan administered to Wahl must have expired no later than 2008; the Tennessee Products Liability Act’s statute of repose requires suits to be instituted within one year of the expiration date appearing on a product’s packaging. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, favoring GE, applying Tennessee choice-of-law rules. View "Wahl v. Gen. Elec. Co." on Justia Law

The decedent in this case fell from a ladder, resulting in his death. Plaintiff sued the companies that manufactured and sold the ladder, alleging that Defendants were liable on the basis of strict liability and under negligence theories. The jury rendered a verdict finding Defendants liable. Neither party objected to the verdict. After the jury was discharged, Defendants moved to set aside the verdict, contending that the jury verdict was fundamentally inconsistent. The trial court denied the motion. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the “fundamental nature” exception to the general rule that Defendants waived their challenges to the inconsistent verdict for failing to timely object applied in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a party must timely object to an inconsistent verdict under these circumstances or the issue is waived; and (2) because Defendants failed to timely raise their objection to the jury’s inconsistent verdict, the trial court did not err in denying Defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict. View "Coba v. Tricam Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

The users of an aerial lift supporting a worker forty feet in the air attempted to move the machine. The worker fell to the ground and died. This action for wrongful death and survivor damages ensued. Petitioner manufactures and sells the aerial lift. Users of the aerial lift are warned that “attempting to move the machine with the platform raised will tip the machine over and cause death or serious injury.” Petitioner has sold more than 100,000 of its lifts worldwide. There are only three reported accidents like the one in issue. Here, the jury found that a design defect in the lift caused the accident. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s design defect finding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was little evidence of a safer alternative design for the aerial lift, and there was no evidence in the record that the lift was unreasonably dangerous. View "Genie Industries, Inc. v. Matak" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a warehouse fire in Pasadena, Texas. Plaintiffs, the company that leased the warehouse and the company that stored materials in the warehouse, sued Defendants, the suppliers of the chlorpyrifos that the lessee used in the warehouse, for manufacturing and marketing defect, breach of contract, negligence, and other causes of action. The jury found that the chlorpyrifos was defective and that Defendants breached the parties’ contract. After the trial court entered judgment for Plaintiffs, Defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the testimony of all four of Plaintiffs’ experts was unreliable and constituted no evidence of negligence, manufacturing defect, and causation. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that each expert’s individual testimony was reliable, and therefore, the experts’ collective testimony was reliable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the testimony of all four experts was unreliable; and (2) consequently, there was no evidence of an essential element of Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

A fire occurred at the Ralph Engelstad Arena on July 3, 2011. Arena Holdings alleges the fire started when a Crown Macro-Tech 5002VZ amplifier produced a direct current to a speaker that spread to adjoining speakers located in the catwalk area. Harman is the manufacturer of the alleged defective amplifier. Impulse Group installed the sound reinforcement system at the Arena when it was originally built, and installed the amplifier. The fire caused approximately $5,000,000 of damage throughout the Arena; it directly damaged the arena structure and equipment in the vicinity of the amplifier and speakers. The presence of smoke and soot throughout the Arena after the fire caused additional damage. Arena Holdings sued Harman, alleging negligence, strict liability and post-sale failure-to warn claims. Harman filed a third-party complaint against Impulse Group and others. The district court granted Harman summary judgment, finding that the economic loss doctrine precluded Arena Holdings from recovering tort damages. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that barring tort claims where a plaintiff seeks economic damages for foreseeable losses for which the plaintiff could have contractually allocated risk is admittedly no longer a "modern trend," but stating that it is neither is an antiquated or disfavored approach. View "Arena Holdings Charitable, LLC v. Harman Prof'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Two nonresident minors filed suit against Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, the manufacturer of an allegedly defective tire that failed, causing a rollover that killed the children’s parents. The minors sued by a next friend - their uncle - who was a Texas resident. The residents resided in Mexico with their grandparents, who became the children’s legal guardians. Bridgestone filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, asserting that the case belonged in Mexico, not Texas. The trial court denied the motion. Bridgestone petitioned for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. The court denied relief, concluding that because the next-friend was a Texas resident the case may not be dismissed on forum-non-conveniens grounds. Bridgestone subsequently sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted Bridgestone’s petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to dismiss the action, holding (1) Texas law allows minors to sue by next friend when they have a legal guardian who is not authorized to sue in Texas in that capacity; (2) a next friend is not a plaintiff for purposes of the forum-non-conveniens statute’s Texas-resident exception; and (3) therefore, this case must be dismissed as a matter of law. View "In re Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC" on Justia Law