Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

The Washington Supreme Court was presented an issue of first impression: whether Washington should adopt the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine for common law product liability claims predating the 1981 product liability and tort reform act (WPLA). By this opinion, the Court joined the clear majority of states that formally adopted the apparent manufacturer doctrine. Applying that doctrine to the particular facts of this case, the Court held genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a reasonable consumer could have believed Pfizer was a manufacturer of asbestos products that caused Vernon Rublee's illness and death. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Rublee v. Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s defective design claim, holding that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, Plaintiff’s misuse of a tool was the cause of his injuries and could not have been reasonably expected by Defendant, the tool’s manufacturer.In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the tool was defective in its design. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence established that Plaintiff misused the tool by failing to follow its directions. The trial court found that Plaintiff misused the tool and that he was at least fifty-one percent responsible for his injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendant, holding (1) the misuse defense serves as a complete defense; and (2) Plaintiff’s injuries could have been avoided had he followed the instructions, and Defendant could not reasonably expect that a consumer would misuse the tool in the manner that Plaintiff did. View "Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Sikkelee was killed when a Cessna aircraft he was piloting crashed after taking off from North Carolina's Transylvania County Airport. The aircraft had a Lycoming engine; Sikkelee's widow alleged the aircraft lost power due to a defect in the design of the engine and its carburetor. The FAA had issued Lycoming a type certificate for the engine, certifying that the design performs properly and satisfies federal regulations. Sikkelee’s widow brought strict liability and negligence claims against Lycoming, alleging design defect. The Third Circuit held that Sikkelee’s state-law claims are not barred based on the doctrine of field preemption. On remand, the district court concluded the claims were conflict-preempted and that Lycoming was entitled to summary judgment on Sikkelee’s strict liability and negligence claims based on Pennsylvania law. The court granted Lycoming summary judgment on Sikkelee’s claim that Lycoming violated 14 C.F.R. 21.3 by failing to notify the FAA of the alleged defect. The Third Circuit reversed in part, rejecting an argument that Sikkelee’s claims were conflict-preempted because FAA regulations made it impossible for Lycoming to unilaterally implement design changes Pennsylvania law allegedly would have required. Lycoming has not produced clear evidence that the FAA would not have allowed it to change the design set forth in the type certificate. Summary judgment on Sikkelee’s strict liability and negligence claims was inappropriate because there are genuine disputes of material fact concerning causation. Summary judgment was proper on the failure-to-notify-the-FAA claim. View "Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp" on Justia Law

After Dr. Alan Sandifer was pierced in the head by the cable guard of his 2007 Hoyt Vulcan XT500 bow, his family filed suit against Hoyt Archery and its insurers under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) alleging that the compound bow was defectively designed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding most of the testimony of plaintiffs' primary expert. In this case, plaintiffs failed to show how the accident occurred, because the expert's response to Hoyt's theory was based on unscientific and unhelpful propensity evidence that was not reasonably relied upon by experts in the biomechanical field and consequently failed to satisfy Daubert's requirements for the admissibility of expert opinion. View "Sandifer v. Hoyt Archery, Inc." on Justia Law

In this strict product liability action, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court's judgment and remanded to the trial court for its determination of whether the manufacturer of flexible bulk containers, Taihua Group, "is unable to satisfy a judgment as determined by the court," as mandated by section 2-621(b)(4) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.The court rejected the "bankrupt or nonexistent" standard for reinstatement under section 2-621(b)(4) promulgated in Chraca v. U.S. Battery Manufacturing Co., 2014 IL App (1st) 132325, and overruled that decision. Rather, the court read the statute to permit the trial court to rely on a broader range of factors to determine if a particular manufacturer is "unable to satisfy" the judgment against it. View "Cassidy v. China Vitamins, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against defendants after plaintiff's daughter died from inhaling a large quantity of aerosol dust remover in a Wal-Mart parking lot. The court held that plaintiff's negligence claim based on premises liability failed because she did not plead that there were any issues with the conditions of the premises, and because Wal-Mart did not owe the daughter any duty of care regarding her purchase or abuse of dust remover. Furthermore, Wal-Mart was not liable for negligent entrustment under Restatement (Second) of Torts 390 and under Texas laws, and Wal-Mart employees were not liable in their individual capacities. The court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand and motion to alter or amend the complaint. View "Allen v. Walmart Stores, LLC" on Justia Law

FDA trans fat regulations governing the contents of the Nutrition Facts Panel did not preempt California's unfair competition laws proscribing false or misleading advertising elsewhere on a food product's label. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a putative consumer class action alleging that The Kroger Company sold Kroger Bread Crumbs that included misleading labels in violation of California law. The panel held that plaintiff had standing to challenge the legitimacy of defendant's product advertising on the face of the label that it contained "0g Trans Fat per serving." The panel took the occasion to reinforce and apply it's holding in Reid v. Johnson & Johnson,780 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2015), that a requirement to state certain facts in the nutrition label was not a license to make that statement elsewhere on the product. The panel also held that plaintiff's labeling claims were not preempted because the FDA regulations did not authorize the contested statements. View "Hawkins v. The Kroger Co." on Justia Law

More than 20 current and former employees at ConAgra’s Rensselaer, Indiana microwave popcorn plant sued various manufacturers and suppliers of butter flavorings that contained the chemical diacetyl, which if inhaled can cause a respiratory disease called “popcorn lung.” All defendants were dismissed except Givaudan. a long‐time supplier to the plant, which faced claims under Indiana product liability law for strict liability, failure to warn, negligence, and design defect. The district court granted Givaudan summary judgment in full. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to most of the claims but remanded the claim that Givaudan failed to warn plaintiffs that its products contained a dangerous substance. Whether an exception to that duty to warn—the sophisticated intermediary doctrine— applies to the employer ConAgra and exonerates Givaudan is a fact question. View "Aregood v. Givaudan Flavors Corp." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order limiting the scope of plaintiff's general causation phase discovery in this products liability suit alleging that plaintiff's husband's use of Enbrel caused his myelodysplastic syndrome (MDS) which resulted in his death. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of plaintiff's general causation discovery; the district court's basis for weighing proportionality was based on common sense and the search conducted by plaintiff's counsel during the discovery hearing; the district court did not rely on misrepresented facts by Amgen in issuing its discovery orders; any error in failing to provide plaintiff an opportunity to cross-examine Amgen's expert was harmless; the district court was under no obligation to order Amgen to provide plaintiff with materials the FDA requests—but does not require—from pharmaceutical companies when the agency evaluates safety risks; and plaintiff's assertion that the district court's order limiting the scope of her discovery prejudiced her case was rejected.The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions under Rule 11 and by imposing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 1927. Finally, the district court properly exercised its inherent power to sanction plaintiff's counsel, and here was no abuse of discretion View "Vallejo v. Amgen, Inc." on Justia Law

Estrada filed a purported class action on behalf of: “All persons who purchased [Johnson & Johnson] Baby Powder in California and states with laws that do not conflict with the laws asserted here.” The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that a plaintiff—who has entirely consumed a product that has functioned for her as expected— has not suffered an economic injury solely because she now sincerely wishes that she had not purchased that product. Buyer’s remorse, without more, is not a cognizable injury under Article III. The court noted that Estrada did not allege that a product has caused her physical injury, nor does she allege even an increased risk of developing cancer; she makes no claim of emotional injury, nor did she describe a defective product. She bought the product regularly for decades and completely consumed what she purchased. Her theory of recovery is simply that she suffered an economic injury by purchasing improperly marketed Baby Powder and that, had she been properly informed that using Baby Powder could lead to an increased risk of developing ovarian cancer, she would not have purchased it. View "Estrada v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law