Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Claiming that she suffered injuries when her dentist soaked her dentures in CaviCide disinfecting solution, which is manufactured by Metrex, plaintiff filed suit against Metrex, the dentist, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and others.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings to Metrex on plaintiff's claim that Metrex failed to warn and label its product adequately. The court held that plaintiff's failure to warn claim failed as a matter of law because she admitted in her complaint that CaviCide's label warned against the specific use that allegedly caused her injuries. In this case, plaintiff conceded that the use of CaviCide to disinfect dentures or any surface or instrument that contacts mucous membranes is prohibited by the CaviCide label. Furthermore, plaintiff maintained that her injures were caused by the dentist's failure to follow manufacturer's instructions clearly printed on the label for the proper use of the product. View "Hale v. Metrex Research Corp." on Justia Law

Verrazono was seriously injured when a rough terrain forklift he was operating tipped over. He sued the manufacturer. The jury returned a defense verdict, finding the forklift was not defective and the manufacturer was not negligent. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Verrazono’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the “consumer expectations” test for design defect and erred in giving a “dynamite instruction” when the jury became deadlocked. Verrazono presented no evidence as to the safety expectations of a “hypothetical reasonable” telehandler user under the circumstances that occurred. Rather, Verrazono’s engineering expert’s testimony bore on a risk-benefit analysis. This was not a case where evidence about the objective features of the product, alone, was sufficient for an evaluation of whether the forklift was defectively designed in the manner Verrazono claimed. Verrazono’s failure to set forth all material evidence forfeited his substantial evidence claims. View "Verrazono v. Gehl Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the court of appeals to consider the viability of each of Plaintiffs' claims presented in the pleadings, holding that the court of appeals improperly failed to address the viability of each claim.Plaintiffs, thirty-six women, filed a product liability suit against Bayer Corporation and some related entities (collectively, Bayer), alleging that Bayer violated Indiana's Product Liability act and other state and federal laws in relation to a medical device that Bayer manufactured. Bayer moved for judgment on the pleadings under Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 12(C). The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals, however, addressed only the legal viability of one claim rather than all of Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to consider the viability of each of Plaintiffs' claims, holding that the court was required to address the viability of each claim presented under Rule 12(C). View "Bayer Corp. v. Leach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Arthur Whelan filed suit against seven defendants, who allegedly manufactured or distributed products integrated with asbestos-containing components. Whelan claimed he was exposed to asbestos dust while working on those products, including their original asbestos-containing components or asbestos-containing replacement components. Defendants contended that Whelan could not establish that his exposure to asbestos was the result of any product they manufactured or distributed, disclaiming any liability for Whelan’s exposure to asbestos-containing replacement parts that they did not manufacture or distribute, even though the parts were incorporated into their products. Whelan countered that it made no difference whether he was exposed to defendants’ original asbestos-containing components or a third party’s asbestos-containing components -- defendants’ duty to warn and liability attached to both. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that defendants had a duty to warn about the dangers of the asbestos-containing replacement components necessary for the continued functioning of their products and that defendants could be held strictly liable for the failure to do so, provided Whelan suffered sufficient exposure to the replacement components to contribute to his disease. After Whelan appealed, the Appellate Division issued Hughes v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 435 N.J. Super. 326 (App. Div. 2014), which held that a defendant had a duty to warn, regardless of who manufactured the replacement components, because under the facts of that case, “it was reasonably foreseeable . . . that the gaskets and packing would be replaced regularly with gaskets and packing that contained asbestos.” The Appellate Division found that Whelan had “presented sufficient evidence detailing his exposure to asbestos,” either from defendants’ original or replacement components or from a third party’s replacement components, to withstand summary judgment. Thus, the Whelan panel reversed the summary judgment order and left the disputed issues of fact to be resolved by a jury. Finding no reversible error in the appellate panel's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "Whelan v. Armstrong International, Inc." on Justia Law

Essure--permanent birth control for women--originally was manufactured and developed by Conceptus, a California corporation. Bayer bought Conceptus. Bayer marketed Essure as safer and more effective than other birth control. Two residents of Madison County, Illinois, filed personal injury complaints, alleging that Essure caused debilitating pain, heavy bleeding that necessitated medication, and autoimmune disorders. including 179 plaintiffs from at least 25 states. Months later, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its “Bristol-Myers” decision. Bayer argued that, following Bristol-Myers, a court cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant as to the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs when the conduct giving rise to the claims did not occur in the forum state. The plaintiffs argued Illinois courts had specific personal jurisdiction over Bayer because it “created the Essure Accreditation Program and the marketing strategy for Essure in Illinois,” conducted clinical trials in Illinois, and used Illinois as a testing ground for its physician training program. The appellate court affirmed the denials of motions to dismiss: Bayer “conducted a part of its general business in Illinois, and [p]laintiffs’ claims arose out of" trials conducted, in part, in Illinois.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The nonresident plaintiffs identified no jurisdictionally relevant links between their claims and Illinois. The nonresidents have not explained how Illinois could be a convenient location for this litigation; they were not implanted with their devices here and have identified no other activity that would connect their specific claims to Illinois. Many nonresident plaintiffs initiated duplicate actions in California, indicating that the interests of judicial economy are not furthered by permitting their claims to proceed in Illinois. A corporation’s continuous activity of some sort within a state is not enough to render the corporation subject to suits unrelated to that activity. View "Rios v. Bayer Corp." on Justia Law

Deborah and Dallas Platt purchased a 2016 Winnebago Era RV in 2016. This purchase was subject to Winnebago’s New Vehicle Limited Warranty, which required the Platts to bring the RV for repairs to an authorized dealer and then, if those repairs were insufficient, to Winnebago itself before they could bring an action against Winnebago. The RV suffered from a litany of defects and the Platts took it in for warranty repairs to Camping World of Golden, Colorado (Camping World), an authorized Winnebago dealership, on numerous occasions for numerous separate defects within the first seven and a half months of their ownership. When the Camping World repairs did not resolve the Platts’ issues with the RV, they scheduled an appointment for repairs with Winnebago in Forest City, Iowa, but they subsequently cancelled the appointment, claiming they had "lost faith" that Winnebago would repair their RV. The Platts sued Winnebago for breach of express and implied warranties under both the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Colorado state law, and also for deceptive trade practices in violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). Winnebago filed a motion for summary judgment which the district court granted, dismissing all of the Platts’ claims. The Platts appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Platt v. Winnebago Industries" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent a preliminary writ sought by LG Chem, Ltd. to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its over overruling LG Chem's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that due process prohibited Missouri courts from asserting personal jurisdiction over LG Chem in this matter.LG Chem, a Korean company with its headquarters in Seoul, South Korea, manufactured model 18650 lithium-ion batteries. Peter Bishop sued LG Chem in the St. Louis County circuit court alleging that he purchased one of LG Chem's batteries in a store located in St. Peters, Missouri for use in his e-cigarette. Bishop alleged that the battery spontaneously exploded in his pocket, resulting in burn injuries. LG filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The circuit court overruled the motion on the merits. LG then sought a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition. The Court then made its preliminary writ permanent with directions to the circuit court to vacate its order overruling LG Chem's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that LG Chem lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Missouri, and therefore, the assertion of personal jurisdiction over LG Chem would violate due process. View "State ex rel. LG Chem, Ltd. v. Honorable McLaughlin" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a group of fourteen diversity cases that were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and transferred to the Northern District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs in all fourteen cases were cancer treatment providers who purchased multi-dose vials of Herceptin, a breast cancer drug, from defendant Genentech, Inc. (Genentech). Plaintiffs alleged that Genentech violated state law by failing to ensure that each vial of Herceptin contained the labeled amount of the active ingredient, and by misstating the drug concentration and volume on the product labeling. After the cases were consolidated, Genentech moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were pre-empted by federal law. The district court agreed with Genentech and granted its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' claims were preempted, and consequently, reversed summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: MDL 2700 Genentech" on Justia Law

While going down Festival’s waterslide, Sharufa inadvertently slipped from a seated position on an inner tube onto his stomach. When he entered the pool below, his feet hit the bottom with enough force to fracture his hip and pelvis. Sharufa sued for negligence, product liability (including breach of express and implied warranties), and negligent misrepresentation. Sharufa’s opposition to a summary judgment motion included a mechanical engineer's opinion that going down the slide on one’s stomach could lead to injury because it would cause a person to enter the water with more velocity than sliding on one’s back. The court found that the engineer did not qualify as an expert on the relevant subject matter and granted Festival summary adjudication on all but the negligent misrepresentation claim. Sharufa dismissed that claim without prejudice to allow an appeal. The court of appeal affirmed as to Sharufa’s negligence cause of action, Festival owes a heightened duty of care as a common carrier; but there was no evidence of breach. The court reversed as to Sharufa’s products liability causes of action; the record is insufficient to show the park provided primarily a service rather than use of a product. The purpose of riding a waterslide is “entertainment and amusement,” but where a product is intended for entertainment, to allow a supplier to be characterized as an “amusement service” provider would risk weakening product liability protections for consumers. View "Sharufa v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of FCA in an action brought under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act, for claims of breach of express and implied warranties and fraudulent concealment based on plaintiff's purchase of a 2013 Dodge Durango manufactured by FCA.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not err by precluding plaintiff's mechanical expert from testifying that a faulty fuel pump relay was one of the possible causes of a claimed lack of power in plaintiff's vehicle. In this case, the expert did not provide any rational explanation of how a faulty fuel pump relay could have caused the power loss that occurred in plaintiff's vehicle; did not provide any explanation for how a problem with the fuel pump relay could have caused an intermittent power loss both before and after the repair; and admitted several times in his deposition that the fuel pump relay was only a possible, not a probable, cause of the power loss. Therefore, the court held that the trial court did not exclude the expert's opinion as speculative. View "Waller v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law