Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

A premature infant was born in West Virginia in 2014 and, after initially being fed her mother’s milk, was switched to a cow’s-milk-based infant formula manufactured by Abbott Laboratories when her mother could no longer produce usable breast milk and no donor milk was available. The hospital, following policy, did not allow sharing of untested breast milk. Shortly after being fed the formula, the infant was diagnosed with necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) and died the next day. The infant’s mother alleged that Abbott failed to adequately warn about the risks of NEC associated with its formula.The mother brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, as part of a multidistrict litigation. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Abbott. The court found that the plaintiff had not shown a feasible alternative design for the formula and, on the failure-to-warn claim, concluded there was insufficient evidence that a different warning would have prevented the infant’s death. The court also denied a Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider, as the plaintiff’s new witnesses were available during discovery.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence that an alternative warning would have changed the outcome, given that the hospital had no donor milk and enforced a policy against sharing untested milk. The court also affirmed the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion, finding no abuse of discretion because the proposed new evidence was not newly discovered. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Mar v Abbott Laboratories" on Justia Law

After a motor vehicle collision, the plaintiff sued both the driver, who was allegedly intoxicated, and five bars under Utah’s Alcoholic Product Liability Act, claiming the bars overserved the driver prior to the crash. The plaintiff settled with the driver and three of the bars for a combined $1 million, resulting in dismissal of all claims against those parties. Two of the bars that participated in the settlement then sought contribution from the driver under Utah Code section 32B-15-302(1)(a), arguing they were entitled to recover part of the settlement amount from him.The Third District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the driver, finding that the term “award” in the Dramshop Act’s contribution provision refers to an amount imposed by a court or authority, not to payments made in voluntary settlements. Since the bars settled the claims, the court concluded no “award” was made against them, and dismissed their crossclaims. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, determining that “award” in the statute does not encompass voluntary settlements and supporting its interpretation with reference to the statute’s language and context.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah granted certiorari and reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The Court held that the Dramshop Act’s contribution provision permits contribution claims only when a party has an award imposed against them, not when they make voluntary settlement payments. The Court rejected arguments that common law or policy required a broader reading. Accordingly, it affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, holding that parties who settle claims under the Act cannot pursue contribution against other alleged wrongdoers. View "RMB v. Celotto" on Justia Law

After a motor vehicle accident in Knoxville, Tennessee, a child sustained serious injuries while riding in a booster seat secured with a seatbelt extender. The seatbelt extender, manufactured by Ford Motor Company, was purchased and installed by the child’s father to address difficulties buckling the booster seat in their Nissan Juke. Both the booster seat and the seatbelt extender were not inherently defective for their intended purposes, but the plaintiff alleged that using the two products together created a dangerous condition. The plaintiff filed a product liability action under the Tennessee Products Liability Act, asserting that Ford failed to adequately warn against the risks of using its seatbelt extender in combination with a booster seat.The Circuit Court for Knox County initially granted summary judgment to Dorel Juvenile Group, the booster seat manufacturer, but denied Ford’s motion for summary judgment, finding Ford to be a manufacturer or seller under the Act. After a mistrial in the plaintiff’s claim against Ford, the trial court allowed an interlocutory appeal to address whether the Tennessee Supreme Court’s prior decision in Coffman v. Armstrong International, Inc. required dismissal of the failure-to-warn claims. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that Coffman barred the plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the certified question and clarified that Coffman, which involved post-sale integration of inherently dangerous asbestos-containing materials into a sound product, does not require dismissal as a matter of law of failure-to-warn claims when two independently sound products are used together and create a dangerous condition. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that Coffman does not foreclose the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims under these circumstances. View "Woodruff v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

A serious automobile accident in Knoxville, Tennessee resulted in the death of Benjamin Woodruff and severe injuries to his six-year-old son, Ethan. At the time of the crash, Ethan was in a high-backed booster seat manufactured by Dorel Juvenile Group and was restrained using a seatbelt extender made by Ford Motor Company, which had been purchased separately to address difficulties in buckling the booster seat in the family’s Nissan Juke. The booster seat’s manual referenced the possible use of a seatbelt extender, while the vehicle’s manual warned against using extenders to install child restraints. After the accident, Sarah Woodruff filed a product liability lawsuit under the Tennessee Products Liability Act, alleging that both Dorel and Ford failed to adequately warn of the dangers of using a seatbelt extender with the booster seat.The Circuit Court for Knox County initially granted summary judgment to Dorel, finding it had no duty to warn about another manufacturer’s product, but denied summary judgment to Ford. After an intervening decision by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Coffman v. Armstrong International, Inc., the trial court vacated its grant of summary judgment to Dorel, then later reinstated it after further motions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Dorel, holding that Coffman barred the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim as a matter of law since Dorel’s product was only allegedly dangerous when used with another manufacturer’s product.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and clarified that its prior holding in Coffman does not mandate dismissal as a matter of law of the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim against Dorel. The Court explained that Coffman was limited to situations involving the integration of inherently dangerous components into another product post-sale, and does not foreclose failure-to-warn claims where two sound products together create a risk. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Woodruff ex rel. Woodruff v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

A dairy farmer with extensive experience was injured when he dismounted a moving tractor manufactured by the defendant in order to retrieve an object in its path. The tractor continued moving forward, pulling an attached seed drill over the plaintiff and causing serious injuries. The tractor featured an electronic parking brake and a manual that included instructions such as not to get off the tractor while it was in motion, to apply the parking brake before leaving, and warnings about the parking brake’s operation. The plaintiff contended he believed the parking brake would stop the tractor automatically after he left his seat for five seconds, and thus did not fully stop the tractor before dismounting.The plaintiff sued the manufacturer in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, asserting a failure to adequately warn about the tractor’s operation and initially alleging a design defect (later abandoned). After discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the danger was open and obvious, but the district court denied the motion. At trial, the jury found for the plaintiff and apportioned sixty percent fault to the defendant. The defendant’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, reconsidered judgment, and a new trial were all denied by the district court.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied Kansas substantive law and federal procedural standards, conducting de novo review. The court held that under Kansas product-liability law, the manufacturer had no duty to warn of the open and obvious danger of dismounting a moving tractor, as a reasonable operator should recognize the risk. The court determined this was a legal question suitable for resolution as a matter of law, given that the evidence pointed clearly in one direction. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment and the jury verdict. View "Miller v. CNH Industrial America" on Justia Law

A man died from burn injuries after his clothing ignited while he was working near a portable propane tank top heater manufactured by Enerco Group, Inc. The decedent’s estate, represented by Jesse Near, filed a wrongful death suit alleging that the heater was defectively designed because it lacked an adequate guard or feasible alternative design to prevent clothing ignition when someone came close to the heater. The plaintiff did not assert a separate failure-to-warn claim. However, the sufficiency of the product warnings was central to the dispute, as Enerco maintained that adequate warnings rendered the product nondefective under South Carolina law.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina addressed three key issues: it denied the plaintiff’s motion to certify to the Supreme Court of South Carolina the question of whether adequate warnings preclude a design defect claim; it excluded the plaintiff’s expert witness on the adequacy of warnings, finding her methodology unreliable; and, after treating the warnings as adequate as a matter of law (because there was no admissible evidence to the contrary), it granted summary judgment to Enerco, holding that under South Carolina law, adequate warnings preclude a design defect claim. The district court relied on the Fourth Circuit’s prior decision in Hickerson v. Yamaha Motor Corp., which interpreted South Carolina law to that effect.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert’s opinions unreliable. However, the Fourth Circuit found that South Carolina law was unsettled on whether adequate warnings categorically preclude a design defect claim, especially in light of subsequent developments in South Carolina case law. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit certified this specific legal question to the Supreme Court of South Carolina and deferred ruling on the summary judgment issue until the Supreme Court responds. View "Near v. Enerco Group, Inc." on Justia Law

A professional track and field athlete received a bottle of Gatorade Recovery Gummies at an award ceremony hosted by Gatorade, which were labeled as “NSF Certified for Sport,” indicating independent testing for banned substances. After consuming the gummies, the athlete submitted a routine drug test that later returned positive for cardarine, a banned performance-enhancing drug, resulting in immediate suspension from elite competition. Subsequent investigation revealed that the gummies lot the athlete received had never been NSF certified, and Gatorade was aware of the mislabeling before distributing the product. The athlete suffered significant consequences, including loss of eligibility to compete, loss of a scholarship, and forfeiture of endorsement opportunities.The athlete initiated legal action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging strict products liability, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, violation of Texas’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, tortious interference with contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed all claims. It found no “cognizable injury outside of purely economic damages” for the strict liability, negligence, and misrepresentation claims, applying New York’s economic loss doctrine. Additional claims were dismissed based on statutory definitions and insufficient allegations of extreme conduct or distress.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the tortious interference, consumer protection, and emotional distress claims. However, the court recognized uncertainty in New York law regarding tort recovery for nonconsensual bodily changes detectable only by laboratory testing and the boundaries of the economic loss doctrine. Accordingly, the Second Circuit deferred decision and certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals concerning the scope of the economic loss doctrine and whether the athlete’s injury is cognizable in tort under New York law. View "Asinga v. Gatorade Co." on Justia Law

Parents, guardians, and children brought state law claims against manufacturers, pharmacies, and retailers of acetaminophen products, alleging that prenatal exposure to acetaminophen caused ADHD and/or autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The plaintiffs contended that the defendants failed to warn about these risks. Acetaminophen is commonly used during pregnancy, but the FDA only requires a general warning for pregnant women and does not mandate warnings about ADHD or ASD. Scientific debate exists regarding any causal relationship between prenatal acetaminophen exposure and neurodevelopmental disorders, with studies and expert opinions both supporting and questioning such links.After these cases were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the court excluded all general causation expert testimony offered by plaintiffs in Rutledge (Drs. Baccarelli, Hollander, Pearson, Cabrera, Louie) and Phippen (Dr. Ness), determining their opinions were unreliable and not based on sufficient scientific methodology under Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. The district court then granted summary judgment for the defendants. It also rejected defendants’ arguments that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims, holding that federal drug labeling regulations did not prohibit supplemental warnings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court erred in excluding the testimony of Drs. Baccarelli, Hollander, and Pearson, as their methodologies and interpretations were consistent with accepted scientific practices and the ongoing debate in the field. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of Drs. Cabrera and Louie. The Second Circuit also held that reconsideration of Dr. Ness’s testimony in Phippen was warranted. The court affirmed the district court’s rejection of the federal preemption defense. The judgments in both cases were vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rutledge v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, represented by the same counsel as earlier litigants, alleged injuries caused by cellphone radiation exposure. Their complaints were nearly identical to those in a previous set of cases involving similar claims. The plaintiffs agreed, through joint stipulations filed in their cases, that the outcome of expert admissibility litigation in the earlier cases would apply to their own. This agreement included being bound by both the substantive ruling on whether expert testimony about general causation was admissible and all procedural rulings leading up to that determination. The stipulations were signed by counsel for both sides, and subsequent court orders stayed the plaintiffs’ cases pending the resolution of expert admissibility in the earlier litigation.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia managed the earlier cases by first resolving whether the plaintiffs had admissible expert testimony on general causation, limiting discovery to that issue. After several hearings and rulings, the court ultimately excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony under the Daubert/Rule 702 standard, and granted summary judgment to the defendants because the plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert evidence to support their claims. The Brooks plaintiffs later moved to lift the stays in their cases, arguing for broader discovery and the opportunity to present new expert witnesses, but the court denied this motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Brooks plaintiffs were bound by their agreements and the trial court’s rulings. The court held that the plaintiffs had agreed—expressly or implicitly—to be bound by both the outcome of the expert admissibility litigation and the procedural rulings in the earlier cases. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs lacked admissible expert testimony required to prove their claims. View "Brooks v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics US, Inc." on Justia Law

A mother brought suit on behalf of herself and her minor son, alleging that the son developed leukemia after attending school near and residing close to a manufacturing plant operated by General Electric Company. The plant, located in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, produced electrical transformers and capacitors containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) for decades. The plaintiff claimed that GE’s use, disposal, and storage of PCBs caused the son’s illness, and sought recovery under various legal theories, including strict liability, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, nuisance, improper transportation of hazardous material, and loss of consortium. The complaint included claims related to the defective design and use of PCB materials, as well as their disposal and remediation.The plaintiff originally filed suit in Massachusetts state superior court. GE removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting federal officer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), based on its wartime production of PCB-containing devices for the federal government and its later remediation efforts pursuant to a consent decree with the EPA. The plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that GE failed to meet the requirements for federal officer removal. The district court agreed, ordered remand, and stayed that order pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s jurisdictional determination de novo. It held that GE satisfied both the “acting under” and “for or relating to” elements of the federal officer removal statute, due to its extensive work producing PCB-containing devices for the federal government. The court reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether GE has a colorable federal defense. View "Czerno v. General Electric Company" on Justia Law