Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Bensenberg, age 85, was driving her 2008 Chrysler SUV when she lost consciousness during a medical episode. Her car entered a ditch beside the highway at 45-65 mph, hit a raised earthen driveway, became airborne, and struck a concrete post. The side-curtain airbag deployed when the vehicle’s sensors detected a potential roll-over, but the front airbag did not deploy. Bensenberg's seat belt deployed properly. Bensenberg suffered an undisplaced fracture of the second cervical vertebra in her neck. She wore a cervical collar for three months but did not require surgery. She died of unrelated causes three years later, after filing suit against the car manufacturer, alleging strict liability based on a manufacturing defect and a design defect in the airbag system.The district court granted a motion in limine to exclude the opinion of Bensenberg’s expert that the vehicle’s airbag was defective because the expert did not identify any purported defect in the airbag system but simply assumed from the airbag’s failure to deploy that it must have had a defect. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The opinion of the plaintiff’s expert is admissible to show that the vehicle was traveling at a rate of speed sufficient to command deployment of the front airbag when it collided with the post; this is sufficient to make a prima facie case of a non-specific defect in the airbag system within the parameters that Illinois courts have established. View "Bensenberg v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while she, her father, and others were tracking a wounded deer at night in the woods. Her father’s Remington Model 710 rifle accidentally discharged and injured her. Plaintiff and her family members filed suit in the district court.At issue before the circuit court is whether the district court erred when it held that Section 60 of the LPLA did not bar her from bringing a claim under Section 56 of the LPLA, which is a general section applicable to design-defect claims.The LPLA “establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products.” LA. STAT. ANN. Sec. 9:2800.52. The court found is that Section 60(B) unambiguously bars design defect claims. Plaintiff argues that because Section 60(C) precludes claims against manufacturers for improper use of firearms, that part of the statute is superfluous if Section 60(B) had already precluded all non-Section 55 manufacturing-defect claims against manufacturers.The court found Section 60(C) precludes claims based on conduct by a broader category of actors than Section 60(B). Further, the court disagreed with plaintiff’s argument that Remington’s interpretation would render Section 60(D) Section 60(E) superfluous. Section 60(B) does not block all failure-to-warn claims but only those based on harm resulting from a shooting injury by a specific actor subset. Finally, the court found that the plain text leads to preventing a meaningful category of potential claims against the manufacturers of firearms. The court reversed and rendered judgment for defendant. View "Seguin v. Remington Arms" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed failure-to-warn product liability claims against a medical device manufacturer based on the manufacturer’s failure to warn about certain risks of its electroconvulsive therapy (“ECT”) device. The district court granted summary judgment to the manufacturer, finding that Plaintiff’s evidence failed to show that stronger warnings from the manufacturer would have affected their physician’s decision to prescribe the product.Plaintiffs appealed, relying on testimony from their prescribing physicians that, had the manufacturer included stronger warnings, they would have communicated those warnings to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claimed that, in light of these warnings, they would not have given consent for the procedures.Finding that California law applies and that there is no binding precedent on the issue, the Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: Is a plaintiff required to show that a stronger risk warning would have altered the physician’s decision to prescribe the product? Or can a plaintiff establish causation by showing that the physician would have communicated the stronger risk warnings to the plaintiff and a prudent person in the patient’s position would have declined the treatment? View "MICHELLE HIMES V. SOMATICS, LLC" on Justia Law

Shelley Droz alleged that her husband, Eric Droz, used an arc grinding machine to resurface brake drum shoes that contained asbestos. She claimed the arc grinder manufacturer, Hennessy, knew that the grinding process generated asbestos dust, and Hennessy had a duty under Washington State law to warn about the dangers of asbestos dust exposure. Eric Droz died of mesothelioma while the litigation was pending. The Superior Court granted Hennessy’s summary judgment motion, holding that once Hennessy showed that the arc grinder could be used with asbestos-containing and asbestos-free brake drum shoes, the burden shifted to Ms. Droz to show that Mr. Droz used asbestos-containing brake drum shoes with the arc grinder. The court agreed with Hennessy that Droz did not offer sufficient evidence of exposure to brake drum shoe asbestos dust to counter Hennessy’s summary judgment motion. The issues for the Delaware Supreme Court were whether the Superior Court misapplied Superior Court Rule 56’s burden-shifting framework and, once the burden shifted to the plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact, whether Ms. Droz came forward with evidence demonstrating that Mr. Droz used asbestos-containing brake drum shoes with the arc grinder. The Supreme Court found the Superior Court properly allocated the summary judgment burdens. But the Court reversed, finding Ms. Droz met her burden to raise a genuine issue of material fact whether Mr. Droz was exposed to asbestos dust from using the arc grinder with asbestos-containing brake drum shoes. View "Droz v. Hennessy Industries, LLC" on Justia Law

While driving over 100 miles per hour, Christal McGee rear-ended a car driven by Wentworth Maynard, causing him to suffer severe injuries. When the collision occurred, McGee was using a “Speed Filter” feature within Snapchat, a mobile phone application, to record her real-life speed on a photo or video that she could then share with other Snapchat users. Wentworth and his wife, Karen Maynard, sued McGee and Snapchat, Inc. (“Snap”), alleging that Snap negligently designed Snapchat’s Speed Filter. The trial court dismissed the design-defect claim against Snap, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Snap did not owe a legal duty to the Maynards because a manufacturer’s duty to design reasonably safe products does not extend to people injured by a third party’s intentional and tortious misuse of the manufacturer’s product. On certiorari, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred: "a manufacturer has a duty under our decisional law to use reasonable care in selecting from alternative designs to reduce reasonably foreseeable risks of harm posed by its products. When a particular risk of harm from a product is not reasonably foreseeable, a manufacturer owes no design duty to reduce that risk. How a product was being used (e.g., intentionally, negligently, properly, improperly, or not at all) and who was using it (the plaintiff or a third party) when an injury occurred are relevant considerations in determining whether a manufacturer could reasonably foresee a particular risk of harm from its product. Nevertheless, our decisional law does not recognize a blanket exception to a manufacturer’s design duty in all cases of intentional or tortious third-party use." Because the holding of the Court of Appeals conflicted with these principles, and because the Maynards adequately alleged Snap could have reasonably foreseen the particular risk of harm from the Speed Filter at issue here, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maynard, et al. v. Snapchat, Inc." on Justia Law

California’s 1986 Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, Health & Saf. Code 25249.5, Proposition 65, provides that no business shall "knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear and reasonable warning.” Mercury compounds are listed as Proposition 65 reproductive toxins. Cosmetics containing 0.0001 percent or more of mercury are prohibited under federal law, 21 U.S.C. 331(a)–(c). Lee alleged skin-lightening creams offered for sale on Amazon’s Web site sold by third parties, contain mercury.The trial court concluded that Amazon is immune from liability under the federal Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230, and that Lee failed to establish elements required by Proposition 65. The court of appeal reversed. The stated reasons for concluding that a laboratory test finding a high level of mercury in one unit of a skin-lightening cream is an insufficient basis for inferring other units of the same product contain mercury do not withstand scrutiny. The trial court erred in ruling that Lee was required to prove Amazon had actual knowledge the products contained mercury and in excluding evidence of constructive knowledge. The negligent failure to warn claim did not seek to hold a website owner liable as the “publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider,” so CDA did not bar the claim. View "Lee v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court granting a writ of mandate directing the trial court to issue a new order denying Ford Motor Company's motion to exclude all of Plaintiff's proffered deposition testimony, holding that the court of appeal erroneously construed Wahlgren as establishing a categorical bar to admitted deposition testimony under Cal. Evid. Code 1291(a)(2).Plaintiff, a putative member of a federal multidistrict class action suit against Ford arising from the diesel engine used in some of Ford's vehicles, opted out of a federal suit in order to pursue his own lawsuit. Plaintiff filed ten designations of deposition testimony listing the depositions of nine out-of-state Ford employees or former employees had given deposition testimony in the federal action or in subsequent related California opt-out litigation that Plaintiff proposed to introduce at trial. Ford moved to exclude the proffered testimony, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court’s analysis was incompatible with (1) the established principle that the party proposing to introduce evidence under section 1291(a)(2)’s former testimony exception to the hearsay rule bears the burden of establishing the requirements for admission; and (2) the Legislature’s official comment reflecting its understanding when it enacted the provision at issue as part of the Evidence Code in 1965. View "Berroteran v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Cortez sued Cook, alleging that she was injured by an Inferior Vena Cava Filter, implanted in her in 2006 for the prevention of pulmonary embolisms. Cortez’s action was part of consolidated multidistrict proceedings. Accordingly, Cortez filed a Short‐Form Complaint that incorporated counts from the Master Consolidated Complaint for Individual Claims, alleging product liability, negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, and violations of Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act.Cook argued that the product liability claims were filed beyond the time period in the statute of repose of Cortez’s home state, Oregon. Cortez countered that the Oregon statute incorporates Indiana law because the product was manufactured there, which allows for equitable tolling of the limitations period, and that the complaint sufficiently alleged entitlement to tolling based on fraudulent concealment. She alleged that Cook knew the product was defective and, through affirmative misrepresentations and omissions, actively concealed significant risks, continuing to promote the Filter as safe and effective even though inadequate clinical trials had been performed.The district court dismissed the claims, finding the allegations insufficient to demonstrate fraudulent concealment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying Indiana law. Because these product liability claims are subject to a statute of repose, and fraudulent concealment cannot extend the time to file claims for such a statute, the claims are untimely. View "Cortez v. Cook Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (the Agency) has not established a clear policy objective concerning automatic emergency breaking (AEB) technology that preempts state tort law claims based on an auto manufacturer's alleged failure to install AEB.Plaintiff sued Chrysler alleging negligence, defective product design, defective product warning, and wrongful death. Chrysler moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that it was preempted given the Agency's objectives regarding the development and deployment of AEB technology. The trial court granted Chrysler's motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Agency did not intend to preempt tort claims based on the absence of AEB. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order, holding (1) the Agency has neither conveyed an authoritative statement establishing manufacturer choice as a significant federal policy objective nor made explicit a view that AEB should not be regulated; and (2) therefore, the Agency has not established a policy objective that actually conflicts with the claims at issue. View "Varela v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

Farnolo helped his clients file short‐form complaints in the multidistrict “Cook” litigation, involving product liability claims alleging injuries caused by Cook’s medical device—a filter designed to prevent pulmonary embolism. The case management order instructed all plaintiffs to complete a profile form with general personal and medical background information and details about their device and alleged injuries. In May 2019, the defendants notified attorney Farnolo that they did not have forms from his four clients. By late June, the forms still had not been filed. Farnolo never responded to the defendants' motion to dismiss.The district court dismissed the cases on July 19, 2019. Farnolo learned about the dismissal not by monitoring the docket, but from his client more than a year later. On August 18, 2020, he moved for reconsideration and reinstatement of the cases, claiming that he did not receive an electronic docket notification of the motion to dismiss; he attributed his delay in asking for reconsideration to his email inbox sending the dismissal order to his junk folder. The district court denied Farnolo’s motion as both untimely and meritless. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; all Rule 60(b) motions must be made within a “reasonable time” and Rule 60(c)(1) specifically requires requests for reconsideration predicated on excusable neglect to be brought within one year of entry of judgment. Inexcusable attorney negligence is not an exceptional circumstance justifying relief. View "Sides v. Cook Medical Inc." on Justia Law