Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. and its affiliates, former processors and distributors of industrial chemicals including talc, faced thousands of asbestos-related tort claims after selling their operating assets in 2004. In 2023, following a $29 million jury verdict in South Carolina for a plaintiff diagnosed with mesothelioma, the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas appointed a receiver to manage Whittaker’s assets. The receiver was granted broad authority to administer Whittaker’s assets and protect its interests, but the order did not explicitly remove the board’s authority over corporate affairs.Whittaker’s board, without consulting the receiver, authorized a bankruptcy filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. The receiver moved to dismiss the bankruptcy, arguing that only he had authority to file. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, finding the board retained authority under New Jersey law, and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed. Meanwhile, the Official Committee of Talc Claimants intervened in an adversary proceeding, contesting whether certain successor liability claims against a nondebtor (Brenntag) were property of the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to the debtors, holding that these claims belonged to the estate, and certified the decision for direct appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed both lower courts. It held that an improperly filed bankruptcy petition is not a jurisdictional defect but may be grounds for dismissal. The court determined that under New Jersey law, the board retained authority to file for bankruptcy because the South Carolina receiver had not been recognized by a New Jersey court. The court also held that successor liability claims based on a “product line” theory are general claims belonging to the bankruptcy estate, not to individual creditors, following its precedent in In re Emoral. View "In re Whittaker Clark & Daniels Inc." on Justia Law

A woman was injured when a heat lamp manufactured by a company made contact with her foot during an acupuncture session performed by a physician. She initially sued the physician and his employer for medical malpractice. The physician then filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer, alleging product liability. The injured woman subsequently filed a direct product liability claim against the manufacturer. The manufacturer raised special defenses, asserting that both the woman and the physician bore comparative responsibility for her injuries and that, if found liable, it would be entitled to contribution from the physician. Before trial concluded, the physician withdrew his third-party complaint. The jury found the manufacturer 80 percent responsible and the physician 20 percent responsible for the woman’s damages.After judgment was rendered, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the judgment as to the medical malpractice claim against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but affirmed the product liability judgment, including the jury’s allocation of comparative responsibility. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied the manufacturer’s petition for certification to appeal, and the woman withdrew her appeals after receiving payment in satisfaction of the judgment.The manufacturer and its insurer then filed a contribution action against the physician, seeking to recover 20 percent of the amount paid to the injured woman. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer. On appeal, the physician argued that he was not a party subject to the comparative responsibility provisions of the Connecticut Product Liability Act and that the contribution action was untimely.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that all defendants in an action involving a product liability claim, regardless of whether they are product sellers, are subject to comparative responsibility under the statute. The Court also held that a contribution action is timely if brought within one year after all appellate proceedings in the underlying action are final. The judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer was affirmed. View "Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang" on Justia Law

Peterson’s Oil Service, Inc. supplied heating fuel to customers in Massachusetts between 2012 and 2019. The fuel contained higher-than-standard levels of biodiesel, averaging 35% between 2015 and 2018, exceeding the 5% industry standard for ordinary heating oil. Customers alleged that this biodiesel-blended fuel was incompatible with conventional heating systems, caused repeated heat loss, and resulted in permanent damage to their equipment. They brought a class action in Massachusetts state court against Peterson’s and its officers, asserting claims for breach of contract, fraud, and negligence, including allegations that Peterson’s continued supplying the fuel despite customer complaints and only later disclosed the high biodiesel content.United States Fire Insurance Company and The North River Insurance Company had issued Peterson’s a series of commercial general liability and umbrella policies. The insurers initially defended Peterson’s in the class action under a reservation of rights, then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts seeking a declaration that they owed no duty to defend or indemnify Peterson’s. The insurers moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims did not arise from a covered “occurrence” and that policy provisions limiting or excluding coverage for failure to supply applied. The district court denied summary judgment, finding a genuine dispute as to whether Peterson’s actions were accidental and holding that the failure-to-supply provisions were ambiguous and did not apply.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The court held that the underlying complaint alleged a potentially covered “occurrence” because it was possible Peterson’s did not intend or expect the property damage alleged. The court also held that the failure-to-supply provisions were ambiguous and, under Massachusetts law, must be construed in favor of coverage. The district court’s summary judgment rulings were affirmed. View "United States Fire Insurance Company v. Peterson's Oil Service, Inc." on Justia Law

A pet food manufacturer, Sunshine Mills, had a longstanding business relationship with Nutra-Blend, a supplier of animal nutrient products. For years, Sunshine Mills ordered a specific concentration of Vitamin D3 (Vitamin D3 7500) from Nutra-Blend for use in its dog food. In 2017, due to a miscommunication, Nutra-Blend shipped a different, much more concentrated product (Vitamin D3 500) instead. Sunshine Mills, unaware of the difference and believing Nutra-Blend only sold one type of Vitamin D3, accepted and used the product, resulting in several dogs developing Vitamin D toxicity, with some becoming ill or dying.After the incident, Sunshine Mills sued Nutra-Blend in the Lee County Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, a claim under the Mississippi Products Liability Act (MPLA), and common-law negligence. Nutra-Blend moved for summary judgment, arguing that all claims were subsumed by the MPLA and failed on other grounds. Sunshine Mills abandoned its tort-based claims, leaving only the contract-based claims. The Lee County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Nutra-Blend on all claims, finding no genuine issues of material fact.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and held that the MPLA does not govern Sunshine Mills’ remaining claims because they do not allege damages caused by a defective product, but rather by breach of contract and implied warranty. The court clarified that the MPLA applies only to claims for damages caused by defective products, not to contract-based claims between commercial entities. The court also found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding both the breach of contract and implied warranty claims, precluding summary judgment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sunshine Mills, Inc. v. Nutra-Blend, LLC" on Justia Law

Three plaintiffs alleged they suffered injuries after receiving the Gardasil vaccine, which is designed to prevent certain strains of human papillomavirus. Each plaintiff experienced adverse symptoms following their Gardasil injections, but the onset of these symptoms occurred more than three years before they filed petitions for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The plaintiffs acknowledged to the special master that their petitions were untimely and sought equitable tolling of the Vaccine Act’s limitations period.The special master in the United States Court of Federal Claims found the petitions untimely and denied equitable tolling, resulting in dismissal of the claims. The plaintiffs then filed suit against Merck & Co. and Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, which was handling multi-district litigation related to Gardasil. Merck moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to timely pursue their remedies under the Vaccine Act. The district court dismissed the complaints, holding that the proper forum for challenging the special master’s timeliness rulings was the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit, not the district court. The court also rejected a constitutional challenge to the process by which Gardasil was added to the Vaccine Injury Table.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Fourth Circuit held that the addition of Gardasil to the Vaccine Injury Table did not violate the Constitution. It further held that timely participation in the Vaccine Act compensation program is a prerequisite to bringing a tort suit, and that courts hearing vaccine-related tort suits may not reconsider the timeliness of a Vaccine Act petition once the special master has made a finding. The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaints. View "Needham v. Merck & Company Inc." on Justia Law

Kyle Messerli died from acute intoxication after repeatedly inhaling Difluoroethane gas contained in computer duster cans, a practice known as “huffing.” He became addicted to the substance, using multiple cans daily, and ultimately overdosed. His father, Robbin Messerli, acting individually and as representative of Kyle’s estate, sued several manufacturers and distributors of the computer duster products. The lawsuit alleged that the companies knew their products were being abused but failed to take adequate steps to reduce harm, including ineffective warnings and product design changes.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas reviewed the case. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Kansas law bars tort recovery when the plaintiff’s injuries result from their own illegal acts. The district court agreed, finding that the illegality defense—where a plaintiff’s illegal conduct proximately causes their injury—remains valid under Kansas law and was not abrogated by the state’s adoption of comparative fault principles. The court dismissed Messerli’s claims and denied his subsequent motion to certify the question to the Kansas Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the illegality defense applies to products liability actions under Kansas law. The court held that the defense is still available, as neither the Kansas Legislature nor the Kansas Supreme Court has abrogated it. The court further determined that Kansas’s comparative fault regime does not implicitly eliminate the illegality defense, which is grounded in public policy against allowing recovery for injuries caused by one’s own illegal acts. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Messerli’s claims. View "Messerli v. AW Distributing" on Justia Law

After being diagnosed with lung cancer, Kirt Bjoin and his wife brought a lawsuit against J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (JMM) and others, alleging that Bjoin’s cancer was caused by exposure to asbestos dust generated when he cut JMM’s asbestos cement pipe with a power saw during the 1980s. Bjoin worked for his father’s company and later co-owned a pipe-laying business, during which time he frequently cut asbestos cement pipe without respiratory protection and claimed he was never warned of the associated risks. He argued that JMM should have provided warnings about the dangers of cutting the pipe with a power saw and the need for protective equipment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over a jury trial in which JMM asserted affirmative defenses, including that Bjoin was a sophisticated user who knew or should have known of the product’s dangers, and that using a power saw to cut the pipe was an unforeseeable misuse. The jury found in favor of JMM on these defenses and on the general negligence claim, concluding that Bjoin was a sophisticated user and that his method of cutting the pipe was not a reasonably foreseeable use. The trial court also granted JMM’s motion for nonsuit on the fraudulent concealment claim. Bjoin’s post-trial motion for a new trial was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that Bjoin failed to meet the high burden required to overturn a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, particularly because he did not adequately address evidence supporting JMM’s defenses. The court also found that Bjoin waived his claims regarding the admission of Cal-OSHA regulations and the product misuse instruction by failing to provide proper legal argument and standards. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of JMM, upholding the jury’s findings and the trial court’s rulings. View "Bjoin v. J-M Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

A general contractor was hired to oversee the construction of a hotel in Vermont and subcontracted with a firm to install metal siding panels manufactured by a third party. The subcontractor relied on installation instructions available on the manufacturer’s website, which did not specify the use of a splice plate to connect the panels. The panels were installed without splice plates, and after construction, the panels began to detach from the building, causing some to fall and damage nearby property. The contractor later discovered that the manufacturer had created an instruction sheet in 2006 recommending splice plates, but this information was not publicly available at the time of installation.The contractor initially sued the installer for breach of contract, warranty, and negligence in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division. The complaint was later amended to add a product liability claim against the manufacturer. After further discovery, the contractor sought to amend the complaint a third time to add new claims against the manufacturer, arguing that new evidence justified the amendment. The trial court denied this motion, citing undue delay and prejudice to the manufacturer, and granted summary judgment to the manufacturer on the product liability claim and on a crossclaim for implied indemnity brought by the installer, finding both barred by the economic-loss rule.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the third motion to amend due to undue delay and prejudice. It also held that the economic-loss rule barred the contractor’s product liability claim, as neither the “other-property” nor “special-relationship” exceptions applied. Finally, the Court found the contractor lacked standing to appeal the summary judgment on the installer’s implied indemnity claim. View "PeakCM, LLC v. Mountainview Metal Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

Peter Engilis, Jr. regularly used Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto, at his homes in Florida from 1990 to 2015. In 2014, he was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukemia, a type of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Engilis and his wife filed a lawsuit against Monsanto, alleging that his cancer was caused by exposure to Roundup. To support their claim, they relied on the expert opinion of Dr. Andrew Schneider, who conducted a differential etiology to determine the cause of Engilis’s cancer.The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California as part of multidistrict litigation involving similar claims against Monsanto. Monsanto moved to exclude Dr. Schneider’s specific causation opinion, arguing it was unreliable. The district court initially granted the motion without a hearing, but later vacated that order in part and held a Daubert hearing. During the hearing, Dr. Schneider was unable to reliably rule out obesity as a potential cause of Engilis’s cancer, conceding he could not determine whether Engilis was obese and failing to provide a reasoned basis for dismissing obesity as a risk factor. The district court found that Dr. Schneider’s methodology did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and excluded his testimony. With no admissible evidence of specific causation, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Monsanto.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of expert testimony for abuse of discretion and its summary judgment order de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Schneider’s opinion because it was not based on sufficient facts or data, as required by Rule 702. The court also clarified that there is no presumption in favor of admitting expert testimony under Rule 702. The summary judgment in favor of Monsanto was affirmed. View "ENGILIS V. MONSANTO COMPANY" on Justia Law

A 93-year-old woman with dysphagia was discharged from the hospital with a recommendation to consume puree-based meals and liquid additives produced by a food company. For about a month, her caretakers provided her with six of these meals and four servings of the additive daily. The product labels disclosed their sodium content. The woman suffered multiple cardiac arrests and was diagnosed with hypernatremia before passing away. Her estate, represented by her daughter, alleged that the company’s products caused her death and brought claims including strict products liability, breach of implied warranty, negligence, and wrongful death.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas excluded one of the estate’s expert reports for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), finding it lacked an opinion and was merely a recitation of facts. The court denied the estate’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the company on all claims, concluding that the estate failed to provide sufficient evidence or expert testimony to support its claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of the expert report for abuse of discretion and its grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert report, as the estate failed to comply with disclosure requirements and did not show the failure was justified or harmless. The court also affirmed summary judgment for the company, finding the estate did not present evidence that the products were defective or unreasonably dangerous, nor did it provide necessary expert testimony for its claims. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Howard v. Hormel Foods Corporation" on Justia Law