Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Billie Cornett received a drug-eluting stent to treat coronary artery disease. Five months later, a blood clot formed near the site of the stent and Cornett suffered a subacute stent thrombosis. Eleven days later, he died. In 2008, his widow, Vonnie Cornett, filed suit in New Jersey seeking damages for the injuries suffered by her husband and his estate. The issue presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether Vonnie Cornett filed her complaint within the statute of limitations, which required the New Jersey Court to determine whether the law of Kentucky or New Jersey applied to this case. The stent used in this case is a Class III medical device that was subject to the rigorous pre-market approval (PMA) process of the Food & Drug Administration (FDA). Therefore, another issue for the Court to decide was whether the various state statutory and common law claims are preempted by federal law governing approval of this medical device. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Kentucky statute of limitations governed this case and that Kentucky applies a discovery rule to product liability actions involving latent injuries and illnesses, but Cornett did not timely file her complaint. The Court also concluded that the great bulk of the state statutory and common law claims were preempted by federal law. View "Vonnie Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

India Graves, a six-month-old girl, died while being monitored by one of CAS Medical Systems' products. India's parents, Kareem and Tara Graves, subsequently filed a products liability lawsuit against CAS, contending the monitor was defectively designed and failed to alert them when India's heart rate and breathing slowed. The circuit court granted CAS's motion to exclude all of the Graves' expert witnesses and accordingly granted CAS summary judgment. The Graves appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of the Graves' computer experts. While the court did err in excluding one doctor's testimony, the Graves were still left with no expert opinions regarding any defects in the monitor. In the absence of this evidence, CAS was entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly the Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Graves v. CAS Medical Systems" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured at work, filed a product liability complaint, identifying himself as “Juan Ortiz,” the name he used at work. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, naming additional defendants, identifying himself as “Juan Ortiz.” Plaintiff identified himself as “Juan Ortiz” in discovery documents. In a deposition, plaintiff stated that his birth name was “Rogasciano Santiago,” but that he had also used the name “Juan Ortiz.” The trial court allowed a second amended complaint to identify plaintiff as “Rogasciano Santiago, f/k/a Juan Ortiz.” The appellate court held that, when a plaintiff intentionally files a complaint using a fictitious name, without leave of court pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-401, the court may dismiss with prejudice and that amendment, after expiration of the limitations period, to correct plaintiff’s name, requires dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A court has discretion to dismiss with prejudice a complaint filed using a fictitious name without leave of court. Dismissal is justified only when there is a clear record of willful conduct showing deliberate and continuing disregard for judicial authority and a finding that lesser sanctions are inadequate to remedy harm to the judiciary and prejudice to the opposing party. The original complaint is not a nullity, per se, and an amended complaint correcting the name may relate back to initial filing. View "Santiago v. E.W. Bliss Co." on Justia Law

Parents of a young man killed in a helicopter accident in British Columbia appealed an Indiana trial court's dismissal of their complaint in favor of the Canadian forum, arguing that their claim should be tried in Indiana because they would only be entitled to nominal damages under British Columbia law. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment after adopting the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, holding that British Columbia provided an available and adequate forum under applicable law, and the trial court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens.View "Otieno v. Rolls-Royce Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a products liability action brought by Jesus Hurtado and John Reitsma, d/b/a J & J Calf Ranch (J & J), against Land O'Lakes, Inc. (Land O'Lakes). J & J alleged that the Land O'Lakes milk replacer it used to feed its dairy calves was defective and caused the death of more than one hundred calves. A jury found in favor of J & J and awarded damages. Land O'Lakes appealed, arguing that the district court improperly admitted expert testimony and that J & J failed to prove both liability and damages. Land O'Lakes petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate the judgment of the district court and enter judgment in its favor or, alternatively, to vacate the judgment and order a new trial. J & J cross-appealed the district court's award of attorney fees, arguing that the court abused its discretion by excluding fees incurred before and during previous litigation in this matter. J & J petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate the award of attorney fees and remand with instructions to include attorney fees accrued in the first trial in its calculation of reasonable attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Land O'Lakes waived issues regarding expert testimony. The Court affirmed the jury verdict because it was supported by substantial competent evidence and affirmed the district court's award of attorney fees because it properly exercised its discretion. View "Jesus Hurtado v. Land O' Lakes, Inc." on Justia Law

The Estate of Stanley Pinkham appealed a superior court judgment granting Cargill, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment on the Estate’s complaint. In 2004, Mr. Pinkham consumed a boneless turkey sandwich that contained a piece of bone. The turkey was "manufactured" by Cargill, Inc. The bone caused an esophageal tear requiring surgery (Mr. Pinkham died several years later after sustaining his injury. He did not sue for wrongful death). Three affidavits that the Estate relied on to defeat Cargill's motion for summary judgment were held inadmissible at trial. After consideration, the trial court granted Cargill's motion noting that Maine had not established the requisite test to use when evaluating a strict liability claim for allegedly defective food pursuant to its strict liability statute. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Estate argued that it provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, thereby rendering summary judgment inappropriate. The Estate further argued that the court erred in concluding that the Estate failed to meet its burden of proof to establish facts from which a fact-finder could infer that Cargill’s boneless turkey product was defective. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that summary judgment was not proper given the facts presented in this case, and vacated the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Stanley Pinkham v. Cargill, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that her husband's death was caused by Defendant's negligence in installing or removing asbestos-containing materials and brought product-liability and contractor-negligence claims against Defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding (1) the application or removal of asbestos-containing products or asbestos-insulted equipment by a contractor is an improvement to real property, and (2) thus, the claim had not been brought within the time Indiana law requires for a claim arising from the construction of an improvement to real property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's work constituted an "improvement to real property," as that phase was commonly understood.View "Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Troy Lofton alleged he suffered from asbestosis as a result of exposure to the Defendant's product, Flosal, during the course of his employment on various oil and gas drilling rigs. Petitioner filed suit in 2004, alleging two theories of product liability (design defect and inadequate warning), as well as claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Petitioner on his claims of design defect and negligent infliction of emotional distress, with one hundred percent of the liability assigned to Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP, successor-in-interest to ConocoPhillips Company, formerly known as Phillips Petroleum Company, and Phillips 66 Company, formerly doing business as Drilling Specialties Company (CPChem) and total damages in the amount of $15,200,000. CPChem's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and its motion for new trial and/or remittur were denied. Aggrieved, CPChem filed this appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial due to the trial court's error in allowing Petitioner's counsel to read from drilling records that were not admitted into evidence during the cross-examination of CPChem’s expert pulmonologist. View "Phillips 66 Co. v. Lofton" on Justia Law

In 2009, Charles Larry McGraw filed a personal-injury action against four sand suppliers: Clark Sand Company, Inc.; Mississippi Valley Silica Co., Inc.; Precision Packaging, Inc.; and Custom Aggregates and Grinding, Inc. McGraw alleged the four defendants' sand caused his lung disease, silicosis. On the day of the trial, after the jury had heard the parties' opening statements, the court recessed, and the parties reached a settlement agreement. Subsequently, McGraw filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add his wife as a plaintiff and American Optical Corporation as an additional defendant. He then filed an amended motion for leave to amend his complaint (First Amended Complaint) to modify his request to add four more defendants: Lonestar Industries, Inc.; Specialty Sand Company; Pearl Sands, Inc.; and Pearl Specialty Sand, Inc. In early 2010, the trial court granted McGraw's amended motion and allowed him to add the five new defendants to the complaint. McGraw later filed a Second Amended Complaint, which added a sixth defendant, Dependable Abrasives, Inc., without seeking leave of court. All six defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal concerning the trial court's order denying their Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint and Dismiss First Amended Complaint. The defendants argued that, because the original parties settled with McGraw prior to his motions for leave to amend, the trial court improperly allowed the filing of the First Amended Complaint to add new parties. The defendants also argue that, because McGraw did not seek court approval in filing his Second Amended Complaint, that complaint should be struck. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing McGraw to file his Second Amended Complaint, because he was required to obtain court approval. However, the Court found that the trial court did comply with the rules of procedure when it allowed McGraw to file his First Amended Complaint. The Court therefore affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and reversed the denial of the motion to strike the Second Amended Complaint. View "Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. McGraw" on Justia Law

Steven Funkhouser, administrator of the estate of Emily Funkhouser, brought this products liability action against Ford Motor Company and Obaugh Ford, Inc. (collectively "Ford") after his daughter, Emily, died from severe burns she suffered when the family's Ford Windstar minivan caught fire. The circuit court ruled that evidence of seven other Winstar van fires was inadmissible. The parties then entered into an agreed final order wherein Funkhouser stipulated that absent evidence of those fires, he would be unable to prove his failure to warn claims, and therefore, entry of summary judgment was proper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in its application of Virginia law governing admissibility of other similar occurrences and in excluding evidence of four of the other Windstar van fires; and (2) the evidence of three of the Windstar van fires was inadmissible. Remanded.View "Funkhouser v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law