Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Andrea Ruiz was driving a Kia Spectra when she was involved in an automobile accident in which the driver’s-side frontal air bag failed to deploy. Andrea died from dislocated vertebrae in her neck. The Ruiz family filed a products liability action against Kia Motors Corporation and Kia Motors America, Inc. (collectively, “Kia”), and the trial court entered judgment against Kia. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the presumption of nonliability in Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 82.008 did not apply in this case; (2) the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s design-defect finding; but (3) the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence of other, dissimilar incidents, and the error was harmful. View "Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Saul Morales was fleeing from the police when one of the police officers left his Ford vehicle, then pursued and apprehended Morales. The officer’s vehicle began rolling backward toward the pair while the officer attempted to handcuff Morales. The vehicle ran over and came to rest on top of Morales, injuring him. Morales sued Ford Motor Company and the car’s seller (collectively, “Ford”), alleging that the vehicle had a design defect. After deposing two of Ford’s expert witnesses, Morales sought to depose a corporate representative of each expert’s employer to expose potential bias. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that on the facts of this case, the Rules of Civil Procedure did not permit such discovery. View "In re Ford Motor Co. & Ken Stoepel Ford, Inc." on Justia Law

M.L. was born in 2003. At his 15-month well-child visit, his pediatrician noted that M.L. was walking and generally developing normally but did not “want to talk.” In 2005, M.L. received several immunizations, including the DTaP vaccination. Hours later, M.L. allegedly began experiencing an abnormally high fever and swelling. He was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of “vaccine adverse reaction with secondary fever, angiodema, and anaphylactoid reaction.” The morning after his discharge, M.L.’s mother called an ambulance because M.L. was exhibiting signs of hypothermia and seizure-like episodes. In the months that followed, M.L.’s vocabulary allegedly decreased. An MRI of M.L.’s brain with and without contrast was normal. After observing M.L.’s developmental delays and repetitive behaviors, a pediatric neurologist placed M.L. in the autism spectrum disorder category. A special master rejected claims under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to -34, and the Claims Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. While the DTaP vaccination likely caused the initial anaphylactic reaction, there was no reliable medical theory that the M.L.’s anaphylaxis caused a focal brain injury. View "LaLonde v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Decedent's family (the Kings) sued Toyota and the local Toyota dealership after Decedent lost control of his Toyota, which rolled over several times. The Kings asserted that the Toyota's allegedly defective seat belt system caused Decedent's ejection from the car and his subsequent death. The jury returned a verdict in Toyota's favor, and the trial court signed a corresponding judgment. The Kings moved for a new trial, alleging that Toyota's counsel had violated the trial court's limine rulings. The trial court granted the Kings' motion. Toyota subsequently filed an original proceeding in the Supreme Court. At issue was whether an appellate court may, in an original proceeding, determine whether the reasonably specific and legally sound rationale of the trial court for ordering a new trial was actually true. The Court conditionally granted relief, holding (1) an appellate court may conduct a merits review of the basis for a new trial order after a trial court has set aside a jury verdict, and if the record does not support the trial court's rationale for ordering a new trial, the appellate court may grant mandamus relief; and (2) in this case, the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial. View "In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Susan and Steven Schrock filed suit against manufacturers of the drug metoclopramide, alleging that Susan's use of the generic drug caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia. In a series of orders, the district court dismissed all claims in favor of the manufacturer. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the dismissal of their claims against PLIVA USA, Inc., Qualitest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Schwarz Pharma, Inc., and Wyeth, Inc. The Tenth Circuit abated this appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in "Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett" (133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013)). In light of "Bartlett," the Tenth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' breach-of-warranty claims against PLIVA and Qualitest were preempted by federal law. The Court also agreed with the district court that plaintiffs' non-warranty claims against the generic manufacturers were barred by Oklahoma’s two year statute of limitations. With respect to the plaintiffs' claims against Schwarz and Wyeth, the Court agreed with the district court’s determination that Oklahoma tort law would not provide a remedy. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs' notice of appeal was untimely as to certain orders they sought to appeal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court.View "Schrock, et al v. Wyeth Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Billie Jo Major sued Security Equipment Corporation (SEC) alleging that the company failed to provide adequate warning to her employer, the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC), on the risks of its oleoresin capsicum pepper spray. Plaintiff alleged that the use of the spray in a training exercise worsened existing bronchial difficulties and caused her permanent injury. The district court granted partial summary judgment to SEC on the grounds that plaintiff failed to create a material issue of fact on whether her injuries were a known or foreseeable risk prior to March 2008 (the date of sale to IDOC). In a motion to reconsider, plaintiff submitted a second affidavit from her expert which was declared a sham affidavit by the district court in its denial of the motion. The district court later granted summary judgment to SEC on the sole remaining issue, the viability of plaintiff's claim under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA). Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the district court, vacated its judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Major v. Security Eq Corp" on Justia Law

Appellee AGCO Corporation (AGCO) manufactured and sold a self-propelled, agricultural spray applicator called the "RoGator." In 2005, AGCO began offering an Extended Protection Plan (EPP) to its RoGator customers. Appellant Lloyd’s Syndicate No. 5820 d/b/a Cassidy Davis provided the master policy of insurance for the EPP program, which covered AGCO for certain liability to customers who purchased the RoGator EPP. Glynn General Corporation administered the plans. Between 2005 and 2008, AGCO enrolled about 2,050 RoGator machines in the EPP program. In 2008, a number of customers presented claims under the EPP based on the failure of wheel motors on the RoGator. After it paid about 25 claims related to this failure, Cassidy Davis invoked the "Epidemic Failure Clause" of the master insurance policy and refused to pay for any more claims. AGCO then sued Cassidy Davis asserting various claims, namely claims for breach of contract and bad faith denial of insurance coverage. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to AGCO and denied partial summary judgment to Cassidy Davis on a breach of contract issue, holding that the EPP covered failures caused by design and engineering defects in the RoGators. The trial court also denied Cassidy Davis’s motion for summary judgment on the bad faith claim, rejecting the insurer’s argument that it was not obligated to indemnify AGCO until a court entered a judgment establishing AGCO’s legal liability to its customers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on both issues. Cassidy Davis appealed, arguing: (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the coverage provision of the extended protection plan; and (2) the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the indemnity provision of the master policy of liability insurance. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the relevant language of both contracts. Therefore the Court reversed on both issues. View "Lloyd's Syndicate No. 5820 v. AGCO Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint against Cardinal under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, based on an implied false certification of "merchantability" by Cardinal to the VA in connection with the sales of Cardinal's Signature Edition Infusion Device (Signature pump). In regards to plaintiff's implied false certification theory, plaintiff's new allegations that merchantability was a "standard condition," or material condition, of Cardinal's contract with the VA, or that the VA would not have paid for the Signature pumps had it known of the defect, were deficient under Rule 9(b). In regards to plaintiff's claim that the Signature pumps were worthless goods, plaintiff failed to allege that any Signature pump sold to the VA over nine years was ever found to be deficient or worthless; failed to allege that any patient was harmed due to the use of the Signature pump at a VA hospital; and that the VA was ever sued due to injury caused by a malfunctioning pump. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to plead her claims with sufficient particularity and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint.View "United States, ex rel. Leslie Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Rebecca B. McDonald, as administrator of the estate of her son Jeremy Wayne McDonald, sued Kubota Manufacturing of America Corporation, Kubota Corporation, and Kubota Tractor Corporation, asserting various claims after her son died as a result of injuries sustained when a Kubota lawnmower he was operating rolled over, pinning him underneath it. Following a three-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Kubota defendants, and the trial court entered a judgment on that verdict. McDonald's subsequent motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court, and McDonald appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that she was entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct and errors the trial court made when instructing the jury. Finding no abuse of discretion nor errors at trial, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "McDonald v. Kubota Manufacturing of America Corporation et al. " on Justia Law

A group of Texas plaintiffs alleged that a corporation exposed two employees to chemicals that caused two of the employees' children to suffer from birth defects. The Superior Court judge excluded expert testimony as irrelevant under Delaware law because it would have been insufficient as a matter of Texas law. The judge did not reach the testimony's reliability under Delaware law. Because the plaintiffs waived their argument that California or Delaware substantive law applied, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judge's ruling that Texas substantive law applies. But before the Court could address whether a judge may consider substantive sufficiency when analyzing procedural admissibility, the case was remanded for the Superior Court judge to determine in the first instance whether the testimony at issue is excludable on reliability grounds.View "Tumlinson, et al. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc." on Justia Law