Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

The Administrators of the estates of two individuals killed in a single-engine airplane crash filed wrongful death actions against Honeywell International, Inc., the manufacturer of the plane’s autopilot system, alleging that Honeywell breached of the warranty of merchantability. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Honeywell. The Administrators appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erroneously admitted hearsay statements in testimony regarding an accident investigation report prepared by the Mooney Airplane Company describing its investigation of the crash, and their admission was not harmless error; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting certain opinion testimony and in allowing Honeywell’s counsel to make certain statements during closing argument. View "Harman v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

A 2006 class action against Pella, a window manufacturer, alleged that certain windows had a design defect that allowed water to enter behind exterior aluminum cladding and damage the wooden frame and the house itself. The district judge certified a class for customers who had already replaced or repaired their windows, seeking damages and limited to six states, and another for those who had not, seeking only declaratory relief nationwide. Initially, there was one named plaintiff, Saltzman. His son-in-law, Weiss, was lead class counsel. Weiss is under investigation for multiple improprieties. The Seventh Circuit upheld the certifications. Class counsel negotiated a settlement in 2011 that directed Pella to pay $11 million in attorneys’ fees based on an assertion that the settlement was worth $90 million to the class. In 2013, before the deadline for filing claims, the district judge approved the settlement, which purports to bind a single nation-wide class of all owners of defective windows, whether or not they have replaced or repaired the windows. The agreement gave lead class counsel “sole discretion” to allocate attorneys’ fees; Weiss proposed to allocate 73 percent to his own firm. Weiss removed four original class representatives who opposed the settlement; their replacements joined Saltzman in supporting it. Named plaintiffs were each compensated $5,000 or $10,000 for their services, if they supported the settlement. Saltzman, as lead class representative, was to receive $10,000. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reversed, referring to “eight largely wasted years,” the need to remove Saltzman, Weiss, and Weiss’s firm as class representative and as class counsel, and to reinstate the four named plaintiffs. View "Riva v. Pella Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners were two German limited liability corporations who were sued by a homeowners association for alleged construction defects in plumbing parts. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they had no direct connection to Nevada, did not manufacture or distribute the allegedly faulty plumbing parts, and had no responsibility or control over their American subsidiaries such that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. The district court asserted jurisdiction over Petitioners, determining that the companies’ American subsidiaries acted as Petitioners’ agents and concluding that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of prohibition challenging the validity of the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them. The district court granted the petition, holding that no agency relationship was shown in this case, and accordingly, the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in imputing the subsidiaries’ contacts to Petitioners. View "Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Novartis in the Western District of Texas, then the case was transferred by the Judicial Panel on MDL to the Middle District of Tennessee. Plaintiffs' compliant alleged, inter alia, that Novartis failed to notify the public and physicians of the possibility of suffering osteonecrosis of the jaw until 2004 and failing to notify dental professionals until 2005. The MDL court granted partial summary judgment to Novartis and ruled that: (1) Texas law applied to plaintiffs' case, and (2) Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 82.007(a) - which provides manufacturers a rebuttable presumption against liability for failing to warn - foreclosed plaintiffs' failure to warn claims. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' remaining claims. The court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) and Rule 60(b) motions; the remand court properly applied the law of the case when it refused to reconsider the MDL court's rulings that section 82.007 applied to plaintiffs' failure to warn claims; and the remand court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' warranty claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McKay, et al v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp." on Justia Law

In 2012, nineteen plaintiff families filed a single complaint alleging products liability and negligence claims against Defendants. In 2013, six plaintiff families filed a single complaint also alleging products liability and negligence claims against Defendants. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court referred Plaintiffs as two civil actions to the Mass Litigation Panel. The Panel entered an order that transformed the two civil actions into twenty-five separate actions. Plaintiffs sought a writ of prohibition to preclude enforcement of the order on the grounds that the Panel did not have the authority to alter their status as two civil actions. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the Panel did not have the authority to separate the cases. View "State ex rel. J.C. v. Judge Mazzone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-insurance company filed suit against Defendant-manufacturer, alleging various theories of products liability. Defendant raised the defense of a lack of personal jurisdiction in its answer but did not file a motion to dismiss the case on that basis. Twelve months after filing its answer to the complaint, during which time Defendant pursued litigation on the merits, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of a lack of personal jurisdiction. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding (1) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant, but Defendant waived this defense by litigating the merits of the case and thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the court; and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed as to the merits, which precluded the entry of summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) where a party raises the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in a responsive pleading, the party’s subsequent conduct may, in some circumstances, result in a forfeiture of that defense; and (2) the superior court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this case. View "Am Int’l Ins. Co. v. Robert Seuffer GmbH & Co. KG" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed various products liability and general tort claims against the Brand Defendants - who initially developed and received FDA approval for metoclopramide - and Generic Defendants - who manufactured and sold the product that plaintiff used. Plaintiff alleged that as a result of his prolonged use of the drug metoclopramide, he developed tardive dyskinesia. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his claims against the Brand Defendants and grant of summary judgment to the Generic Defendants. The court held that plaintiff's products liability claims against the Generic Defendants were preempted under the holdings and reasoning of PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, and that plaintiff failed to adequately plead any parallel claims. The court also held that plaintiff's claims against the Brand Defendants failed because plaintiff did not use the Brand Defendants' products and because Texas did not recognize a duty to a consumer who uses a competitor's products. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the Generic Defendants and grant of summary judgment to the Brand Defendants. View "Eckhardt, et al. v. Qualitest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence and strict products liability suit against Stryker, the manufacturer and seller of the pain pump that was inserted into her shoulder to mitigate her pain while recovering from surgery. Plaintiff's husband filed a claim for loss of consortium. The court concluded that Stryker could not have foreseen the potential for articular cartilage damage as the result of the surgical implementation of its pain pump on the medical community's knowledge in 2002; Stryker, as a matter of law, had no duty to protect or warn plaintiff of the harm that Stryker's pain pumps may inflict; and the FDA denials did not indicate to Stryker that use of its pain pumps in intra-articular spaces was unsafe or could result in foreseeable harm. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Stryker. View "Mack, et al. v. Stryker Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Tommie Patterson’s vehicle was struck from behind when he braked to avoid a car stalled in his lane of travel. He sued the owner of the stalled vehicle and subpoenaed her for trial, but she refused to appear. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court should have issued a warrant or an order to show cause to compel the appearance of this party. In addition, the superior court instructed the jury on Patterson’s products liability claim against Ford Motor Company (manufacturer of Patterson's vehicle), but this claim was erroneously omitted from the special verdict form. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court’s judgment and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Patterson v. Cox" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Linda Two Two and Patricia Fodge filed a complaint against defendant that included claims for negligence and strict liability. Plaintiffs alleged that they had been injured in separate incidents in 2008 when an elevator in the building in which they worked dropped unexpectedly and stopped abruptly. In their negligence claim, plaintiffs alleged that defendant had negligently designed, installed, and maintained that elevator and that defendant's negligence was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. In their strict liability claim, plaintiffs alleged that defendant had designed, installed, and constructed the elevator and that the elevator was defective and dangerous. Defendant sought summary judgment on both claims. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on both claims. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court decided that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' negligence claim, but did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' strict liability claim. View "Two Two v. Fujitec America, Inc." on Justia Law