Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

In 1994 Hartman’s father gave him a muzzle-loading rifle that was designed to use black powder as a propellant. The gun ignited newer, pelletized propellants erratically. In 2008, Hartman installed a kit on his gun. The kit was sold by KR Warranty, the maker of the rifle; it modified the muzzleloader and enabled it to ignite new propellants more reliably. The next day, Hartman was sighting in his “upgraded” muzzleloader when the gun unexpectedly discharged as he was trying to load it. The ramrod and a patched round ball passed through Hartman’s hands and arm, inflicting serious injury. Hartman sued KR for negligence and strict liability. The district court dismissed. Indiana has a 10-year statute of repose for products-liability actions and the gun was 14 years old. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There are exceptions to the statute, for “any reconstruction or reconditioning … which has the effect of lengthening the useful life of a product beyond what was contemplated when the product was first sold” and for situations where a manufacturer “merely … incorporat[es] a defective component into an old product.” Hartman cannot satisfy either exception. View "Hartman v. Ebsco Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Purchasers of organic asphalt roofing shingles in many states sued IKO and affiliated firms, contending that it falsely told customers that the shingles met an industry standard (ASTM D2250 and that compliance had been ascertained by use of a testing protocol (ASTM D228). What distinguishes an “organic” asphalt tile is inclusion of a layer made from felt or paper; tiles that include a fiberglass layer are not called organic, even though asphalt itself has organic components. In 2009 the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of the federal suits to the Central District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 1407. Plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class that would cover IKO sales in eight states since 1979. The court declined. After determining that subject matter jurisdiction existed despite the district court’s error in transferring the matter to a judge without approval of the Panel, the Seventh Circuit vacated, While not required to certify the proposed class, the district court denied class certification under a mistaken belief that “commonality of damages” is legally indispensable. View "Zanetti v. IKO Mfg Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against Volvo Cars of North America, alleging defective design of a product. The case proceeded to trial. At Plaintiff’s request, the trial court included a pattern jury instruction to charge the jury that was the same standard jury charge in malpractice actions. The instruction tells the jury that a defendant who has special skills in a trade or profession is required to use the same degree of skill and care that others in the same trade or profession would reasonably use in the same situation. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because this was not a malpractice case but a design defect case, the charge should not have been given, and the error required reversal and a new trial. View "Reis v. Volvo Cars of N. Am." on Justia Law

In 1957, the FDA approved propoxyphene for the treatment of mild to moderate pain, under the trade name Darvon. In 1972, the manufacturer obtained FDA approval to market another product combining propoxyphene with acetaminophen, under the name Darvocet. Because the new drug application (NDA) process is onerous, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, (Hatch-Waxman Act) to make available more low cost generic drugs. Generic drugs require an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) showing that the drug is equivalent to and that labeling proposed is the same approved for the brand-name drug. Several companies obtained approval to market generic versions of Darvon and Darvocet. Complaints about perceived risks associated with propoxyphene began in 1978; eventually the United Kingdom withdrew it from the market. Two FDA advisory committees recommended withdrawal from the market, but the FDA ordered the NDA holder to change the label to include “Black Box” warnings and to undertake a clinical trial to assess the risks of a particular cardiac complication. In 2010, the FDA determined that the risks of propoxyphene outweighed its benefits and ordered its removal from the market. Plaintiffs in 68 consolidated cases alleged that they ingested propoxyphene products prior to its withdrawal and that manufacturers continued marketing propoxyphene after they knew or should have known that risks exceeded benefits. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, except with respect to one plaintiff.View "Germain v. Teva Pharm, USA, Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband brought a products liability action against the Little Giant Ladder's manufacturer after she suffered injuries while using the ladder. The district court excluded plaintiff's expert testimony and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove the various theories of products liability. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to the manufacturer. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the compression tests on the grounds the tests were not conducted under conditions substantially similar to those surrounding the accident. Furthermore, because plaintiff had no admissible expert testimony to support her theories of product liability, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting the manufacturer's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Loomis, et al. v. Wing Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Ford Motor Company for injuries they sustained in a roll-over accident. The case was submitted to a jury. After the jury began its deliberations, the parties agreed to settle the case. Ford, however, later refused to pay the settlement amount to Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract. After hearing all of the evidence, the jury found the settlement agreement was invalid because of fraudulent inducement and mutual mistake. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s take-nothing judgment, concluding that the circumstantial evidence of fraud in the case was legally insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the circumstantial evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo" on Justia Law

In early June of 2007, Karrin Massey consumed at least one, but perhaps several, poultry pot pies that were manufactured by ConAgra Food, Inc. and sold under the Banquet brand name. Soon after, Karrin, who was six months pregnant at the time, developed salmonellosis. After an outbreak of salmonella was linked to Banquet pot pies, it was discovered that Karrin's strain of salmonella matched the strain of salmonella found in the contaminated pot pies. Karrin, her husband, Mark Massey, and their daughter Emma filed suit against ConAgra, alleging claims of product liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. The district court eventually granted ConAgra's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Masseys had failed to establish the pot pies in question were defective. The Masseys filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The Masseys then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred: (1) in determining that the Masseys failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the pot pies were defective; (2) in granting summary judgment on the issue of negligence; (3) in concluding the Masseys waived their right to challenge the district court's denial of their motion to reconsider; and (4) in finding that the Masseys' failure to warn claim was not adequately pleaded. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Massey v. Conagra Foods" on Justia Law

Petitioner 5 Star, Inc. is a lawn maintenance and pressure washing company owned by Stan Shelby. In February 2005, 5 Star purchased a used 1996 Ford F-250 pickup truck. Several months later, Shelby parked the truck for the weekend in 5 Star's North Charleston warehouse. Two days later, Shelby returned to the warehouse and discovered that a fire had occurred. The truck was destroyed, and the warehouse was severely damaged. The Chief Fire Investigator for the North Charleston Fire Department, performed an investigation and observed that the truck was located in the middle of the warehouse, where the most extensive damage occurred. The Chief noted the engine compartment of the truck was the likely origin of the fire. 5 Star filed a products liability action against Ford Motor Co. for negligent design of the speed control deactivation switch (deactivation switch), seeking actual and punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed a jury verdict awarding $41,000 in actual damages in a negligent design products liability action based on the failure of the trial court to grant a directed verdict. The trial court qualified petitioner-expert Leonard Greene as an expert in electrical engineering and fire origin and cause. The court of appeals, however, found that Greene was not "qualified as an expert in automotive design or any other area of expertise that would enable [him] to offer opinions as to whether Ford's conduct was negligent." 5 Star claimed that the court of appeals erred and that Greene's extensive qualifications in electrical engineering related to automobiles were sufficient to enable him to testify regarding Ford's exercise of due care. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "5 Star v. Ford Motor" on Justia Law

Schwarz Pharma Inc. was sued in seven individual actions by Plaintiffs, who filed suit in the St. Louis city court. Schwarz filed a motion to transfer venue in these seven individual actions under Mo. R. Civ. P. 51.045. The trial court ruled that the motions were untimely because they were not filed within the sixty-day period after Schwarz was served. Schwarz wrought writs of prohibition in the court of appeals, which denied relief. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that Schwarz’s motions to transfer venue were untimely; (2) Schwarz’s timely filed motions demonstrated that venue was improper in St. Louis city; and (3) therefore, the trial court was required to sustain the timely filed motions to transfer venue. View "State ex rel. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Judge Dowd" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, guardian ad litem for minor H.T.P., appealed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in this products liability case. Plaintiff alleged that Enfamil, an infant formula, was defective or unreasonably dangerous due to C.sak contamination. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow its experts' testimony under Rule 702. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiff's experts where the methodology employed by the experts was scientifically valid, could properly be applied to the facts of the case and was therefore reliable enough to assist the trier of fact. With the expert testimony proposed, plaintiff has created an issue of fact for a jury on the issue of the specific cause of H.T.P.'s C. sak infection and plaintiff was entitled to attempt to prove his claim for products liability under Minnesota law. Accordingly, the court reversed the orders of the district court excluding the testimony of plaintiff's experts, and granting summary judgment and costs in favor of Mead, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co." on Justia Law