Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and her kids filed a wrongful death action in state court against R.J. Reynolds and others after her husband died from throat cancer. Defendants removed to federal court, arguing that both of the nonmanufacturers had been fraudulently joined. The district court then granted defendants' motion to dismiss because the family's claims were barred by res judicata. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding fraudulent joinder, denying plaintiff's motion for remand, and then dismissing the nonmanufacturers from the case. The court also concluded that the "one recovery" rule of Missouri Revised Statutes 537.080 barred recovery against defendants in plaintiff's earlier suit for a wrongful death caused by the same conduct. Therefore, the district court was correct in dismissing the claims against the manufacturing defendants under the more demanding of the dismissal standards. As a result of the prior judgment, the husband no longer had a viable claim against the cigarette manufacturers at the time of his death, and his family is barred from bringing such a claim now. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Thompson, et al. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., et al." on Justia Law

Lee was injured while shooting a revolver made by Smith & Wesson. In his product liability suit alleging a defect in the firearm, the only expert evidence regarding how a defect in the firearm could have caused the injury was excluded because the expert’s theory was not consistent with aspects of plaintiff’s own memory of what happened. Lee reserved the right to challenge that evidentiary decision and stipulated to dismissal. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Smith & Wesson identified no judicial admission on the part of Lee in his represented status as plaintiff. Lee as a witness testified as to what he remembered. A tort plaintiff should be able to testify honestly to his memory of what happened and still have his lawyer argue that on the evidence as a whole it is more probable than not that the memory was faulty. If no jury could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff’s memory was faulty, dismissal would be warranted. View "Lee v. Smith & Wesson Corp." on Justia Law

In 1975, a pistol manufactured by MKEK malfunctioned, firing a bullet through Ohntrup’s hand while he loaded the gun. The court held the seller, Firearms Center and MKEK, which is wholly owned by the Republic of Turkey, jointly liable for $847,173.97 and required MKEK to indemnify Firearms Center. The Morgan law firm represented MKEK, but after appeal, sought to withdraw. The court permitted the individual lawyers to withdraw but required the firm to remain as counsel of record until MKEK hired substitute counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed, characterizing MKEK as an intractable litigant and stating that a communication gap would hamper post-judgment proceedings. The Ohntrups tried to collect their judgment; MKEK disregarded the Ohntrups’ discovery requests. The Ohntrups sought assistance from the State Department and pursued MKEK in Turkish courts, to no avail. In 2007, Ohntrup’s widow obtained a $16 million civil contempt judgment against MKEK that grows by $10,000 annually. Ohntrup’s judgments against MKEK are now worth about $25 million. In 2011, Ohntrup’s lawyers learned of a $16.2 million transaction in which a Minneapolis-based company. (Alliant), agreed to sell munitions manufacturing components to MKEK. Ohntrup obtained some discovery from Alliant, but the district court denied subsequent discovery requests. When Ohntrup renewed her post-judgment discovery efforts, Morgan was granted leave to withdraw. The Third Circuit affirmed the order granting leave to withdraw, but remanded the discovery order. The court erred when it relied upon the uncertainty surrounding the judgment creditor’s ability to attach the targeted property.View "Ohntrup v. Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kur" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant-cross-appellee R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc. appealed a Superior Court judgment on a jury verdict of $2,864,583.33 plus interest to Plaintiff-appellees-cross-appellant Darcel Galliher, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Michael Galliher. The decedent, Michael Galliher, contracted and died from mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos or asbestiform material while employed by Borg Warner at a bathroom fixtures facility. Vanderbilt provided industrial talc to Borg Warner, which was alleged to be the source of the substance that caused Michael's illness. At trial, Vanderbilt denied causation and claimed that Borg Warner was responsible because it did not operate the facility in a manner that was safe for employees like Michael. Vanderbilt argued: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the duty of care required of Borg Warner, as Michael's employer; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to grant a new trial based on the admission of unreliable and inflammatory evidence that previously was ruled inadmissible. Galliher argued on cross-appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it disallowed post-judgment interest for a certain period of months. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it failed to provide any instruction to the jury on Borg Warner's duty of care to Michael, despite Vanderbilt's request that it do so. The trial court also abused its discretion when it denied Vanderbilt's motion for a new trial based upon the substantial prejudice resulting from the admission of evidence, not subject to cross-examination, that it had engaged in criminal conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., v. Galliher, et al." on Justia Law

Gibson, sued former manufacturers of white lead carbonate pigments, which were used, before the federal government banned them in the 1970s, in paints, including paints applied to residences. Gibson claimed negligence and strict liability, but cannot identify which manufacturer made the white lead carbonate pigment that injured him. He relied on the “risk contribution” theory of tort liability fashioned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Thomas v. Mallet in 2005, under which plaintiffs are relieved of the traditional requirement to prove that a specific manufacturer caused the plaintiff’s injury. The district court held that risk-contribution theory violates the substantive component of the Due Process Clause and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting the broad deference that the Constitution grants to the development of state common law. The risk-contribution theory survives substantive due process scrutiny and the manufacturers’ other constitutional challenges. View "Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co." on Justia Law

Hardin suffered complete blindness and permanent, severe and painful scarring after she took Lamotrigine, the generic form of the medication Lamictal. Hardin sued the prescribing physician, the manufacturer, the store where she bought the prescription (Safeway), WKH, which produced the drug information pamphlet (monograph), and PDX, a software provider that distributes drug information to pharmacy customers. Unlike physician package inserts and patient medication guides, which are FDA-mandated, WKH monographs are not regulated or reviewed by the FDA, but are produced as part of a self-regulating action plan required under 110 Stat. 1593. The WKH monograph was the only information received by Hardin when she first filled her prescription for Lamictal. The abbreviated warning used by Safeway and provided to Hardin omitted the “Black Box” warning: “BEFORE USING THIS MEDICINE” that stated: “SERIOUS AND SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY WITH THE USE OF THIS MEDICINE. Hardin says that had she been provided this warning, she would not have taken the medication. WKH moved to strike Hardin’s claims against it under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the “anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation ) statute.. The trial court ruled that WKH’s production of drug monographs was protected speech concerning a public issue or an issue of public interest and that Hardin had no probability of prevailing because she could not establish that WKH owed her any duty. The court denied PDX’s motion to strike, finding that the activity underlying PDX’s alleged liability was the reprogramming of its software to permit Safeway to give customers an abbreviated, five-section monograph that omitted warnings instead of the full eight-section version that included those warnings. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Hardin v. PDX, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Ilan Brand appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants Hyundai Motor America and Allen Used Cars, LLC (Hyundai) after granting Hyundai's nonsuit motion on plaintiff's breach of implied warranty of merchantability lawsuit. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred in granting the motion on grounds that no reasonable jury could have concluded a new vehicle sunroof that spontaneously opens and closes while driving constituted a safety hazard in violation of the implied warranty. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff and reversed the judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Brand v. Hyundai" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a products liability suit against generic and brand-name manufacturers of the prescription drug metoclopramide, alleging that her long-term use of generic metoclopramide caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia and that manufacturers provided misleading and inadequate warnings. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings for the generic manufactures under Rule 12(c) on plaintiff's failure-to-warn, design-defect, and express-warranty claims because the claims were preempted by federal law; affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the brand-name manufacturers under Rule 12(b)(6) because the claims were barred by Louisiana state law where plaintiff never ingested Reglan manufactured by brand-name manufacturers; even if Louisiana law did not apply, plaintiff has not established that name-brand defendants owed her a duty of care; and denied plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Johnson v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Timothy Bostic died from mesothelioma, which can be caused by asbestos. Plaintiffs, Bostic’s family members, sued Georgia-Pacific Corporation and thirty-nine other defendants, alleging that Bostic had been exposed to asbestos as a child and teenager while using Georgia-Pacific drywall joint compound. A jury found Georgia-Pacific liable under negligence and marketing defect theories and awarded Plaintiffs $6.8 million in compensatory damages and $4.8 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals held that the causation evidence was legally insufficient and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the standard of substantial factor causation established in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, an asbestosis case, applies to mesothelioma cases; (2) Plaintiffs were not required to prove that but for Bostic’s exposure to Georgia-Pacific’s asbestos-containing joint compound, Bostic would not have contracted mesothelioma; and (3) the evidence of causation was legally insufficient to sustain the verdict in this case. View "Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff developed a neurological disorder from her prolonged use of metoclopramide, sold under the brand name Reglan and as a competing generic formulation. Plaintiff admitted she ingested only generic metoclopramide but sued both the manufacturer of the generic drug and the manufacturers of the branded formulation. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims, ruling (1) Plaintiff’s claims against the generic manufacturer were preempted by federal law that requires conformity with the brand manufacturers’ warning labels approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); and (2) Plaintiff’s claims against the brand manufacturers required proof that the brand defendants manufactured or supplied the product that caused Plaintiff’s injury. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the brand manufacturers and reversed in part summary judgment for the generic manufacturer, holding (1) Plaintiff’s state common law tort claims against the generic manufacturer based on inadequate warnings were not preempted to the extent that the generic manufacturer failed to adopt warning language approved by the FDA for Reglan; and (2) the brand manufacturers are not liable for injuries to those who used only the competing generic formulation. View "Huck v. Wyeth, Inc." on Justia Law