Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

A.S., who suffers from a congenital birth defect, and his mother, Miller, who ingested Paxil while pregnant, sued GSK in the Philadelphia County Court, alleging that all parties were citizens of Pennsylvania. GSK removed the case based upon diversity. On plaintiffs’ motion, the case was consolidated with other Paxil cases before a district court judge who had previously held that GSK was a citizen of Pennsylvania and who remanded A.S.’s case and the other consolidated cases to state court. The case returned to state court on January 4, 2012. On June 7, 2013, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Johnson, which held that GSK was a citizen of Delaware. Less than 30 days after the Johnson decision, GSK filed a second notice of removal in A.S.’s case and in eight other cases with the same procedural posture. The district court denied the motion and certified its order for interlocutory review. The Third Circuit directed remand to state court, holding that the second removal request was untimely under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b) because there had been a final order. View "A.S. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp" on Justia Law

Ezequiel Castillo and other occupants of his Ford Explorer sued Ford Motor Company for injuries sustained in a roll-over accident, asserting design defects in the Explorer. During the jury’s deliberations, Ford Motor Company agreed to settle the case with one of Castillo’s attorneys for $3 million. Later, in its defense to the settlement, Ford asserted fraudulent inducement, unilateral mistake, and mutual mistake. After hearing all of the evidence, the jury found the settlement agreement invalid due to fraudulent inducement and mutual mistake. The trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment. Castillo appealed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Marianne and Daniel Chapman, filed a products liability suit against P&G after Marianne developed neurological symptoms that the Chapmans maintain were caused by zinc-induced, copper-deficiency myelopathy (CDM) from using Fixodent denture adhesive. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of P&G. The court concluded that the district judge properly determined that Fixodent, containing zinc, was in the McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc. category two analysis involving toxic substances and conducted the requisite Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., review of proffered expert testimony. The court also concluded that the district judge, as gatekeeper of the evidence presented to the jury, did not abuse her discretion or commit manifest injustice by precluding the testimonies of Dr. Brewer, Dr. Lautenbach, and Dr. Landolph as experts on general causation; in precluding Dr. Greenberg's expert testimony regarding the specific causation of Marianne's CDM; and in granting P&G's motions preventing the testimonies of three additional plaintiffs' experts. Because plaintiffs' general and specific-causation-expert testimony was inadmissible at trial, plaintiffs failed to prove that Fixodent caused Marianne's CDM. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to P&G. View "Chapman, et al. v. The Procter & Gamble Dist., et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concern the ongoing tobacco litigation that began as a class action in Florida courts more than two decades ago. At issue is the fate of 588 personal injury cases filed on behalf of purportedly living cigarette smokers who, as it turns out, were dead at the time of filing (predeceased plaintiffs), 160 loss of consortium cases filed on behalf of spouses and children of these predeceased plaintiffs, and two wrongful death cases filed more than two years after the decedent-smoker's death. Plaintiffs' counsel sought leave to amend the complaints, but the district court denied those requests and dismissed the cases. The root of the problem occurred back in 2008 when these cases were originally filed where the law firm that brought the cases did not have the time or resources required to fully investigate all the complaints. Consequently, problem after problem cropped up once the district court started going through the inventory of cases. The defects that led to these consolidated appeals stemmed from counsel's failure to obtain accurate information regarding whether or when certain smokers died. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of these cases where, among other reasons, the problems could have been avoided if counsel had properly investigated the claims, and even if that lack of diligence were somehow excusable, counsel failed to inform the court that so many complaints were defective. View "4432 Ind. Tobacco Plaintiffs v. Various Tobacco Companies, et al." on Justia Law

Decades ago, BASF’s predecessor, Engelhard, discovered that its talc products contained disease-causing asbestos. Plaintiffs allege that Engelhard, with the help of the Cahill law firm, destroyed or hid tests and reports that documented the presence of asbestos in Engelhard talc; when new plaintiffs focused on Engelhard’s talc as a possible cause of their disease, Engelhard represented that its talc did not contain asbestos and that no tests ever said it did. Most of the original plaintiffs have died. Spurred by recent testimony that Engelhard’s talc contained asbestos and that the company knew it, survivors and successors brought claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment, and violation of the New Jersey Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The district court dismissed, finding that each was inadequately pled or barred by law. The court found the requested declarations and injunctions-ranging from an injunction against the future invocation of res judicata to a declaration that BASF and Cahill committed fraud—beyond its power to grant, but rejected defendants’ argument that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it of jurisdiction. The Third Circuit reversed as to the fraud and fraudulent concealment claims, but affirmed dismissal of the RICO claim. To the extent that plaintiffs attempt to have the court decide, now, statute of limitations, laches, and preclusion issues that will arise in future cases, they fail to present a whole or ripe controversy. View "Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC" on Justia Law

Payne sued Novartis for failing to warn her doctor that two of the drugs it manufactures, Aredia and Zometa, could cause serious damage to a patient’s jaw bones. The drugs are given intravenously, most often to patients with cancerous conditions, and are effective in preventing pathological fractures and other bone pains. Payne took both in 1999-2001 and had to have part of her jaw removed in 2007 because of osteonecrosis, which results in the gums being eaten away until the bone is exposed The connection between the drugs and the condition began to come to light to the medical community in the early 2000’s. The district court entered summary judgment for Novartis. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under Tennessee law, the question of whether Novartis’s failure to warn was a cause of Payne’s injuries is for a jury to determine. Payne’s testimony, combined with that of her doctor, could establish a sufficient causal link between Novartis’s failure to warn and Payne’s jaw death. A reasonable jury could conclude that Payne would not have taken Aredia or Zometa had her doctor warned her of the risk View "Payne v. Novartis Pharm. Corp." on Justia Law

Paul and Terri Broome purchased a 2010 Chevrolet Equinox from a Chevrolet dealership in April 2010. The vehicle came with a three-year or 36,000 mile warranty. According to the Broomes, the vehicle had various defects which they attempted to have repaired through the dealership. When the dealership was unable to fix the defects, in December 2011, the Broomes filed suit against General Motors, the manufacturer of the vehicle, for breach of written and implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act. This case was one of first impression to the Supreme Court: whether Mississippi Code Section 63-17-159(6) (Rev. 2013), the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, or Mississippi Code Section 75-2-101 (Rev. 2012), et seq. (the Uniform Commercial Code, the “UCC”) was the most analogous state statute to the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act for the purposes of determining the statute of limitations for Magnuson-Moss Act claims filed in Mississippi. The trial court found that the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act was the most analogous state law to the Magnuson-Moss Act and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim as barred by the statute of limitations. The Court held that Mississippi’s UCC was the most analogous state statute to the Magnuson-Moss Act. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim. View "Broome v. General Motors, LLC " on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wyeth, alleging that she developed breast cancer after using Wyeth's's hormone therapy medication, Prempro. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the the Eastern District of Arkansas as part of the ongoing In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation. After the district court subsequently dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to respond to discovery orders, her attorney filed a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to set aside the dismissal. Plaintiff's attorney had failed to register for the Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM-ECF) system and, consequently, did not receive electronic notices of the filings in plaintiff's case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b)(1) motion because the district court did not abuse its discretion where, on more than one occasion, the district court instructed all attorneys to register for the CM-ECF system and warned that those who did not would not receive electronic filing notices or hard copies of orders. View "Freeman v. Wyeth, et al." on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were driving a 2004 Jeep Cherokee in San Joaquin County, when the vehicle rolled over and the roof collapsed. Young sustained injuries, rendering her a permanent quadriplegic. Young’s daughter allegedly suffered physical and emotional harm. They filed suit, claiming that the roof and restraint systems were defectively designed. The vehicle at issue was designed, manufactured, and distributed by DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC), a former indirect subsidiary of Daimler. Among others, the complaint named Daimler and DCC as defendants. Daimler is a German public stock company that designs and manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and has its principal place of business in Stuttgart. Before 1998, DCC was known as Chrysler Corporation. After a 1998 agreement, Chrysler Corporation became an indirect subsidiary of Daimler and changed its name to DCC. DCC was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. It ceased to be a subsidiary of Daimler in 2007, changing its name to Chrysler LLC. Daimler is not a successor-in-interest to DCC or Chrysler LLC. Plaintiffs served Daimler with the complaint in accordance with the Hague Convention. The trial court quashed service for lack of personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG. The court of appeal affirmed, relying on the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. View "Young v. Daimler AG" on Justia Law

Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) was sued in a coordinated proceeding before the San Francisco Superior Court for alleged defects in Plavix, a drug BMS manufactures and sells throughout the country. BMS moved below to quash service of the summons regarding the complaints concerning plaintiffs who are not California residents, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied BMS’s motion, finding that California had general jurisdiction over BMS, and did not address the issue of specific jurisdiction. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) which limited the application of general jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, the California Supreme Court remanded to the court of appeals, which affirmed denial of the motion to quash. California does not have general jurisdiction over BMS in this case, but, applying the International Shoe Co. v. Washington test of “fair play and substantial justice,” the court reasoned that BMS has engaged in substantial, continuous economic activity in California, including the sale of more than a billion dollars of Plavix to Californians. That activity is substantially connected to claims by non-residents, which are based on the same alleged wrongs as those alleged by California-resident plaintiffs. BMS has not established that it would be unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over it. View "Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law