Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

The Piltches were traveling in their 2003 Mercury Mountaineer in February 2007 when they hit a patch of black ice, causing the car to slide off the road and into a wall. Upon impact, none of the car’s air bags deployed and both were injured. They filed suit in 2010, alleging the vehicle was defective under Indiana law. The district court granted Ford’s summary judgment motion holding that, without expert testimony, the Piltches could not create an issue of fact as to proximate cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Piltches stated a claim for relief under the Indiana Products Liability Act; there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of a defective product that expert testimony is not required; they are not required to produce expert testimony to establish proximate cause; and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, raising an inference of negligence on the part of Ford. The Piltches’ presentation of circumstantial evidence was not “one of the ‘rare instances’ where it is enough to negate all possible causes other than a product defect.” View "Piltch v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Velasquez worked at a company that made food flavorings, moving diacetyl, in closed and open containers. He breathed ambient diacetyl particles while mixing liquid and dry flavorings. Material safety data sheets attached to the containers warned that diacetyl was “harmful by inhalation,” but, consistent with industry practices at the time, did not warn of specific risks. The California Division of Occupational Safety and Health did not issue exposure limits until years later. During a 2005 incident, Velasquez inhaled fumes from a concentration that included acetaldehyde, but not diacetyl. He experienced trouble breathing and sought medical attention. Velasquez returned to the hospital twice in the next two months. In 2005, Velasquez’s supervisor took him to a clinic where a “company doctor” told him he could not continue working for the company in his condition. In 2006 Velasquez was diagnosed with bronchiolitis obliterans, a rare lung disease which is usually progressive and fatal. He filed suit. After finding the issue relevant to Velasquez’s ability to receive a lung transplant, the judge advised prospective jurors that Velasquez is an undocumented immigrant. The court entered judgment on the jury’s special verdict, including findings that the supplier’s acts were not a substantial factor in causing Velasquez’s harm. The court of appeal reversed, based on the error in disclosing Velasquez’s status to jurors. View "Velasquez v. Centrome, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against I-Flow, manufacturer of the PainBuster continuous infusion pump, alleging state common law claims for negligence and strict products liability. Plaintiff alleged that I-Flow negligently failed to warn that its pain pump should not be used in intra-articular spaces such as the glenohumeral joint; and that I-Flow was strictly liable for selling a product that was unreasonably dangerous due to the lack of adequate warnings. The PainBuster is regulated under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to the Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 360c(a)(1)(A)(i), (B), (C)(i). Concluding that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal where judgment was entered as to all defendants, the court concluded that the requested jury instructions regarding negligence and federal standards were not preempted by the MDA. Therefore, the court remanded and declined to reach the evidentiary issues. The court dismissed I-Flow's cross appeal as moot. View "McClellan v. I-Flow Corp." on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff was severely injured when a 2000 Dodge Neon that she was driving was struck from behind by another vehicle. In July 2010, she filed a personal-injury action against Midstate, the automobile dealer that sold her the vehicle; Chrysler Group LLC, successor-in-interest to Chrysler Corporation, which manufactured the vehicle but later declared bankruptcy; JCI, which manufactured the vehicle's driver's seat; and Autoliv ASP, Inc., which manufactured the vehicle's seatbelts. In September 2012, plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with Midstate and Chrysler Group. Based on the settlement agreement, the trial court issued an order of dismissal with prejudice in favor of Midstate and Chrysler Group. A jury trial in June 2013 on plaintiff's remaining action against JCI resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the products-liability claim. The trial court also entered a final judgment in favor of JCI and against Midstate on the cross-claim for indemnity. Midstate appealed that judgment. The issue primarily briefed by the parties on appeal was whether an indemnitee invoking common law equitable indemnity must extinguish the liability of the indemnitor to collect indemnity. The Supreme Court found no basis to distrub the judgment in favor of JCI, and affirmed. View "Heco v. Foster Motors" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's daughter developed a condition known as dental fluorisis, plaintiff filed suit against the manufacturers of bottled water, infant formula, and baby food that her daughter consumed. At issue was whether federal law, which provides uniform labeling standards for the products at issue, preempts plaintiff's state-law claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action, holding that federal law preempts plaintiff's bottled water claims and that her complaint as to the infant formula and baby food products fails to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). View "Nemphos v. Nestle Waters North America" on Justia Law

Zachary Gage Duncan sustained a serious injury while driving his 2008 Hyundai Tiburon when he struck a tree. The side airbag did not deploy. Plaintiffs, individual and as Duncan’s guardians and conservators, filed suit against Hyundai, claiming breach of implied warranty of merchantability. During trial, Plaintiffs’ designated expert witness Geoffrey Mahon testified that the location of the side airbag sensor rendered the Tiburon unreasonably dangerous. Hyundai appealed from the judgment of the trial court, arguing that there was an insufficient foundation for the expert witness’s opinion. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) Mahon’s opinion was premised upon his unfounded assumption that the side airbag would have deployed if the sensor had been located in a different area; and (2) because Mahon’s opinion supplied the only support for Plaintiffs’ claim that the vehicle was unreasonably dangerous, the inadmissibility of Mahon’s opinion was fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim. View "Hyundai Motor Co. v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Bill Head, who owns and operates the Silver Spur Truck Stop in Pharr, Texas, hired Petroleum Solutions, Inc. to manufacture and install an underground fuel system. After the discovery that a major diesel-fuel release leak had occurred, Head sued Petroleum Solutions for its resulting damages. Petroleum Solutions filed a third-party petition against Titeflex, Inc., the alleged manufacturer of a component part incorporated into the fuel system, claiming indemnity and contribution. Titeflex filed a counterclaim against Petroleum Solutions for statutory indemnity. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Head and in favor of Titeflex. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Head’s claims against Petroleum Solutions, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by charging the jury with a spoliation instruction and striking Petroleum Solutions’ defenses, and the abuse of discretion was harmful; and (2) affirmed as to Titeflex’s indemnity claim, holding that Titeflex was entitled to statutory indemnity from Petroleum Solutions and that any error with respect to the indemnity claim was harmless. View "Petroleum Solutions, Inc. v. Head" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Pliva, manufacturer of the prescription medication metoclopramide, alleging that the medication caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia. On appeal, plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her claims. The court concluded that the prescribing physicians' exclusive reliance on information from the brand-name manufacturers broke any causal link between Pliva's failure to incorporate the 2004 label change and the plaintiffs' injuries; to the extent plaintiff alleges failure to warn claims against Pliva based on the allegedly inadequate content or manner of delivery of the 2004 warnings, her claims are squarely preempted by federal law; because plaintiff failed to explain how Pliva could avoid liability under Missouri law for the alleged design defects without changing its product, changing its labeling, or leaving the market, plaintiff's design defect claims - whether sounding in strict liability or negligence - are preempted by impossibility; and federal law preempts plaintiff's implied warranty claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brinkley v. Pliva, Inc." on Justia Law

Richard Palermo alleged that he was injured by infected tissue surgically placed into his knee. He sued LifeLink Foundation, Inc., under the Mississippi Products Liability Act (“MPLA”), Mississippi Code Section 11-1-63. The trial court and Court of Appeals both found that Mississippi Code Section 41-41-1, which defined the procurement, processing, storage, distribution, and use of human tissue as a “service,” exempted LifeLink from liability under the MPLA. The Supreme Court clarified the analysis surrounding this issue, found no reversible error, and therefore affirmed the trial court and the Court of Appeals. View "Palermo v. LifeLink Foundation, Inc. d/b/a LifeLink Tissue Bank" on Justia Law

In 2007, neighbors reported a fire that had erupted at the home of the Terrence and Judith Tincher in Downingtown. The residence was the central unit of a two-story triplex purchased by the Tinchers in 2005. The fire was eventually extinguished and no one was harmed. Investigators concluded that a lightning strike near the home caused a small puncture in the corrugated stainless steel tubing (“CSST”) transporting natural gas to a fireplace located on the first floor of the residence. The CSST installed in the Tinchers’ home was manufactured and sold by Omega Flex as part of a gas transportations system marketed as the TracPipe System. The melting of the CSST caused by the lightning strike ignited the natural gas and fueled the fire estimated to have burned for over an hour. The fire caused significant damage to the Tinchers’ home and belongings. After the fire, the Tinchers reported the incident to their insurer, United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”). USAA compensated the Tinchers for their loss up to the limit of their policy and received an assignment of liability claims. The Tinchers suffered an additional out-of-pocket loss because a portion of their claimed loss exceeded the limits of the USAA policy. In January 2008, the Tinchers filed a complaint against Omega Flex; USAA prosecuted the claims in the name of the Tinchers to obtain reimbursement of the insurance proceeds payout, but the Tinchers retained an interest in the litigation to recover the losses exceeding their insurance coverage. The Tinchers asserted claims premised upon theories of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty, alleging that Omega Flex was liable for damages to their home caused by the placement on the market and sale of the TracPipe System. Omega Flex, Inc., appealed the Superior Court's decision to affirm the judgment on the verdict entered in favor of the Tinchers. After review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and remanded the case with instructions: (1) "Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company," (391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978)) was overruled; (2) a plaintiff pursuing a cause upon a theory of strict liability in tort must prove that the product is in a “defective condition”; (3) whether a product is in a defective condition is a question of fact ordinarily submitted for determination to the finder of fact; (4) to the extent relevant here, the Court declined to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability despite acknowledging that "certain principles contained in that Restatement has certainly informed [its] consideration of the proper approach to strict liability in Pennsylvania in the post-Azzarello paradigm." View "Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc." on Justia Law