Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a products liability suit against Toyota, alleging that plaintiffs' accident occurred because their Toyota Tundra lacked electronic stability control (ESC), also known as vehicle stability control (VSC), and that the absence of this device or system was a design defect. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s denial of their motion in limine to exclude evidence that the custom of the automotive industry was not to include ESC as standard equipment in pickup trucks. The court held that evidence of industry custom and practice may be admissible in a strict products liability action, depending on the nature of the evidence and the purpose for which the proponent seeks to introduce the evidence. In this case, the trial court properly denied plaintiffs' motion in limine because plaintiffs moved to exclude all such evidence. The court also concluded that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and imposition of a time limit on the duration of rebuttal argument were not an abuse of discretion, and that the trial court properly refused plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions on federal safety standards and industry custom. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal stems from multi-district litigation involving transvaginal mesh medical devices used to treat pelvic organ prolapse and other pelvic issues. The jury awarded plaintiff $250,000 in compensatory damages, and the punitive damages award was split pursuant to a Georgia statute, with seventy-five percent going to the State of Georgia and twenty-five percent going to plaintiff. Both parties appealed. The court affirmed the district court's exclusion of evidence that Bard had complied with the FDA's 510(k) product safety process under F.R.E. 402 for lack of relevance; affirmed the district court's decision to admit evidence of a material data safety sheet pertaining to polypropylene, a material used in the construction of the Avaulta Plus implanted in plaintiff's body, as non-hearsay, finding that any use of the evidence by plaintiff that went beyond the limited purpose for which it was admitted as non-hearsay resulted in harmless error and was not prejudicial to Bard’s defense; and concluded that the district court did not err in giving the Georgia pattern jury instruction, in denying Bard’s request for a modified instruction, or in upholding the jury’s causation finding. The court also concluded that the punitive award was not constitutionally excessive. In regard to plaintiff's challenges, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Georgia's split-recovery statute garnishing seventy-five percent of any punitive damages award arising from a product liability judgment does not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cisson v. C. R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

Virl Birch died when the off-road vehicle in which he was riding flipped over and pinned him to the ground. His surviving family members sued Polaris Industries, the vehicle manufacturer, for strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Polaris argued there was no evidence Birch’s vehicle was defective at the time of sale, and moved for summary judgment. Well after the deadlines for amending the pleadings and for discovery had passed, Birch’s survivors filed motions: (1) to add new theories to their complaint; and (2) for additional discovery. A magistrate judge denied both motions as untimely, and the district court affirmed the magistrate’s ruling. Based on the allegations in the unamended complaint, the district court then granted summary judgment to Polaris on all claims. The survivors appealed the district court’s denial of their two motions and the grant of summary judgment. But finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Birch v. Polaris Industries" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a negligence and strict products liability action against E.F. Brady, alleging that asbestos-containing products it distributed caused Joel Hernandezcueva’s mesothelioma. On appeal, Jovana Hernandezcueva challenged the trial court's rulings on the motions for nonsuit and a new trial. In the published portion of the court's opinion, the court concluded that the trial court erred in granting a nonsuit on the strict products liability claim because the Hernandezcuevas’ evidence sufficed to show that E. F. Brady, while acting as a subcontractor in the construction of a commercial building, was in the stream of commerce relating to the asbestos-containing products, for purposes of the imposition of strict liability. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hernandezcueva v. E.F. Brady Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Dolores Hunter, the personal representative of the estate of Benjamin G. Francis, appealed a series of orders following a jury verdict in a wrongful death, products liability, and fraud action against Philip Morris USA Inc. resulting from Francis’s death from lung cancer. Following the verdict, Hunter moved for a new trial on the basis of evidentiary rulings at trial and on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The superior court initially granted Hunter’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence but then granted Philip Morris’s motion to reconsider, vacated its first order and denied Hunter’s motion for a new trial. Because the superior court’s orders applied a test that was inconsistent with the “weight of the evidence” new trial standard the Alaska Supreme Court previously established to guide trial courts, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration of Hunter’s motion. View "Hunter v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

After all defendants to the original complaint filed responsive pleadings in Mary Meeks’s medical malpractice suit, Meeks obtained leave of court and filed a first amended complaint, adding as a defendant the manufacturer of a medical device, Hologic, Inc. A doctor performed an outpatient diagnostic hysteroscopy and an endometrial ablation on Meeks at the Northwest Regional Medical Center in Clarksdale using a Novasure medical device manufactured and sold by Hologic to treat Meeks’s menorrhagia. Meeks did not serve the first amended complaint on Hologic but instead filed a second amended complaint without leave of court or permission from all defendants. Hologic filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Meeks’s claims against Hologic were federally preempted and that Meeks’s claims additionally were barred by the statute of limitations. Because Meeks failed to obtain leave of court or permission from the defendants to file the second complaint, and because the first was never served on Hologic, the Supreme Court found that the statute of limitations had expired against Hologic and that the trial court properly granted Hologic’s motion to dismiss. View "Mary Meeks v. Hologic, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, Yates, 17 years old, was sexually active and was suffering from severe menstrual cramps. Smith, a licensed physician assistant, counseled Yates about various contraceptives, and the risks and benefits accompanying each. Yates admits that she was counseled concerning the risk of a stroke and clotting associated with ORTHO EVRA®. She decided to try Depo-Provera, which requires injections at three-month intervals. In 2005 she discontinued Depo-Provera due to weight gain and switched to the ORTHO EVRA® patch. Smith again discussed side effects. Yates admitted that she would have used ORTHO EVRA® even if she had read package warnings. Yates suffered a stroke while she was wearing her first weekly patch. A board-certified neurologist and neurophysiologist opined that Yates’s “use of the Ortho-Evra patch was the contributing cause of her stroke.” Smith’s suit was transferred for consolidated pretrial proceedings in connection with In re: Ortho Evra Products Liability Litigation. The district court dismissed her claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The ORTHO EVRA® warnings in effect when Yates was prescribed the patch adequately warned her prescribing medical provider of the risk of stroke; there was no duty to directly warn Yates. The court rejected design defect, manufacturing defect, and negligence claims. View "Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharma., Inc." on Justia Law

Deborah Jackson sued Illinois Central Railroad Company under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for the wrongful death of her husband, Charles. Jackson alleged that her husband’s death from lung cancer was caused by his exposure to asbestos while working for the railroad. After the close of discovery, Illinois Central filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to strike Jackson’s expert, Michael Ellenbecker. Later, Illinois Central moved to strike improper evidence from Jackson’s response to the motion for summary judgment. When Jackson attempted to supplement Ellenbecker’s designation at the summary-judgment hearing, Illinois Central moved ore tenus to strike the supplementation. The Circuit Court denied all of Illinois Central’s motions. Illinois Central appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that Jackson’s expert designation of Ellenbecker was improper summary-judgment evidence because it was not sworn to upon personal knowledge and constituted inadmissible hearsay. Because the supplemental response was unsworn and never was filed, it also was improper. And, because Jackson could not show a genuine issue of material fact without Ellenbecker’s testimony, the Court reversed the denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Illinois Central. View "Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Jackson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the packaging and labeling of sodium bromate, a chemical which contributed to a fire that occurred in a plant owned by Engelhard Corporation in June 2004. At the time of the fire, Scott Lawing worked at Engelhard's Seneca plant as a maintenance mechanic. Engelhard produced a precious metal catalyst used in the automobile industry, and refined metals from recycled materials. In this products liability action, Trinity Manufacturing, Inc. and Matrix Outsourcing, LLC argued that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to them on a strict liability cause of action. In their cross-appeal, Scott and Tammy Lawing asked the Supreme Court to reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the trial court's decision to charge the jury on the "sophisticated user" defense. After review, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals. The Court found the appellate court erred in setting forth its broad definition of "user," and affirmed as modified the court of appeals' decision on this issue. Furthermore, the Court concluded the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's decision to charge the sophisticated user defense to the jury. The appellate court did not err, however, in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Trinity and Matrix on the Lawings' strict liability claim. The Supreme Court found that the evidence in this case did not support the sophisticated user defense, so the trial court erred in charging the defense to the jury. The case was remanded for a new trial on the Lawings' negligence and implied warranty of merchantability claims. View "Lawing v. Univar" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Ford, alleging that Ford breached implied and express warranties and committed fraud in the sale of Ford Focus vehicles containing rear suspension defects. The court concluded that the district court's order granting summary judgment as to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1792, claims of plaintiffs is reversed in light of Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co. Mexia held that “latent defects” may breach the implied warranty even when they are not discovered within the implied warranty’s duration. The court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment as to the express warranty claims of plaintiffs given the ambiguous terms of Ford's express warranty. Finally, the court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment on plaintiff's Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1770(a), and Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, because plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of fact as to reliance. The court declined to address additional issues raised by Ford. Because the court reversed plaintiffs’ implied and express warranty claims, the court also reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment as to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301–2312, claims. View "Daniel v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law