Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a helicopter pilot, was forced to land a Bell 407 helicopter when the helicopter’s engine suddenly quit working. Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging that the flameout was caused by false overspeed solenoid activation (FOSSA). Defendants asserted that Plaintiff’s engine flameout was not caused by FOSSA but by Plaintiff’s failure to adequately clear the helicopter of snow and ice before takeoff. The jury returned a defense verdict. After trial, two defendants issued bulletins applicable to the type of engine in Plaintiff’s helicopter addressing FOSSA. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) and (3), arguing that the information contained in the bulletins compelled an inference that one or more defendants knew about a “circuit design error” existing at the time of Plaintiff’s accident rendering Bell 407s susceptible to FOSSA but failed to disclose it during discovery or at trial, which failure constituted misconduct. The district court denied Plaintiff’s post-trial motions. The First Circuit vacated in part and remanded, holding that the district judge misconstrued the requirements of the Rule 60(b)(3) burden-shifting inquiry set forth in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. Remanded for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion. View "West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc." on Justia Law

Officer Lapham responded to a call for backup; another officer had stopped a car with expired tags when a passenger—16-year-old Robert—ran from the car, broke into an abandoned house, and hid. Lapham arrived as an officer began to arrest Robert, who then tried to evade the officer’s grasp. A struggle ensued. Lapham de-holstered his taser and shot Robert. One dart hit inches above Robert’s heart, the other inches below. Robert fell to the ground. A medical team could not resuscitate him. In training, officers had been told that, “even when the taser’s darts land on the chest, the weapon is safe.” Robert’s mother settled claims against the officers and the city, then added claims against the weapon’s manufacturer, Taser. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Taser, finding no duty to warn the Warren Police Department about any cardiac risks at the time of sale in 2006, Michigan law precluded any post-sale duty to warn, Taser had not assumed a duty to warn by virtue of its training regimen, and plaintiff could not prove that Lapham would have ever seen a warning even if Taser had issued one. View "Mitchell v. City of Warren" on Justia Law

In the 1960’s, Hellam worked at his grandfather’s boiler business, MBS, and was exposed to asbestos-containing products, including Crane’s, while refurbishing boilers. Hellam sued Crane and others after he developed mesothelioma, a fatal cancer caused by exposure to asbestos. Hellam reached settlements with several defendants. A jury awarded him $937,882.56 in economic damages and $4.5 million in noneconomic damages on his design-defect claim, allocating 75 percent of the fault to MBS, 13 percent to Western Plumbing, seven percent to Crane, and the remainder to other defendants. The court of appeal affirmed. Meanwhile, Hellam disclosed pre-verdict settlements that allocated 50 percent of settlement proceeds to Hellam’s personal-injury claims and 50 percent to any future wrongful-death claims by Hellam’s sons. The trial court approved that allocation, ruled that it would apply 17.2 percent of the pre-verdict settlement proceeds as a setoff against Crane’s liability for economic damages, and ordered Hellam to provide unredacted versions of the agreements for its review. Hellam had total settlement proceeds of $2,192,500 from nine defendants. The court of appeal affirmed, reclassifying one settlement as post, rather than pre-verdict. The court upheld the 50/50 allocation of proceeds, the setoff for pre-verdict settlements, denial of Crane’s request to review unredacted versions of the agreements, and refusal to apply a setoff for possible recoveries from asbestos bankruptcy trusts. View "Hellam v. Crane Co." on Justia Law

Neal and Bonnie Messer owned a building located in close proximity to a building owned by Steve Forster and Daniel Krebs. An explosion occurred in the Forster/Krebs building and subsequently damaged the Messers' building. B&B Hot Oil Service, Inc. held a lease on the west half of the Forster/Krebs building. B&B stored two hot oil trucks inside the building. The trucks were a 2005 vehicle designed and manufactured by Energy Fabrication, and a 2009 "knockoff" truck jointly constructed by B&B and JB's Welding through reverse engineering of an EnerFab vehicle. A hot oil truck holds various chemicals to flush and clean oil wells and lines, including propane. An investigation into the explosion determined both trucks were storing propane at the time of the explosion, and the source of the explosion allegedly started in the B&B leased space. The investigation also indicated that the explosion was a result of a propane leak from the "knockoff" truck. The Messers filed claims against both B&B and JB as a result of the explosion: JB for damage to their building under both theories of strict products liability as a manufacturer of the reverse engineered truck and negligence in construction of the truck. They alleged that the EnerFab vehicle design included an electronic failsafe control valve for the propane storage which acts as a shutoff safety feature in case manual control valves fail to close or leak, and the reverse engineered truck did not include a failsafe control valve. JB moved for summary judgment and dismissal of the claims. At the hearing, the Messers presented the affidavit of an expert witness who stated that the failure to install an electronic failsafe shutoff control valve rendered the "knockoff" truck unreasonably dangerous when it was accepted by B&B, and JB was negligent in failing to design and manufacture the firebox assembly with that control valve. In granting JB's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that JB only welded the shell of the truck including the firebox and propane lines, and had nothing to do with the propane system, valves, or decision to install automatic shutoffs. The Supreme Court reversed: the record showed a factual dispute existed as to whether JB was a manufacturer under a theory of strict liability. "[R]easonable issues of material fact exist as to JB's status as a manufacturer of the truck, and whether JB's alleged failure to install the electronic shutoff valves was the proximate cause of the Messers' injuries. Because this status is undetermined, whether JB holds a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design or manufacture of the truck, or holds a duty to warn of the inherit danger of the vehicle, depends on factual determinations to be decided by a trier of fact. The appropriate procedure is to instruct the jury to find the status of JB before determining whether a duty, if any, was owed by JB to the Messers." View "Messer v. B&B Hot Oil Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including Jack and Nancy Cooper, filed suit against Takeda, manufacturers of the prescription drug Actos, which is used to treat type 2 diabetes mellitus. The Coopers appealed the trial court's grant of Takeda's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and Takeda's alternative motion for new trial on the grounds that without the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Smith, the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, and that the trial court should not have instructed the jury regarding concurrent causation. The court concluded that the trial court erred in striking the expert’s testimony. The court concluded that, by requiring that the expert rule out all other possible causes for Jack Cooper’s bladder cancer, even where there was no substantial evidence that other such causes might be relevant, the trial court exceeded the proper boundaries of its gatekeeping function in determining the admissibility of the complex scientific testimony. The court also concluded that the evidence supported giving a jury instruction on multiple causation. Accordingly, The court reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the order granting a new trial, as well as the subsequent judgment entered in favor of Takeda, and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to enter a new judgment based on the jury’s verdict. View "Cooper v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

After Secundino Medino died of asbestos-related mesothelioma, Medina's estate and his family filed suit against several defendants, including BWMT, alleging claims for negligence, strict liability, and wrongful death. The court affirmed the district court's grant of nonsuit to Eli, Medina's great-grandson, and rejected Eli's contention that substantial evidence showed that he was dependent on Medina for one-half or more of his support, thereby conferring upon him standing to assert wrongful death claims. The court affirmed the noneconomic damages awarded to Medina's daughters because the court concluded that they were amply supported by the record and were not the product of passion or improper evidence. However, the court reversed as to the punitive damages because plaintiffs' limited evidence of BWMT's financial condition was not sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages. Finally, the court affirmed the jury's allocation of fault. View "Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC" on Justia Law

Robinson worked as a sandblaster for decades. Sand sometimes breaks down into silica dust, which, if inhaled, can cause the incurable lung disease silicosis. By 1997, Robinson knew that sandblasting could cause silicosis. In 1998, he saw Dr. Ragland, after coughing up white mucus. In 2002, he went to Ragland for bronchitis. In 2007, Robinson went to an emergency room for chest pain. The report listed three possibilities: tuberculosis, sarcoidosis, or a pneumonoconiosis disease (e.g., silicosis) caused by inhaling dusts. Medical notes reflect an “impression” of “silicosis related to sandblasting.” Robinson saw a respiratory specialist, to “follow up his silicosis.” Ridgeway’s notes, shared with Ragland, list an “impression” of silicosis. In 2011 Ridgeway biopsied Robinson’s lung. According to Robinson, Ridgeway then first told him he had silicosis. In 2012, Robinson sued entities that “sold, designed, manufactured, or marketed . . . silica related products.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the suit was time-barred. Arkansas’s three-year limitations period for product-liability actions applied, subject to a discovery rule: the period “does not commence running until the plaintiff knew or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the causal connection between the product and the injuries suffered.” Robinson should have known in 2007 that silica-related products had damaged his lungs. View "Robinson v. Mine Safety Appliances Co." on Justia Law

Robinson worked as a sandblaster for decades. Sand sometimes breaks down into silica dust, which, if inhaled, can cause the incurable lung disease silicosis. By 1997, Robinson knew that sandblasting could cause silicosis. In 1998, he saw Dr. Ragland, after coughing up white mucus. In 2002, he went to Ragland for bronchitis. In 2007, Robinson went to an emergency room for chest pain. The report listed three possibilities: tuberculosis, sarcoidosis, or a pneumonoconiosis disease (e.g., silicosis) caused by inhaling dusts. Medical notes reflect an “impression” of “silicosis related to sandblasting.” Robinson saw a respiratory specialist, to “follow up his silicosis.” Ridgeway’s notes, shared with Ragland, list an “impression” of silicosis. In 2011 Ridgeway biopsied Robinson’s lung. According to Robinson, Ridgeway then first told him he had silicosis. In 2012, Robinson sued entities that “sold, designed, manufactured, or marketed . . . silica related products.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the suit was time-barred. Arkansas’s three-year limitations period for product-liability actions applied, subject to a discovery rule: the period “does not commence running until the plaintiff knew or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the causal connection between the product and the injuries suffered.” Robinson should have known in 2007 that silica-related products had damaged his lungs. View "Robinson v. Mine Safety Appliances Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a products liability suit, alleging that defendants are liable for the their injuries after using the medical device known as Infuse. At issue was whether the presence of a so-called “nominal defendant” can prevent the remaining defendants from obtaining a forum non conveniens dismissal when, in the absence of the nominal defendant, the action can and should be pursued in alternative forums. The court concluded that the presence of a nominal defendant cannot defeat a forum non conveniens dismissal which should otherwise be granted. In this case, the trial court correctly granted the forum non conveniens dismissal in favor of all other defendants, but erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ action against the nominal defendant. Instead, the court should have severed the action against the nominal defendant and allowed it to proceed in California. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "David v. Medtronic, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants challenged a district court order requiring that they add two statements to their cigarette packages and advertisements: an announcement that a federal court has ruled that they “deliberately deceived the American public” about the dangers of cigarettes; and a declaration that they “intentionally designed cigarettes” to maximize addiction. The court concluded that given its earlier decisions in this case, the manufacturers’ objection to disclosing that they intentionally designed cigarettes to ensure addiction is both waived and foreclosed by the law of the case. Those decisions make equally clear that the district court, in ordering defendants to announce that they deliberately deceived the public, exceeded its authority under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, to craft remedies that “prevent and restrain” future violations. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a). The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law