Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Appellant brought a products liability claim against Respondent, the manufacturer of various models of swimming pool filters for both commercial and residential swimming pools, after he was injured when a filter canister exploded. Appellant alleged that the design of the filter was legally defective and that Respondent failed to give him proper warnings regarding the risk of explosion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent on all claims. Appellant filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The district court denied the motion. Appellant appealed, arguing that, during closing argument, Respondent’s counsel made various impermissible statements that were not based in evidence or that reflected the personal opinion of counsel. Appellant’s counsel did not timely object to any of the disputed statements. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for new trial, holding that attorney misconduct could be deemed to have occurred in this case and that the evidence supporting the products liability verdict was weak. Remanded to the district court for additional findings and with direction for the district court to reconsider its conclusion. View "Michaels v. Pentair Water Pool & Spa" on Justia Law

This products liability action arose following the death of Benjamin Riley, who was killed in a motor vehicle accident involving a negligently designed door-latch system in his 1998 Ford F-150 pickup truck. Petitioner Laura Riley, as the Personal Representative of the Estate, filed suit against Respondent Ford Motor Company and the at-fault driver, Andrew Marshall Carter, II. Carter settled with the Estate for $25,000, with $20,000 allocated to the survival claim and $5,000 allocated to the wrongful death claim. Petitioner and Ford proceeded to trial on the wrongful death claim. The jury returned a verdict for Petitioner in the amount of $300,000. The trial court granted a nisi additur of $600,000, bringing the judgment to $900,000. Ford appealed. The court of appeals upheld the finding of liability but reversed the trial court as to nisi additur, as well as the allocation and setoff of settlement proceeds. On appeal, Petitioner argued the court of appeals departed from well-established law concerning nisi additur and that the court of appeals erred in modifying the negotiated, court-approved settlement allocation and in finding Ford was entitled to offset the amount of $20,000. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court. View "Riley v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

This action under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and the False Advertising Law (FAL) arose from Philip Morris USA, Inc.'s use of terms such as "Lights" and "Lowered Tar and Nicotine" in advertising Marlboro Lights, to indicate they were less harmful to one's health than Marlboro Reds and other full-flavored cigarettes. The trial court determined Marlboro Lights were as dangerous than any other cigarettes, Philip Morris knew that, and its advertising was likely to deceive consumers. The court, however, denied plaintiffs' prayer for restitution on the ground they received value from Marlboro Lights apart from the deceptive advertising, and the evidence they submitted in an effort to show the difference between what they paid for Marlboro Lights and the value they actually received was incompetent and inadmissible. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the court erred as a matter of law by determining the only measure of restitution in a UCL products action was the measure set forth in "In re Vioxx Class of Cases," 180 Cal.App.4th 116 (2009)). Plaintiffs asserted value was immaterial, and they were not required to show any loss attributable to the deceptive advertising, because as an alternative measure the court had discretion to order Philip Morris to make a full refund of consumer expenditures, or its profits thereon, exclusively for the purpose of deterrence. Plaintiffs also contended the court abused its discretion by denying injunctive relief on the ground of mootness. A federal court opinion affirmed in relevant part in "United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." (566 F.3d 1095 (2009)), and federal legislation have already enjoined tobacco companies' use of the objectionable descriptors, plaintiffs asserted the matter was not moot because Philip Morris continued to market the cigarettes, called Marlboro Gold, in light-colored packs, which ostensibly signified they were less dangerous than Marlboro Reds or other cigarettes sold in dark-colored packs. Additionally, plaintiffs argued the court erred by denying them declaratory relief, awarding Philip Morris costs as the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, and denying them sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 for Philip Morris's failure to make admissions. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that all of plaintiffs' points were meritless and affirmed the judgment. View "In re Tobacco Cases II" on Justia Law

Amanda Maddox and her then-husband, Dwyane Maddox, where traveling in their 2001 Nissan Pathfinder when their vehicle was hit by a drunk driver. Amanda sustained serious injuries in the accident. Amanda filed suit against the drunk driver’s estate, Nissan Motor Company, Ltd and Nissan North American, Inc. (collectively, Nissan) alleging that her injuries were caused by Nissan’s defectively designed restraint system and failure to warn her about the system’s limitations. A jury ruled in favor of Amanda and assessed thirty percent of the fault to the drunk driver and seventy percent of the fault to Nissan. The jury found Nissan responsible for $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a punitive damages jury instruction was proper. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on that issue and vacated the trial court’s judgment assessing punitive damages against Nissan, holding that an instruction authorizing punitive damages against Nissan was inappropriate. View "Nissan Motor Co. v. Maddox" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kenneth Badilla bought a pair of work boots at Wal-Mart. He claimed the soles of the boots came unglued, causing him to trip and injure his back. More than three years later, he sued Wal-Mart and its store manager (Defendants) for breach of express and implied warranties. In his complaint plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries he claims were caused by the boots’ alleged failure to conform to their warranties. Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted on two grounds: (1) that Plaintiff’s complaint was time-barred by the application of the three-year statute of limitation for causes of action for torts; and (2) that there were no genuine issues of material fact to rebut plaintiff’s inability to establish the elements for breach of express and implied warranty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue, and because its determination on that issue was dispositive, it abstained from addressing the second basis upon which the district court granted summary judgment. Plaintiff sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision by petition for writ of certiorari, asking this Court to determine whether his claims for personal injury damages resulting from breach of warranties were subject to the four-year limitation period set out in Section 55-2-725 or the three-year limitation period for tort actions found in Section 37-1-8. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the UCC’s four-year statute of limitation governed breach of warranty claims, including those seeking damages for personal injuries resulting from the breach. View "Badilla v. Wal-Mart Stores East Inc." on Justia Law

Shiffer developed mesothelioma and sued CBS, whose predecessor, Westinghouse, provided a turbine set and asbestos-containing insulation for a power plant where Shiffer worked for several months in 1969-1970. Shiffer did not repair or maintain any Westinghouse equipment and did not install or remove any insulation material himself; no already-installed insulation was removed or disturbed during Shiffer’s time at the power plant. The trial court granted CBS summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed. Shiffer failed to produce evidence raising a triable issue that Shiffer suffered bystander exposure to Westinghouse asbestos while at the plant. The trial court also properly denied plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration and a new trial, because evidence of potential harm from reentrainment of asbestos was not new and could have been presented in opposition to the original summary judgment motion. View "Shiffer v. CBS Corp." on Justia Law

A city pipeline buried beneath a road leaked odorless natural gas which infiltrated a nearby home, causing an explosion. Residents alleged that the natural gas lacked its distinctive rotten egg smell, and that the odorant that was designed to provide the warning odor was defective because it faded. After reviewing Plaintiffs’ products-liability and assorted negligence claims against the odorant manufacturer, odorant distributor, and transmission pipeline, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that these claims failed as a matter of law. The Court therefore affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to the odorant manufacturer and transmission pipeline, and reversed the circuit court’s denial of the odorant distributor’s motion for summary judgment to render judgment in its favor. View "Elliott v. El Paso Corporation" on Justia Law

Johnson filed a products liability action, claiming that chronic exposure as an auto mechanic to benzene-containing products led him to develop acute myeloid leukemia. Defendants included U.S. Steel, which supplied a fabricator with a benzene-containing coal residue, “raffinate,” once the principal ingredient in Liquid Wrench, a solvent for loosening rusted bolts and machine parts. The court granted U.S. Steel, summary judgment, finding insufficient evidence to support claims for negligence and strict products liability under a design defect theory, citing the “component parts doctrine” (“bulk supplier defense”), under which the manufacturer of a component is not liable for injuries caused by the finished product into which the component was incorporated unless the component itself was defective and caused harm. Distinguishing cases that have held raw asbestos to be inherently defective and to contain a design defect under the consumer expectations test, the court held that raffinate is not inherently defective. The court of appeal agreed that the supplier of a raw material used in the manufacture of another product can be held liable for a design defect under the consumer expectations test only if the raw material is itself inherently defective, but held that summary judgment was inappropriate because the record did not contain evidence under that test negating the existence of a design defect in U.S. Steel coal raffinate. View "Johnson v. U.S. Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Larry Kirkbride was injured while attempting to dislodge a foreign object from a portable rock-crushing plant manufactured by the predecessor of Defendant Terex USA, LLC. Kirkbride brought a products-liability action against Terex, and a jury found the company liable for failure to adequately warn of the plant’s dangers, for defectively manufacturing a critical part inside the crushing plant that led to Kirkbride’s injury, and for breaching an implied warranty of merchantability. Terex argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that Kirkbride failed to present sufficient admissible evidence to establish his claims, and that the jury was wrongly instructed on the implied-warranty claim. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that there was insufficient evidence to hold Terex liable on any of the theories of recovery that went to the jury, and as a result, Terex was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Kirkbride v. Terex USA" on Justia Law

Bradley purchased ratchet straps to use exclusively on a hunting treestand. In 2008, Bradley used the straps to secure his treestand, exposed to the elements, from early September to mid-October. Bradley then stored the treestand and straps in his garage until 2011. He did not use the treestand until a few months after setting it up. He inspected the treestand and straps before climbing into the stand. Within minutes of Bradley’s ascent, the straps broke, causing Bradley to fall and sustain injuries. Bradley’s suit allegied strict product liability, negligent design and manufacture, strict liability failure to warn, negligent failure to warn, loss of consortium, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The court excluded the testimony of two plaintiffs’ experts, one of whom would have testified that the straps failed to include an ultraviolet light inhibitor that would have reduced the rate of polymer degradation due to sunlight exposure and that the defendants failed to warn and instruct consumers how to recognize when the straps were no longer safe, finding the expert’s experience “with the webbing material . . . sparse.” The court dismissed the failure-to-warn claims on other grounds. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the expert qualified and that the court erred by not allowing Bradley to proceed under the consumer expectation test, relying on lay testimony about objective facts and circumstances surrounding the straps’ failure. View "Bradley v. Ameristep, Inc." on Justia Law