Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Deborah Jackson sued Illinois Central Railroad Company under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for the wrongful death of her husband, Charles. Jackson alleged that her husband’s death from lung cancer was caused by his exposure to asbestos while working for the railroad. After the close of discovery, Illinois Central filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to strike Jackson’s expert, Michael Ellenbecker. Later, Illinois Central moved to strike improper evidence from Jackson’s response to the motion for summary judgment. When Jackson attempted to supplement Ellenbecker’s designation at the summary-judgment hearing, Illinois Central moved ore tenus to strike the supplementation. The Circuit Court denied all of Illinois Central’s motions. Illinois Central appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that Jackson’s expert designation of Ellenbecker was improper summary-judgment evidence because it was not sworn to upon personal knowledge and constituted inadmissible hearsay. Because the supplemental response was unsworn and never was filed, it also was improper. And, because Jackson could not show a genuine issue of material fact without Ellenbecker’s testimony, the Court reversed the denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Illinois Central. View "Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Jackson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the packaging and labeling of sodium bromate, a chemical which contributed to a fire that occurred in a plant owned by Engelhard Corporation in June 2004. At the time of the fire, Scott Lawing worked at Engelhard's Seneca plant as a maintenance mechanic. Engelhard produced a precious metal catalyst used in the automobile industry, and refined metals from recycled materials. In this products liability action, Trinity Manufacturing, Inc. and Matrix Outsourcing, LLC argued that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to them on a strict liability cause of action. In their cross-appeal, Scott and Tammy Lawing asked the Supreme Court to reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the trial court's decision to charge the jury on the "sophisticated user" defense. After review, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals. The Court found the appellate court erred in setting forth its broad definition of "user," and affirmed as modified the court of appeals' decision on this issue. Furthermore, the Court concluded the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's decision to charge the sophisticated user defense to the jury. The appellate court did not err, however, in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Trinity and Matrix on the Lawings' strict liability claim. The Supreme Court found that the evidence in this case did not support the sophisticated user defense, so the trial court erred in charging the defense to the jury. The case was remanded for a new trial on the Lawings' negligence and implied warranty of merchantability claims. View "Lawing v. Univar" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Ford, alleging that Ford breached implied and express warranties and committed fraud in the sale of Ford Focus vehicles containing rear suspension defects. The court concluded that the district court's order granting summary judgment as to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1792, claims of plaintiffs is reversed in light of Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co. Mexia held that “latent defects” may breach the implied warranty even when they are not discovered within the implied warranty’s duration. The court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment as to the express warranty claims of plaintiffs given the ambiguous terms of Ford's express warranty. Finally, the court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment on plaintiff's Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1770(a), and Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, because plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of fact as to reliance. The court declined to address additional issues raised by Ford. Because the court reversed plaintiffs’ implied and express warranty claims, the court also reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment as to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301–2312, claims. View "Daniel v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, diagnosed with acute myelogenous leukemia allegedly caused by exposure to Safety-Kleen 105 Solvent during the course of their employment, filed suit against defendants, including Calsol, a distributor of mineral spirits for the ultimate manufacturer, Safety-Kleen. The trial court granted Calsol's motion for summary judgment based on the raw material or component parts doctrine. The court concluded, however, that the component parts doctrine requires a showing that the mineral spirits supplied to Safety-Kleen was not inherently dangerous. Because Calsol failed to make that showing, the court concluded that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether mineral spirits are inherently dangerous. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brady v. Calsol, Inc." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff contracted peritoneal mesothelioma, he sued Union Carbide Corporation (Defendant), claiming that his disease was caused by his exposure to an asbestos product designed and manufactured by Defendant. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff, finding that Defendant was liable for Plaintiff’s damages, in part, under theories of negligence and strict liability defective design and failure to warn. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision and remanded to the Third District with directions that the judgment be reinstated, holding (1) the Third District improperly applied the Restatement (Third) of Torts to Plaintiff’s strict liability defective design claim; and (2) the Third District improperly reversed the judgment for the failure to warn claim based on the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the learned intermediary defense. View "Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp." on Justia Law

Whether a third-party payer (TPP) will cover the cost of a member’s prescription depends on whether that drug is listed in the TPP’s formulary. Pharmacy Benefit Managers prepare TPPs’ formularies of drugs approved for use by TPP members by analyzing research regarding a drug’s cost effectiveness, safety and efficacy. In 1999, the FDA approved Avandia as a prescription for type II diabetes. TPPs included Avandia in their formularies and covered Avandia prescriptions at a favorable rate. GSK downplayed concerns about Avandia’s heart-related side effects. In 2010, the FDA restricted access to Avandia in response to increasing evidence of its cardiovascular risks. TPPs (union health and welfare funds) sued GSK on behalf of themselves and similarly situated TPPs. asserting that GSK’s failure to disclose Avandia’s significant heart-related risks violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act based on predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, tampering with witnesses, and use of interstate facilities to conduct unlawful activity. They also claimed unjust enrichment and violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law and other states’ consumer protection laws. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the TPPs adequately alleged the elements of standing. View "In Re: Avandia Mktg.,Sales Practices & Prod. Liab." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two individuals who purchased Marlboro Light cigarettes in Oregon. Defendant Philip Morris was the company that manufactured, marketed, and sold Marlboro Lights. Plaintiffs brought this action under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA), alleging that defendant misrepresented that Marlboro Lights would deliver less tar and nicotine than regular Marlboros and that, as a result of that misrepresentation, plaintiffs suffered economic losses. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of approximately 100,000 individuals who had purchased at least one pack of Marlboro Lights in Oregon over a 30-year period (from 1971 to 2001). The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion after concluding that individual inquiries so predominated over common ones that a class action was not a superior means to adjudicate the putative class’s UTPA claim. On appeal, a majority of the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s predominance assessment, concluding that the essential elements of the UTPA claim could be proved through evidence common to the class. The majority remanded to the trial court to reconsider whether, without the trial court’s predominance assessment, a class action was a superior means of litigating the class claims. In granting defendant’s petition for review, the Supreme Court considered whether common issues predominated for purposes of the class action certification decision, and what a private plaintiff in a UTPA case of this nature had to prove. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly denied class certification, and accordingly, it reversed the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the individual plaintiffs’ claims. View "Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc." on Justia Law

Remington manufactured O’Neal’s Model 700 .243 caliber bolt-action rifle in 1971, using the “Walker trigger.” As early as 1979, Remington knew that the Walker trigger can cause the rifles to fire a round when the safety lever is released to the fire position, without the trigger being pulled, because of the manner in which components of the trigger mechanism interact. Remington estimated that at least 20,000 rifles would inadvertently fire merely by releasing the safety, but decided against a recall. O'Neal, deer hunting with friends, loaned his Remington Model 700 to Ritter. The hunters were traveling in a pickup truck when they spotted a deer. After the pickup stopped, Ritter began to exit the truck and moved the safety lever on the rifle to the fire position without pulling the trigger. The rifle discharged. The cartridge traveled through the pickup seat and hit O’Neal, who eventually died from the gunshot. The gun had had three owners; it had been loaned out several times. In a suit by O’Neal’s widow, the court granted Remington summary judgment on grounds that O'Neal could not show whether the alleged defect existed at the time of manufacture or resulted from subsequent modification. The Eighth Circuit reversed: South Dakota law permits a plaintiff to prove a product defect through circumstantial evidence. O'Neal presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to show the alleged defect was present at the time of manufacture and did not result from an alteration. View "O'Neal v. Remington Arms Co., LLC" on Justia Law

This case was a latent-injury silicosis case filed against a Florida corporation that was dissolved. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Florida corporate-survival statute applied to a Mississippi plaintiff, or whether the discovery rule for latent injuries permitted claims to be brought against the foreign corporation after dissolution. Sixteen plaintiffs sued Clark Sand Company, Inc. more than four years after the corporation’s dissolution. The circuit court judge sustained Clark Sand’s motion for summary judgment. "At common law, when a corporation dissolved, it no longer existed, and it could not be sued. But because of the harshness of this rule, Florida, like most states, has adopted a corporate-survival statute that allows plaintiffs to bring suit against a Florida corporation for up to four years after dissolution." Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Williams v. Clark Sand Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant brought a products liability claim against Respondent, the manufacturer of various models of swimming pool filters for both commercial and residential swimming pools, after he was injured when a filter canister exploded. Appellant alleged that the design of the filter was legally defective and that Respondent failed to give him proper warnings regarding the risk of explosion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent on all claims. Appellant filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The district court denied the motion. Appellant appealed, arguing that, during closing argument, Respondent’s counsel made various impermissible statements that were not based in evidence or that reflected the personal opinion of counsel. Appellant’s counsel did not timely object to any of the disputed statements. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for new trial, holding that attorney misconduct could be deemed to have occurred in this case and that the evidence supporting the products liability verdict was weak. Remanded to the district court for additional findings and with direction for the district court to reconsider its conclusion. View "Michaels v. Pentair Water Pool & Spa" on Justia Law