Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Grant worked for Bath Iron Works from 1964-1970, and again from 1978-1994. During Grant’s first period of employment, asbestos was a common component of the insulation and other materials used at Bath, including for the construction and renovation of ships. Grant worked in a variety of positions, including as a ship cleaner. Cleaning included sweeping up debris— sometimes including asbestos. In 2011, Grant died of lung cancer, caused by exposure to asbestos. The trial court rejected, on summary judgment, Grant’s estate’s complaint, alleging negligence, violation of 14 M.R.S. 221 (defective or unreasonably dangerous goods), and loss of consortium. The complaint named 15 defendants, including Bath’s suppliers. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The trial court required the estate to show “[t]hat the defendant’s asbestos-containing product was at the site where the plaintiff worked or was present, and that the plaintiff was in proximity to that product at the time it was being used.” The estate was unable to produce evidence to establish a prima facie case that any of the named defendants’ products were a proximate cause of the injuries View "Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured by exposure to asbestos products, he filed suit against a raw asbestos supplier (Special Electric) for failure to warn him about the danger. At issue is the extent of the supplier's duty to warn. Under the sophisticated intermediary doctrine, the supplier can discharge this duty if it conveys adequate warnings to the material's purchaser (in this case, Johns-Manville), or sells to a sufficiently sophisticated purchaser, and reasonably relies on the purchaser to convey adequate warnings to others, including those who encounter the material in a finished product. Special Electric arguably forfeited the sophisticated intermediary defense by failing to present it to the jury. However, assuming the defense was preserved, the record does not establish as a matter of law that Special Electric discharged its duty to warn by reasonably relying on a sophisticated intermediary. The evidence is disputed about whether Special Electric consistently provided warnings to Johns-Manville during the relevant time frame; although the record clearly shows Johns-Manville was aware of the risks of asbestos in general, no evidence established it knew about the particularly acute risks posed by the crocidolite asbestos Special Electric supplied; plaintiffs presented evidence that at least one Special Electric salesperson told customers crocidolite was safer than other types of asbestos fiber, when the opposite was true; and the record does not establish as a matter of law that Special Electric actually and reasonably relied on Johns-Manville to warn end users like plaintiff about the dangers of asbestos. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court did not err in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict because substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict against Special Electric. View "Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In a certified appeal, the issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's consideration was whether the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applied to actions under the Wrongful Death Act (WDA), an issue of first impression in New Mexico. Alice Brice (Decedent) died in an automobile accident in 2006, when her 2002 Toyota Camry suddenly accelerated into a highway intersection, collided with a tractor-trailer, and burst into flames. The Estate of Alice C. Brice (Plaintiff) filed a wrongful death lawsuit in 2010, asserting products liability and various other claims against the car manufacturer, the dealer, and others (Defendants). Because this wrongful death action was filed three years and eleven months from the date of Decedent’s death, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants prevented Plaintiff from obtaining knowledge about the cause of action, that Defendants were aware of the sudden acceleration problem in its vehicles for most of the decade preceding 2010 and well before Decedent’s 2006 accident, and that Defendants fraudulently concealed these problems until February 2010 when the sudden acceleration problems drew public attention and led to congressional hearings. Plaintiff contended that it had no way to discover its wrongful death cause of action before February 2010. Plaintiff asserted therefore that after discovering its cause of action, it promptly filed its wrongful death suit on August 31, 2010. The district court granted Defendants' motion. After review, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment could apply to toll the statutory limitations period for a wrongful death claim if a defendant has fraudulently concealed a cause of action, thereby preventing that defendant from claiming the statute of limitations as a defense until the plaintiff learned or, through reasonable diligence, could have learned of the cause of action. Accordingly the Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Brice v. Toyota Motor Corp." on Justia Law

Jarred Wellman, a West Virginia resident, was killed in a one-car rollover crash in West Virginia. Jarred was operating a 2002 Ford Explorer at the time of the accident. Plaintiff, a West Virginia resident and the father and administrator of Jarred’s estate, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Wyoming County against Ford Motor Company alleging product liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. Ford filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the grounds that it was a nonresident corporation. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Ford requested the Supreme Court to issue a writ of prohibition seeking dismissal from the underlying action. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ as moulded, holding (1) Ford has not shown that it is entitled to extraordinary relief whereby the Court would dismiss it from the underlying civil action; but (2) Ford’s assertions regarding its challenge to jurisdiction are of such a significant nature that the parties are entitled to an opportunity to develop the record and submit argument to be considered and determined by the circuit court. View "State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Hon. Warren R. McGraw" on Justia Law

Hennessy manufactured and supplied brake shoe arcing machines, (grinders) used to grind asbestos brakes. Hetzel allegedly used its grinder while working as a mechanic from 1958 to 1962 and alleged Hennessy knew or should have known its grinders would be used in conjunction with asbestos-containing brake linings. All brake shoe linings used with automobiles during the relevant period contained asbestos. He claimed Hennessy had a duty to warn of the risks. Hennessy’s grinders did not contain asbestos and are designed to reshape the friction material of a brake shoe, regardless of the shoe’s composition, by mechanical abrasion. When the grinder comes into contact with an asbestos-containing brake shoe, it releases asbestos into the air. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Hennessy, reasoning that brake shoes without asbestos existed at the time of plaintiff’s exposure and Hennessy’s grinders worked on all brake linings, regardless of whether they contained asbestos. Hetzel, who suffered lung damage, died in 2012. The court of appeal reversed. The combined use of Hennessy’s machines with the asbestos brakes inevitably created a hazardous condition by releasing asbestos fibers into the air. Hennessy was in a position to provide safeguards from this exposure. View "Hetzel v. Hennessy Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a products liability suit against defendants after suffering severe injuries soon after being treated with defendants' product, the ProNeuroLight. At issue is the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to exclude the medical testimony of a chiropractor. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony without performing the requisite Daubert inquiry regarding the chiropractor's qualifications. Furthermore, the district court's abuse of discretion affected plaintiff's substantial rights where the chiropractor was the sole witness in defendants' case. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carlson v. Bioremedi Therapeutic Sys." on Justia Law

Between 1945 and the mid-1970s, Hassell was employed as an electrician by the Railroad, responsible for the maintenance and repair of passenger railcars designed and manufactured by defendants' predecessors. Steam pipes running underneath those railcars were insulated with material containing asbestos. As a consequence of his exposure to asbestos, Hassell contracted asbestosis and mesothelioma. He died in 2009, during the pendency of his lawsuit. Defendants argued that state law claims were preempted by the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. 20701, the Safety Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. 20301, and the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20101. The district court held that Hassell’s claims were preempted by the LIA. The Third Circuit vacated, noting the lack of evidence supporting defendants’ assertion that the railcar pipes at issued formed an “interconnected system” with the locomotive. Even assuming that evidence for the “interconnected system” could have been gleaned from the record, Hassell produced evidence from a former Railroad supervisor showing that, instead of being connected to locomotives, the pipes were connected to “power cars” that separately supplied steam heat to the passenger coaches. There was a genuine dispute material fact precluding summary judgment. View "In Re: Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig." on Justia Law

Maribel Quilez-Bonelli died from injuries she received in an automobile accident with a truck used by employees of the Municipality of San Juan. The truck had fitted onto its trash body an underride guard designed by Ox Bodies, Inc. Maribel’s family members (collectively, Quilez) brought suit in federal district court against Ox Bodies, seeking damages for negligence and defective design of the under ride guard. A jury found Ox Bodies strictly liable for defective design and awarded Plaintiffs $6 million in damages. The jury assigned twenty percent of responsibility for the damages to Ox Bodies and eighty percent to the Municipality of San Juan, which was not a party in the suit. The magistrate judge ruled that Ox Bodies should be held responsible for only twenty percent of the damages award. Both parties appealed. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the magistrate judge’s decision to admit the testimony of Quilez’s expert regarding an alternative underride guard design; and (2) as to Quilez’s appeal, certified to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico the question of the extent of Ox Bodies’ liability for the damages award. View "Quilez-Velar v. Ox Bodies, Inc." on Justia Law

Jim Bishop Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, Inc. ("Jim Bishop"), appealed judgment entered on jury verdicts in favor of Michael and Tina Burden ("Burden"). In 2012, the Burdens sued General Motors, LLC, Jim Bishop, and Lynn Layton Chevrolet, Inc. ("Lynn Layton"), to recover damages for injuries they allegedly sustained as the result of a fire that occurred in a truck they had purchased from an automobile dealership owned and operated by Jim Bishop. When Jim Bishop filed its answer, also generally denying the allegations contained in the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses, Jim Bishop further asserted a cross-claim against General Motors alleging it had refused to indemnify Jim Bishop. The Burdens eventually entered into pro tanto settlements with General Motors, which agreed to pay them $20,000, and Lynn Layton, which agreed to pay them $32,000, as to the respective claims asserted by the Burdens against those defendants. The settlement with General Motors resolved the breach-of-warranty claims and the "Magnuson-Moss" claim. The trial court dismissed the Burdens' claims against both General Motors and Lynn Layton pursuant to joint stipulations of dismissal filed by those parties. Jim Bishop moved the trial court for a summary judgment on the Burdens' remaining claims against it, moved at the close of evidence for a judgment as a matter of law, and renewed its JML motion post-verdict. All three were denied, and the jury returned its verdict against Jim Bishop. Based on its review of the facts entered into the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to grant Jim Bishop's motion for a JML and in submitting the case to the jury. Therefore, it reversed the judgment entered in favor of the Burdens on the jury's verdicts and rendered a judgment for Jim Bishop. View "Jim Bishop Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Burden" on Justia Law

The vehicle in which Plaintiff was riding was hit by a drunk driver. Plaintiff was wearing her seatbelt, and the airbags deployed properly, but Plaintiff sustained serious injuries. Plaintiff filed suit against Nissan Motor Company, Ltd. and Nissan North America, Inc. (collectively, Nissan) alleging that her injuries were caused by Nissan’s defectively designed restraint system and failure to warn her about the system’s limitations. The jury ruled in Plaintiff’s favor and found Nissan responsible for approximately $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on the issue of punitive damages, holding that an instruction permitting assessment of punitive damage against Nissan was inappropriate in this case. View "Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Maddox" on Justia Law