Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

The case involves four plaintiffs who took docetaxel, a chemotherapy drug, as part of their treatment for early-stage breast cancer and subsequently suffered permanent chemotherapy-induced alopecia (PCIA). The plaintiffs allege that the manufacturers of the drug, Hospira, Inc., Hospira Worldwide, LLC, and Accord Healthcare, Inc., violated state law by failing to warn them that docetaxel could cause PCIA.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, where the defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' state law failure-to-warn claims were preempted by federal law. The district court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was tasked with determining whether federal law preempts the plaintiffs' state law failure-to-warn claims against the defendant drug manufacturers. The court found that the district court had erred in its interpretation of what constitutes "newly acquired information" under the changes-being-effected (CBE) regulation, which allows manufacturers to file a supplemental application with the FDA and simultaneously implement a labeling change before obtaining FDA approval. The court held that the district court failed to enforce the requirement that newly acquired information must "reveal risks of a different type or greater severity or frequency than previously included in submissions to FDA."The court vacated the district court's judgment on the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims and remanded the case for further consideration of one outstanding issue: whether the Bertrand Abstract, a scientific study, constituted "newly acquired information" that revealed a greater risk of PCIA than previously known. If the Bertrand Abstract does not meet this standard, the court held that the defendants would not be liable to the plaintiffs on their state law failure-to-warn claims. View "Hickey v. Hospira" on Justia Law

This case involves a lawsuit filed by Cornelius Williams against J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (JMM), a supplier of asbestos-cement pipe. Williams alleged that he developed mesothelioma due to secondary exposure to asbestos from his brother Nathan's work with asbestos-cement pipe over a period of more than 20 years. Williams and Nathan did not live together, but had regular close contact during Nathan's employment. The jury found JMM liable under theories of design defect and failure to warn, concluding that the pipe sold by JMM was a substantial factor in increasing Williams' risk of developing cancer. JMM appealed the decision.The trial court dismissed Williams' negligence claim, but not the strict liability claim. The jury found in favor of Williams on his remaining strict liability claim, awarding him significant damages. JMM moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and, in the alternative, for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of a previous case, Kesner v. Superior Court, to preclude only the negligence cause of action. The motion was denied. JMM also appealed from the judgment and order denying its motion for JNOV.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court rejected JMM's arguments that (1) judgment must be entered in its favor because, under Kesner, strict liability does not apply to Williams; (2) the judgment must be reversed for lack of substantial evidence; or (3) a new trial is necessary because the trial court abused its discretion on certain evidentiary rulings. View "Williams v. J-M Manufacturing Company" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Molitor Equipment, LLC purchased two tractors from Deere & Company. These tractors were a transitional model and did not include engine compartment fire shields as standard equipment, which were included in the subsequent 2019 model. A year after purchase, both tractors caught fire in separate incidents. Molitor had an insurance policy with SECURA Insurance Company, who paid Molitor's claim and then pursued Molitor's warranty claims against Deere. SECURA claimed the tractors were defective and unreasonably dangerous due to the absence of the fire shields and that Deere's warranty obligated them to remedy the problem or refund the purchase prices.Deere moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that its warranty only covered manufacturing defects, not design defects. The district court granted Deere's motion, dismissing SECURA's breach of warranty claim to the extent it was based on a design defect theory. The case proceeded on a manufacturing defect theory. At the close of discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. Deere argued that since the tractors conformed to their intended design, there was no manufacturing defect. The district court granted Deere's motion, holding that SECURA could not establish its breach of warranty claim because Deere's warranty covers defects only in "materials or workmanship."On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. The appellate court agreed with the district court's interpretation of Deere's warranty, concluding that it did not cover design defects. The court also agreed that SECURA could not establish a breach of warranty claim based on a manufacturing defect, as the tractors conformed to their intended design. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of SECURA's design defect claim and its grant of summary judgment to Deere on the manufacturing defect claim. View "Secura Insurance Company v. Deere & Company" on Justia Law

Five diabetic patients, Henry J. Hebert, Traci Moore, Aliya Campbell Pierre, Tiffanie Tsakiris, and Brenda Bottiglier, were prescribed the Dexcom G6 Continuous Glucose Monitoring System (Dexcom G6) to manage their diabetes. The device allegedly malfunctioned, failing to alert them of dangerous glucose levels, resulting in serious injuries and, in Hebert's case, death. The patients and Hebert's daughters filed separate product liability actions against Dexcom, Inc., the manufacturer. Dexcom moved to compel arbitration, arguing that each patient had agreed to arbitrate disputes when they installed the G6 App on their devices and clicked "I agree to Terms of Use."The trial court granted Dexcom's motions to compel arbitration in all five cases. The plaintiffs petitioned the appellate court for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its orders compelling them to arbitrate. The appellate court consolidated the cases and issued an order directing Dexcom to show cause why the relief sought should not be granted.The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred. Although a clickwrap agreement, where an internet user accepts a website’s terms of use by clicking an “I agree” or “I accept” button, is generally enforceable, Dexcom’s G6 App clickwrap agreement was not. The court found that Dexcom undid whatever notice it might have provided of the contractual terms by explicitly telling the user that clicking the box constituted authorization for Dexcom to collect and store the user’s sensitive, personal health information. For this reason, Dexcom could not meet its burden of demonstrating that the same click constituted unambiguous acceptance of the Terms of Use, including the arbitration provision. Consequently, arbitration agreements were not formed with any of the plaintiffs. The court granted the petitions and directed the trial court to vacate its orders granting Dexcom’s motions to compel arbitration and to enter new orders denying the motions. View "Herzog v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over whether a hospital that supplies and administers a drug that causes harm can be considered a "seller" under Oregon's strict product liability statute, ORS 30.920(1). The plaintiffs, Brown and Gomez, are the parents of a child who suffered irreparable heart defects as a result of in utero exposure to the drug Zofran, which Providence Health System - Oregon administered to Gomez. The plaintiffs sued Providence, asserting a claim for strict liability under ORS 30.920, alleging that Providence was a "seller" of Zofran and that the drug was "unreasonably dangerous and defective."The trial court granted Providence's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute was inapplicable under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, disagreeing with the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. The Supreme Court of Oregon granted review.The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the legislature did not intend to exclude hospitals from the scope of ORS 30.920(1); a hospital that supplies and administers a dangerously defective drug in conjunction with providing a healthcare service can be a "seller" that is "engaged in the business of selling" for purposes of liability under ORS 30.920; and, consequently, the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC" on Justia Law

Nicholas and Julie Kuhar filed a product liability claim against Thompson Manufacturing, a Utah company, seeking compensation for injuries Nicholas sustained when his safety harness failed while he was cleaning rain gutters in New Jersey. This was not the first lawsuit the Kuhars had brought regarding this incident. They had previously sued Thompson and other defendants in New Jersey federal court, alleging that the harness was defective. That suit was unsuccessful, with Thompson being dismissed from the case due to a lack of personal jurisdiction. The Kuhars then refiled their claims against Thompson in Utah.In the New Jersey case, the Kuhars' expert witness was excluded, and the remaining defendants were granted summary judgment. Thompson then moved in the Utah case to preclude the Kuhars from litigating the issue of whether the harness was defective. The district court agreed with Thompson and dismissed the Kuhars' claims. However, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the issue litigated and decided in New Jersey was not identical to the issue Thompson sought to preclude in Utah.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals. It concluded that the elements of issue preclusion were satisfied. The court clarified that to determine the issue-preclusive effect of the New Jersey federal court’s judgment in this case, the substantive law of New Jersey applies. Under that law, the court concluded that the issue Thompson sought to preclude the Kuhars from litigating—whether the harness was defective—was actually litigated and decided on the merits in the New Jersey court’s summary judgment order. Therefore, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Kuhar v. Thompson Manufacturing" on Justia Law

The case involves William Schmidt, an employee of Tesoro Logistics, who was injured while working at a site owned and operated by Hess Corporation. Schmidt claimed that Hess required him to use breathing air equipment, installed by Basin Safety Consulting Corporation, which caused him to trip and fall, injuring his arm and shoulder. He filed negligence and premises liability claims against both Hess and Basin Safety.The District Court of McKenzie County dismissed Schmidt’s claims on summary judgment, ruling that neither Hess nor Basin Safety owed him a duty of care. The court determined that while Hess required Schmidt to wear an air hose, it did not specify the method of using it, thus Hess did not retain control over Schmidt. The court also ruled that Basin Safety did not owe a duty of care to Schmidt as it did not provide training regarding the air hose or have any control over the worksite.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment in favor of Basin Safety but reversed the judgment in favor of Hess. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Hess owed Schmidt a duty of care. The court concluded that evidence indicating Hess required the use of the air hose and prohibited its use in a manner preferred by the workers could be seen as Hess retaining control over the work. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Schmidt v. Hess Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves three consolidated appeals by Dexcom, Inc., a California-based company, against the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California to remand three product liability actions back to California state court. The remand was based on the forum defendant rule, which prohibits removal based on diversity jurisdiction if any of the defendants is a citizen of the state where the action is brought.Dexcom had removed the cases to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction after the complaints were submitted electronically but before they were officially filed by the clerk of court. Dexcom argued that the forum defendant rule did not bar removal because it had not yet been “joined and served” as a defendant.The district court held that an electronically submitted complaint is not “filed” in California state court until it is processed and endorsed or otherwise acknowledged as officially filed by the clerk of the court. Therefore, Dexcom’s removals were ineffectual attempts to remove cases that did not yet exist as civil actions pending in state court. As a result, the district court had the power to grant the plaintiffs’ eventual motions to remand based on a perceived violation of the forum defendant rule, even though the motions were brought 31 days after Dexcom’s initial (ineffectual) notices of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction, as the district court had the power under § 1447(c) to order remand based on the forum defendant rule. View "Casola v. Dexcom, Inc." on Justia Law

On July 4, 2022, a mass shooting occurred in Highland Park, Illinois, where Robert Eugene Crimo III used a Smith & Wesson M&P15 rifle to kill seven people and wound 48 others. Victims of the shooting and their estates filed multiple consolidated suits against Crimo, his father, the gun shops where Crimo acquired the rifle, and the rifle's manufacturer, Smith & Wesson. The plaintiffs argued that Smith & Wesson should not have offered the M&P15 to civilians, as it is a machine gun reserved for police and military use. They also claimed that the manufacturer is liable because the weapon was advertised in a way that attracted irresponsible individuals.The defendants, including Smith & Wesson, filed notices of removal to federal court, asserting that the victims' claims arise under federal law. However, the two Crimos, who are the principal asserted wrongdoers, neither filed their own notices of removal nor consented to Smith & Wesson’s. This led the plaintiffs to move for remand, arguing that all defendants must consent to removal under federal law. Smith & Wesson countered that removal was authorized by a statute that allows removal whether or not other defendants elect to be in federal court.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois was not persuaded by Smith & Wesson's arguments and remanded the cases to state court. Smith & Wesson appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the cases to state court. The court rejected Smith & Wesson's argument that the state suits presented multiple "claims" against them, stating that the company's belief that each legal theory is a separate "claim" is incorrect. The court clarified that the core claim in these suits is that Crimo killed and injured multiple persons, and Smith & Wesson may bear secondary liability for their role in facilitating his acts. The court also suggested that the district judge should consider whether Smith & Wesson must reimburse the plaintiffs' costs and fees occasioned by the unjustified removal and appeal. View "Roberts v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a verdict from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs, C. Sidney Johnston and Danette Johnston, had sued Ferrellgas, Incorporated after Mr. Johnston was injured using a propane tank manufactured by Ferrellgas. A jury had found Ferrellgas liable for a manufacturing defect and negligence and awarded the Johnstons $7 million, which the district court reduced to $1.7 million. On appeal, Ferrellgas contended that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law because there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict.The Court of Appeals agreed with Ferrellgas. The Court found that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that the tank was defective when it left Ferrellgas's possession, a crucial element of a manufacturing defect claim. The Court also found that the negligence claim must fail, as it was dependent on the tank having a manufacturing defect.The Court therefore reversed the district court's denial of Ferrellgas's motion for judgment as a matter of law on both the manufacturing defect and negligence claims, and rendered judgment for Ferrellgas. View "Johnston v. Ferrellgas" on Justia Law