Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Ryan Davis and Anthony Crane ordered wet ready-mix concrete from Simon Contractors for a garage floor project. Both had limited experience with concrete, though Davis had experience with a similar product called thinset. The concrete was delivered in two truckloads, and Davis and Crane worked without proper protective equipment. They suffered severe chemical burns from prolonged contact with the wet concrete.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska held a jury trial. Davis and Crane claimed Simon Contractors was negligent for failing to warn about the dangers of wet concrete. The jury found in favor of Simon Contractors. Davis and Crane appealed, arguing errors in jury instructions and the admission of evidence about Davis’s prior litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court correctly instructed the jury on the sophisticated user and assumption of risk defenses under Nebraska law. The court held that Davis and Crane’s experience with similar products and the warnings provided were sufficient for the jury to conclude they knew or should have known the risks. The court also found no error in the assumption of risk instruction, as evidence showed Davis and Crane were aware of the dangers and failed to take necessary precautions.Regarding the cross-examination about Davis’s prior litigation, the court ruled that any error in admitting this evidence was harmless. The probative questions were about Davis and Crane’s knowledge of the risks, and the evidence on these issues was clear. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Simon Contractors. View "Davis v. Simon Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

Lavonne S. Mottern died after receiving a contaminated intravenous injection at Princeton Medical Center, operated by Baptist Health System, Inc. (BHS). Donald J. Mottern, as administrator of Lavonne's estate, filed claims against BHS, Meds I.V., LLC (the manufacturer of the injection), and three individuals associated with Meds I.V. The claims against Meds I.V. and the individuals were settled, leaving only the claims against BHS, which included negligence, wantonness, a claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD), and a breach of implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed all of Mottern's claims against BHS, including the negligence and wantonness claims, which BHS conceded should not have been dismissed. BHS argued that the AEMLD and UCC claims were subject to the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA) and required proof of a breach of the standard of care. The trial court agreed and dismissed these claims, leading to Mottern's appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and agreed with BHS that all of Mottern's claims, including those under the AEMLD and UCC, are subject to the AMLA's standard-of-care provisions. The court held that the AMLA applies to all actions for medical injury, regardless of the theory of liability, and requires proof of a breach of the standard of care. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the negligence and wantonness claims and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The main holding is that the AMLA's standard-of-care provisions apply to all claims alleging medical injury, including those under the AEMLD and UCC. View "Mottern v. Baptist Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

A Florida resident, Sheri Sawyer, acting as the personal representative of her deceased son Thomas's estate, filed a product-liability lawsuit against Cooper Tire & Rubber Company in the Mobile Circuit Court. The case arose from a fatal single-vehicle accident in Mobile County, Alabama, where a tire manufactured by Cooper Tire allegedly experienced tread separation, causing the vehicle to crash. The tire was purchased in Alabama by Barbara Coggin, the mother of the driver, Joseph Coggin, both Alabama residents.Cooper Tire moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Alabama courts lacked specific personal jurisdiction over it due to insufficient suit-related contacts with Alabama. Sawyer countered that Cooper Tire's extensive business activities in Alabama, including the sale, distribution, and advertising of the tire model in question, established sufficient contacts. While the motion was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, which held that specific personal jurisdiction could exist even without a direct causal link between the defendant's forum activities and the plaintiff's claims.The Mobile Circuit Court granted Cooper Tire's motion to dismiss, concluding that Sawyer failed to show that Cooper Tire sold, distributed, or marketed the specific tire model in Alabama within three years before the accident. The court also noted that neither Sawyer nor her son were Alabama residents, reducing Alabama's interest in providing a forum for the case. Sawyer appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower court's decision, applying the analytical framework from Ford. The court held that Cooper Tire's sale, distribution, and advertising of the tire model in Alabama "related to" Sawyer's claims, establishing specific personal jurisdiction. The court also found that the trial court's focus on the timing of Cooper Tire's contacts and Sawyer's residency was not dispositive. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Sawyer v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company" on Justia Law

The case involves the plaintiffs, including the estate of Carson Bride and three minors, who suffered severe harassment and bullying through the YOLO app, leading to emotional distress and, in Carson Bride's case, suicide. YOLO Technologies developed an anonymous messaging app that promised to unmask and ban users who engaged in bullying or harassment but allegedly failed to do so. The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against YOLO, claiming violations of state tort and product liability laws.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) immunized YOLO from liability. The court found that the claims sought to hold YOLO responsible for third-party content posted on its app, which is protected under the CDA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' misrepresentation claims, holding that these claims were based on YOLO's promise to unmask and ban abusive users, not on a failure to moderate content. The court found that the misrepresentation claims were analogous to a breach of promise, which is not protected by Section 230. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' product liability claims, holding that Section 230 precludes liability because these claims attempted to hold YOLO responsible as a publisher of third-party content. The court concluded that the product liability claims were essentially about the failure to moderate content, which is protected under the CDA. View "Estate of Bride v. Yolo Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Meghan Faxel was injured while riding an inflatable tube down the "Black Hole" water slide at the Wilderness Hotel in Wisconsin Dells. Her tube became stuck and flipped over, causing a shoulder injury. Meghan and her husband, Mike Faxel, sued Wilderness for negligence, common-law premises liability, and loss of consortium. Wilderness filed a cross-claim against ProSlide Technology, Inc., the slide's manufacturer, seeking contribution if found liable. The Faxels missed the deadline to disclose their liability expert and sought an extension, which was denied by the magistrate judge. Wilderness then moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The magistrate judge agreed and entered judgment for Wilderness.The case was initially filed in the Northern District of Illinois, which transferred it to the Western District of Wisconsin due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. The Faxels filed an amended complaint adding ProSlide as a defendant, but the claims against ProSlide were dismissed as time-barred. The Faxels also missed the deadline to disclose an expert witness and their motion to extend the deadline was denied. Wilderness moved for summary judgment, which the magistrate judge granted, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to establish the standard of care required of water-park operators.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. The court held that the hotel’s duty of care regarding the safety protocols, inspection, and maintenance of water slides required specialized knowledge and expertise. Without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The court concluded that the safety measures taken by Wilderness appeared reasonable on their face and that jurors could not determine the standard of care without expert testimony. Therefore, summary judgment for Wilderness was appropriate. View "Faxel v. Wilderness Hotel & Resort, Inc" on Justia Law

David Schaffner, Jr. and Theresa Sue Schaffner filed a lawsuit against Monsanto Corporation, alleging that Monsanto violated Pennsylvania law by failing to include a cancer warning on the label of its weed-killer, Roundup. The Schaffners claimed that this omission caused Mr. Schaffner to develop non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma due to his exposure to Roundup. The case was initially filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, and was later removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (JPML) then transferred the case to the Northern District of California for consolidated pretrial proceedings.In the Northern District of California, the MDL Court had previously ruled in similar cases that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) did not preempt state-law tort duties to include a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. Following this precedent, the MDL Court denied Monsanto’s motion for summary judgment on preemption grounds. The case was subsequently remanded to the Western District of Pennsylvania, where the parties stipulated to a judgment in favor of the Schaffners, reserving Monsanto’s right to appeal the preemption issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether FIFRA preempted the Pennsylvania duty to warn. The court held that FIFRA’s preemption provision, which prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements different from those required under federal law, did preempt the state-law duty to include a cancer warning. The court reasoned that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had approved Roundup’s label without a cancer warning, and FIFRA regulations require pesticide labels to conform to the EPA-approved label. Therefore, the Pennsylvania duty to warn was not equivalent to the federal requirements and was preempted by FIFRA. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court. View "Schaffner v. Monsanto Corporation" on Justia Law

David Burke died after falling down retractable steps attached to his motorhome. His estate, wife, and children filed product liability claims against Lippert Components, Inc., and LCI Industries, who had purchased the product brand after the Burkes bought the vehicle. The plaintiffs alleged negligence, design defects, manufacturing defects, and inadequate instructions and warnings. They later sought to add the previous owners of the product brand as defendants and amend the scheduling order, but the district court denied these motions and granted summary judgment in favor of Lippert and LCI.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the plaintiffs' motions to amend the complaint and the scheduling order, citing unreasonable delay. The court then granted summary judgment for Lippert and LCI, finding that they did not manufacture, distribute, or sell the steps in question, and thus were not liable under Iowa law. The plaintiffs appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that Lippert and LCI were not required to plead an affirmative defense regarding successor liability, as their defense negated an essential element of the plaintiffs' claims. The court also found that Lippert and LCI did not assume liability through the purchase agreement and that expert testimony was necessary to support the claim of inadequate post-sale warnings. Finally, the court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to show good cause for their delayed motions to amend the complaint and scheduling order. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Burke v. Lippert Components, Inc." on Justia Law

Jessica Gehner was implanted with a Cook Medical inferior vena cava (IVC) filter in Ohio. She later experienced abdominal pain, and a CT scan in March 2013 revealed that the filter had perforated her IVC. Her doctors recommended the filter's removal, which occurred in April 2013, but a fragment was left behind due to the filter fracturing. Gehner filed a lawsuit in May 2016 against Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical LLC, and William Cook Europe APS, alleging products liability and implied warranty claims. The defendants argued that her claims were time-barred under Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was converted to a summary judgment motion. The court concluded that Gehner's claims were time-barred, as she was informed by her doctors in March 2013 that the IVC filter caused her injury, starting the statute of limitations clock. Gehner contended that she was unaware of the defect until 2016 when her mother saw a television commercial about defective IVC filters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under Ohio law, the statute of limitations for product liability claims begins when the plaintiff is informed by competent medical authority of an injury related to the product or when the plaintiff should have known of the injury through reasonable diligence. The court found that Gehner was aware of her injury and its relation to the IVC filter by April 2013 at the latest. The court rejected Gehner's argument that the statute of limitations should start when she learned of the defect, noting that awareness of the injury itself was sufficient to start the clock. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Gehner's claims were indeed time-barred. View "Gehner v. Cook Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

RCBA Nutraceuticals, LLC, a Florida-based nutritional supplements company, contracted with Western Packaging, Inc. for the manufacture of plastic zipper pouches to hold its protein powder. These pouches were produced by PolyFirst Packaging, Inc. in Wisconsin, which was later acquired by ProAmpac Holdings, Inc. The pouches were shipped to companies in New York and Texas for filling. RCBA discovered that the pouches were defective, with seams splitting and spilling the protein powder, leading to a lawsuit against ProAmpac in federal court in Wisconsin. RCBA's claims included breach of contract, breach of implied warranties, negligence, civil conspiracy, and fraudulent misrepresentation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed RCBA’s complaint. The court found that the claims were "foreign" under Wisconsin’s borrowing statute, WIS. STAT. § 893.07, and applied the statutes of limitations from New York and Texas for the contract claims, and Florida for the negligence claim. The court concluded that the contract claims were time-barred under the four-year statutes of limitations of New York and Texas, and the negligence claim was time-barred under Florida’s statute of limitations. The remaining tort claims were precluded by the economic loss doctrine. RCBA’s motion to reconsider was denied, with the court ruling that RCBA had waived its equitable arguments by not raising them earlier.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the final significant event for the contract claims occurred where the defective pouches were delivered, in New York and Texas, making the claims foreign and subject to those states' statutes of limitations. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny the motion to reconsider, noting that RCBA had waived its equitable arguments by not presenting them in response to the motion to dismiss. The court concluded that RCBA’s claims were either time-barred or precluded. View "RCBA Nutraceuticals, LLC v. ProAmpac Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael Berkheimer experienced severe medical issues after a chicken bone became lodged in his throat while eating a "boneless wing" at a restaurant. He sued the restaurant, its food supplier, and a chicken farm, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, and other claims. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, stating they were not negligent as a matter of law. Berkheimer appealed, arguing that the court focused on the wrong question by determining whether the bone was natural to the boneless wing.The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the presence of a bone in the boneless wing was something a reasonable consumer could have anticipated and guarded against. The court applied a blended analysis, considering both whether the bone was foreign to or natural to the food and whether a consumer could reasonably expect its presence.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The court reaffirmed the analysis from Allen v. Grafton, which blends the "foreign-natural" test and the "reasonable-expectation" test. The court concluded that there was no breach of duty because a reasonable consumer could have expected and guarded against the presence of a bone in the boneless wing. The court emphasized that the label "boneless wing" was a description of the cooking style, not a guarantee of the absence of bones. Therefore, the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Berkheimer v. REKM, L.L.C." on Justia Law