Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

A woman developed mesothelioma and lung cancer, allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos dust brought home on her husband’s work clothing. Her husband had applied asbestos-containing insulation to power generation turbines manufactured by a company at a Maryland power plant in the 1960s. The plaintiff did not work at the plant or use the product herself but routinely shook out and laundered her husband’s dusty clothes. After her death, her estate continued the lawsuit, asserting a strict liability design defect claim against the turbine manufacturer and others.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment for the manufacturer on all claims. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment as to the strict liability design defect claim and remanded the case. Following remand, the Superior Court again granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, concluding that, under Maryland law, the plaintiff could not recover as a bystander. The plaintiff appealed, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Supreme Court of Maryland, asking whether a household member claiming injury from asbestos dust must prove an additional element of “duty” beyond the four elements of strict liability under Maryland law.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a household member in the plaintiff’s position need not prove the additional element of duty to recover on a strict liability design defect claim in an asbestos case. The court emphasized that, unlike negligence or failure to warn claims, strict liability design defect actions require only the four elements identified in Phipps v. General Motors Corp. The court clarified that “duty” is not an additional element for such claims, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a “user,” “consumer,” or a household member exposed through no fault of their own. View "Quinn v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. and three affiliates, historically involved in the manufacture and distribution of asbestos-containing talc, faced thousands of personal injury and environmental claims. Over the years, the companies divested their operating assets, notably selling them to Brenntag North America in 2004 while expressly excluding pre-sale asbestos and environmental liabilities. As liabilities mounted, one plaintiff obtained a large jury verdict in South Carolina and successfully moved to put Whittaker into receivership, with a receiver appointed to administer its assets.Following the South Carolina receivership, Whittaker's board authorized a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey without consulting the receiver. The receiver moved to dismiss the bankruptcy, arguing that under the receivership order, only he had authority to file such a petition. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, finding that the receivership order did not displace the board’s authority. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed this ruling. While bankruptcy proceedings moved forward, the Debtors negotiated a $535 million settlement with Brenntag to resolve successor liability claims. However, the Official Committee of Talc Claimants argued that certain product-line successor liability claims belonged exclusively to talc creditors and not to the bankruptcy estate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed two central issues. First, it held that the propriety of Whittaker’s bankruptcy petition did not affect the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction and that, under New Jersey law, the board retained authority to file for bankruptcy because the South Carolina receiver had not obtained recognition or ancillary receivership in New Jersey. Second, the court held that product-line successor liability claims, like other derivative claims based on injury to the debtor and available to all creditors, are property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ judgments. View "In re: Whittaker Clark & Daniels" on Justia Law

An employee of a Minnesota company purchased a third-party replacement battery for her cellphone through an online marketplace. The battery, sold by a Chinese company and shipped via the marketplace’s fulfillment program, malfunctioned and caused a fire, resulting in significant property damage. The employer’s insurer covered the loss and then pursued recovery from the online marketplace, the battery’s seller, and the manufacturer. The insurer’s claims against all parties except the online marketplace were eventually dropped.After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, the insurer sought to have the court certify to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question of whether the online marketplace could be strictly liable for the defect under Minnesota law. The district court, however, declined to certify the question and instead made its own prediction (“Erie guess”) that Minnesota law would not hold the marketplace strictly liable for third-party goods it fulfills but does not sell.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the issue presented is novel, unsettled under Minnesota law, and implicates significant public policy concerns. The appellate court decided it was appropriate to certify the legal question to the Minnesota Supreme Court, rather than attempt its own prediction. The court certified the question of whether, under Minnesota law, an e-commerce company that allows an unrelated party to sell a defective product through its website and provides order-fulfillment services is strictly liable for harm caused by the defect. The Eighth Circuit stayed further proceedings pending the Minnesota Supreme Court’s response. The holding is that the court will certify this question to the Minnesota Supreme Court and not decide the merits of strict liability itself. View "Berkley Regional Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a decedent who developed and died from mesothelioma, a disease linked to asbestos exposure. The decedent encountered asbestos both during his employment with a state agency and the town of Manchester, as well as outside of work in various settings. After his death, his wife, acting as executrix of his estate, pursued and settled multiple product liability suits against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products. The settlement allocated a percentage of damages to the estate for personal injuries and death, and a portion to the spouse for loss of consortium. Subsequently, the plaintiff also sought and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits, based on findings that occupational asbestos exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease.Before the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Commission, the administrative law judge determined that the decedent’s employers were entitled to a statutory lien under General Statutes § 31-293 (a) on the net settlement proceeds attributable to both occupational and nonoccupational asbestos exposure. The Compensation Review Board affirmed this decision. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the portion of the settlement related to nonoccupational exposure should not be subject to the employer’s lien because this exposure was not a work-related injury under the statute.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the lower board’s ruling. The court held that, because the decedent suffered a single occupational disease—mesothelioma—that was caused in substantial part by occupational exposure, the disease was fully compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, regardless of nonoccupational contributions. Thus, the employers’ lien under § 31-293 (a) extended to the net settlement proceeds from both occupational and nonoccupational exposures. The court also rejected the argument that a tortfeasor’s lack of an employment relationship with the decedent precluded application of the lien. View "Dodge v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

A helicopter manufactured in 1997 by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. was involved in a fatal crash in 2017 after an engine cowling came loose and struck the tail rotor. The pilot, working for a later owner, died in the accident. The pilot’s family brought suit against Bell, alleging that the flight manual was defective for failing to include an explicit warning about the dangers of flying with an unsecured engine cowling, even though the manual included a checklist item stating the cowling should be “Secured.” The physical cowling and its fasteners were original to the aircraft and had not been replaced or modified.Bell asserted that the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an 18-year statute of repose, barred the suit. The plaintiffs responded that the repose period had been reset because Bell periodically revised the flight manual in the years before the crash. The 270th District Court of Harris County denied Bell’s summary judgment motion without explanation. Bell then sought mandamus relief from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which denied the petition without a substantive opinion.The Supreme Court of Texas held that GARA’s 18-year clock is only reset when a “new” part or component, including a substantive revision to the flight manual, is added or replaced and is alleged to have caused the accident. Because the engine-cowling instruction in the manual, which was the alleged defect, had not been revised since 1997, and no relevant “new” part was implicated, the rolling provision of GARA did not apply. The court conditionally granted Bell’s petition for writ of mandamus and directed the district court to grant summary judgment for Bell, holding that GARA bars the suit and that mandamus relief was appropriate to prevent litigation Congress has expressly foreclosed. View "IN RE BELL HELICOPTER SERVICES INC." on Justia Law

A Massachusetts resident, Barbara, began smoking Marlboro and Parliament cigarettes manufactured by Philip Morris as a teenager and continued for decades, becoming addicted and unable to quit despite many attempts. In 2015, after finally quitting, she was diagnosed with inoperable lung cancer and died two years later. Her husband and two children, individually and on behalf of her estate, sued Philip Morris for wrongful death, alleging breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, negligent design and marketing, fraud, civil conspiracy, and deceptive trade practices.The Superior Court (trial court) dismissed claims against other defendants and tried the remaining claims against Philip Morris before a jury. The jury found for the plaintiffs on most claims, awarding $8.014 million in compensatory damages and $1 billion in punitive damages. The judge, after post-trial motions, reduced (remitted) the punitive damages to about $56 million—seven times the compensatory damages—finding the original award excessive. The judge also denied Philip Morris’s motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that the jury was not swayed by passion or prejudice and that the compensatory and punitive damages were supported by the evidence.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying a new trial or further remittitur, and that the remitted punitive damages were constitutionally permissible in light of the egregious conduct by Philip Morris. The court also rejected Philip Morris’s arguments that the trial should have been bifurcated, that a higher burden of proof was required for punitive damages, that federal preemption barred certain claims, and that evidentiary rulings were improper. The judgment and denial of post-trial motions were affirmed. View "Fontaine v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a decedent who developed and died from mesothelioma, a disease caused by exposure to asbestos both at his workplace and at home. His wife, acting as executrix of his estate, pursued and settled product liability claims against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products, with the majority of the settlement proceeds attributed to nonoccupational exposure. She also filed claims for workers’ compensation benefits, which were awarded based on findings that both occupational and nonoccupational exposures were significant factors in causing his disease.An administrative law judge for the Workers’ Compensation Commission found that, because the decedent’s work-related asbestos exposure was a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma, the disease constituted a compensable occupational disease under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The judge awarded workers’ compensation benefits to the estate and the surviving spouse. The judge further concluded that the decedent’s employers—the state and the town—were entitled under Connecticut General Statutes § 31-293(a) to a lien on the net amount of the tort settlement proceeds received by the estate, including those attributable to nonoccupational exposure. The Compensation Review Board affirmed this decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the decisions below. It held that when a single occupational disease is caused in substantial part by both occupational and nonoccupational factors, and workers’ compensation benefits are awarded accordingly, the employer’s statutory lien on any third-party recovery extends to the entire net proceeds, including those attributable to nonoccupational causes. The court also held that the statute’s reference to a “person” liable for damages is not limited to parties with an employment relationship to the decedent. The decision of the Compensation Review Board was therefore affirmed. View "Dodge v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The case concerns a fatal helicopter crash during a sightseeing tour in Hawaii, resulting in the deaths of all aboard, including the plaintiffs’ daughter. The helicopter, manufactured by Robinson Helicopter Company in 2000, had its main rotor hub and blades replaced with new, identical parts from Robinson in December 2018, which was over eighteen years after the helicopter’s initial delivery. The plaintiffs alleged that defects in the replaced rotor hub and blades caused the crash, and brought claims for negligence, strict products liability, and failure to warn.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii heard the case first. Robinson invoked the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), which generally bars actions against manufacturers eighteen years after delivery of the aircraft. The plaintiffs argued for exceptions under GARA’s “rolling provision”—which restarts the repose period for newly replaced parts—and the “fraud exception”—which removes the bar if the manufacturer concealed or misrepresented material information to the FAA. The district court granted summary judgment for Robinson, holding that the rolling provision did not apply because the replacement parts were not substantively altered from the originals, and that the plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with the necessary specificity. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion to further amend their complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in requiring a “substantive alteration” for the rolling provision to apply, as GARA only requires that a new part replaces an old one. The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in part and remanded for a new causation analysis regarding the replaced parts. However, the court affirmed the lower court’s determinations that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for the fraud exception and that denying leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. View "MCAULIFFE V. ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY" on Justia Law

The plaintiff underwent a surgical procedure involving multiple surgical staplers, one of which was used to create an anastomosis that subsequently leaked. In October 2021, the plaintiff filed a products liability suit against several manufacturers of surgical staplers. Over the course of pretrial proceedings, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina issued multiple scheduling orders, ultimately extending the plaintiff’s expert disclosure deadline to March 15, 2024. The plaintiff failed to disclose any experts by this deadline. Twenty days later, the plaintiff moved to extend the expert disclosure deadline, citing delays in obtaining discovery and the model number of the stapler at issue.The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the scheduling order, finding that he had not shown “good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), and entered summary judgment for the defendants due to the absence of expert testimony needed to support the plaintiff’s claims. The court noted that the plaintiff had not acted diligently, as required by Rule 16(b)(4), and had not filed a motion to compel or otherwise timely challenged the adequacy of discovery responses. The district court also relied on the plaintiff’s own representations regarding when he learned the model number of the stapler.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to amend for abuse of discretion and the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the district court correctly applied Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard to the request to extend the expert disclosure deadline and did not abuse its discretion in finding a lack of diligence. Because the plaintiff failed to offer expert evidence, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings in full. View "Eichin v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, LLC" on Justia Law

A fatal collision occurred when a Volkswagen Jetta, driven by Raul Lopez with Emilio Martinez-Arroyo as a passenger, rear-ended a utility trailer owned by Ron J. Peterson Construction, Inc. (RJP) on a Utah highway. The trailer, which was transporting construction equipment and did not have underride protection, was traveling significantly below the speed limit with its emergency flashers on. Both occupants of the Jetta died instantly after their car slid under the trailer. Yesneiri Maldonado-Velasquez, the decedent’s wife, sued RJP alleging negligence both in operating the vehicle and in using a trailer that lacked safety features that could have mitigated the injuries.In the Third District Court, Summit County, RJP moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had no duty to upgrade the trailer beyond federal safety standards and that the crash was solely caused by Lopez. The district court found a general statutory duty to operate safe equipment but determined that there was no specific duty to alter the trailer, based on federal preemption and application of factors from B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West. As a result, the court excluded much of the plaintiff's expert testimony on enhanced injury and trailer design, allowing only claims related to negligent operation. The jury ultimately found RJP not at fault.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that the district court erred by applying the Jeffs factors to narrow an already established broad statutory duty to operate safe vehicles. The Supreme Court clarified that federal regulations set a minimum standard, not a ceiling, and that state law may impose greater obligations unless direct conflict preemption applies. The court also held that the exclusion of expert testimony premised on the erroneous duty ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Maldonado-Velasquez v. Ron J Peterson Construction" on Justia Law