Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, plaintiff Carla J. Kappel, acting on behalf of her deceased ex-husband's estate and as mother to their minor children, sued LL Flooring, Inc., alleging that the company's Chinese-manufactured laminate flooring caused her ex-husband's death due to exposure to formaldehyde.The district court dismissed Kappel's wrongful death lawsuit, arguing that her claim was barred by a settlement agreement that had been reached in connection with two multidistrict litigation (MDL) actions related to LL Flooring's products. The court maintained that the deceased, Mr. Tarabus, was a class member subject to that settlement agreement and thus his claims, including any claims involving bodily injuries or death caused by the subject flooring, had been settled.On appeal, Kappel argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make the dismissal order and that the MDL settlement agreement did not bar her wrongful death lawsuit on behalf of the children. The Court of Appeals agreed with Kappel's latter argument and held that the settlement agreement failed to resolve Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit.The Court found that the claims in Kappel's lawsuit, which concerned the bodily injuries Mr. Tarabus experienced and the alleged causal connection between the laminate flooring and his cancer diagnosis, were materially distinct from the claims in the MDL proceedings. Notably, the settlement class representatives had twice made clear that they were not pursuing personal injury claims on a class-wide basis, and at no point did any class representative ever allege or pursue a wrongful death lawsuit.Therefore, the Court vacated the lower court's dismissal of Kappel's lawsuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kappel v. LL Flooring, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around injury suffered by a swimmer, Dr. Jennifer Pennington, who collided with the corner of a swimming-pool wall at a health and fitness center owned and operated by Memorial Hospital of South Bend, doing business as Beacon Health and Fitness. The design and construction of the swimming pool was carried out by Spear Corporation and Panzica Building Corporation. The Penningtons filed a suit against Beacon, Spear, and Panzica, alleging negligent design, failure to warn, negligent maintenance and operation, negligent construction, and deprivation of companionship due to the injury. The trial court granted summary judgment to Panzica and Spear on all counts and to Beacon on some counts, but denied summary judgment to Beacon on the count of negligent maintenance and operation and failure to provide adequate warnings and instructions. The Indiana Supreme Court held that Beacon was not entitled to summary judgment on any count, except as to the single issue of the level of the water within Count III. The court affirmed summary judgment for Spear and Panzica, stating that the Penningtons failed to provide admissible evidence regarding Spear or Panzica's breach of their professional duty of care. However, the court found that there were issues of fact regarding Beacon's role in the pool’s design and its maintenance and operation that required a trial. View "Pennington v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc." on Justia Law

In a case brought before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Michael and Melissa Sullivan sued Werner Company and Lowe's Companies, Inc. over a mobile scaffold that collapsed and caused serious injury to Michael Sullivan. The Sullivans claimed the scaffold was defectively designed because it was possible for a user to inadvertently rotate the deck pins off the platform during normal use.Before trial, the Sullivans filed a motion to preclude Werner and Lowe’s from admitting into evidence any industry or government standards, which the trial court granted. The jury ultimately found Werner and Lowe’s liable for the design defect and awarded the Sullivans $2.5 million in damages.Werner and Lowe's appealed, arguing that they should have been allowed to present evidence that the mobile scaffold complied with industry and governmental safety standards. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that such compliance evidence remained inadmissible in products liability cases.The court applied the risk-utility test, which asserts that a product is in a defective condition if a ‘reasonable person’ would conclude that the probability and seriousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the burden or costs of taking precautions. The court concluded that evidence of a product’s compliance with governmental regulations or industry standards is inadmissible in design defect cases to show a product is not defective under the risk-utility theory because such evidence goes to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct in making its design choice, not to whether the product was defectively designed. View "Sullivan v. Werner Co." on Justia Law

In this case before the Supreme Court of Alabama, the plaintiffs were the children of Robert Crum Jr., who was killed when the concrete truck he was driving overturned due to a tire failure. The tire was a 10-year-old Hankook AH10 tire, and the plaintiffs sued the companies that allegedly designed, manufactured, and distributed the tire, Hankook Tire America Corporation and Hankook Tire & Technology Co., Ltd. ("Hankook"). The plaintiffs alleged that the tire was defective and caused the accident. They sought to depose Hankook's designated corporate representative, Won Yong Choi, and claimed that he provided evasive answers or did not answer at all. They also alleged that Hankook's attorney consistently interrupted the deposition, objected to questions, and instructed Choi not to answer. As a result, the plaintiffs moved the trial court to impose sanctions against Hankook.The trial court granted the motion and imposed sanctions that included prohibiting Hankook from having any corporate representative give testimony at trial that went beyond Choi's deposition testimony, barring Hankook from disputing at trial that the failed tire was defective, and striking 10 of Hankook's affirmative defenses. The trial court also ordered the plaintiffs to submit evidence of the attorneys' fees and costs they had incurred in preparing for and taking Choi's deposition. After they did so, the trial court entered an order awarding the plaintiffs $66,550 in attorneys' fees.Hankook petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, asking the court to direct the trial court to vacate the sanctions order and the fee order. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition, holding that the sanctions imposed by the trial court were not authorized by Rule 37(d) because Choi did not fail to appear for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Therefore, the court directed the trial court to vacate both its initial order sanctioning Hankook and its later order imposing a monetary sanction. View "Ex parte Hankook Tire America Corporation PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS" on Justia Law

In this case, Crista Miller tripped on a vertical misalignment of less than one inch between a metal plate covering an underground utility vault, owned by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), and the surrounding sidewalk adjacent to a property owned by Hip Sen Benevolent Association (Hip Sen), resulting in an injury to her ankle. Miller filed a lawsuit against both PG&E and Hip Sen, alleging general negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the lawsuit was barred by the trivial defect doctrine.Miller appealed, but the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court concluded that the vertical misalignment was a trivial defect as a matter of law. The court stated that to recover damages for negligence or premises liability, Miller had to prove that the defendants breached a legal duty to either repair or warn about the existence of the misalignment. However, it is well-established law that landowners are not liable for damages caused by minor, trivial, or insignificant defects in property. Even considering the steepness of the sidewalk, the weather conditions, the time of the incident, and the crowded nature of the street, the court found that these factors did not render the misalignment a dangerous condition. The court also found that the city's guidelines and repair notices did not impose a legal duty to repair such minor defects.Miller also argued that the city's repair notices to PG&E and Hip Sen for their violations of the city's Guidelines rendered them liable under a theory of negligence per se. However, the appellate court found this argument to be forfeited as Miller did not raise this issue in the trial court and only presented it for the first time in her appellate reply brief.Therefore, the appellate court concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find the trivial sidewalk defect posed a substantial risk of injury to a foreseeable pedestrian exercising due care and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Miller v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

Appellants’ father died in a multi-car accident caused by a deer crossing State Route 154 (SR-154). Appellants sued respondent California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and others for negligence. They alleged the road constituted a dangerous condition under Government Code section 835. The trial court found that design immunity applied to Caltrans and granted summary judgment. Appellants contend the trial court erred when it found design immunity was a complete defense to Caltrans’ liability. They also contend the court failed to address a separate basis of liability, failed to warn when it ruled on the motion for summary judgment.The Second Appellate District affirmed. Appellants’ theory of the case, in sum, is that Caltrans designed SR-154 without certain specific features they contend would have made the highway safer. The court explained that Caltrans need not produce additional evidence to prove this point. A traffic engineer attested to the applicable design standards and how Caltrans addressed the dangers posed by deer entering traffic and vehicles crossing the median. This constitutes substantial evidence of advance approval. The court wrote that it would not second-guess the decision of Caltrans to include or omit certain design features. The court concluded that substantial evidence showed that a reasonable public employee would have adopted the SR-154 design plans, even without the features and changes Appellants contend Caltrans should have considered and included. View "Stufkosky v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

In this case, a Pennsylvania trial court transferred venue based on a determination the corporate defendant did not regularly conduct business in Philadelphia County because only 0.005% of the company’s total national revenue was derived from that county. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding the trial court abused its discretion in transferring venue. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to evaluate the Superior Court’s determination, and affirmed: venue was proper in Philadelphia County. View "Hangey, et al. v. Husqvarna, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted conspiracy jurisdiction in this case in which three law firms petitioned the Court to order a judge to dismiss them from the underlying lawsuit, holding that the law firms demonstrated a "clear and indisputable right to the relief requested and a lack of other means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or to obtain he requested action."Plaintiffs sued certain cigarette manufacturers and retailers, bringing product liability, fraud, and conspiracy claims. Plaintiff also sued three law firms that counseled the tobacco companies, alleging two counts of conspiracy. The law firms each filed motions to dismiss under Haw. R. Civ. P. (HRCP) Rule 12(b)(2), claiming that Hawai'i courts lacked general and specific jurisdiction over them. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss without making minimum contacts findings or undertaking any due process analysis. The law firms subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition and, alternatively, for a writ of mandamus ordering dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court adopted conspiracy jurisdiction and granted the law firms' writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court clearly exercised jurisdiction beyond its authority, and there were no other means for the law firms to adequately address the alleged wrong or to obtain dismissal. View "Dickinson v. Kim" on Justia Law

In the multidistrict National Prescription Opiate Litigation, municipalities from across the nation, Indian Tribes, and other entities allege that opioid manufacturers, distributors, pharmacies, and retailers acted in concert to mislead medical professionals into prescribing, and millions of Americans into taking and often becoming addicted to, opiates. Two northeast Ohio counties, Trumbull and Lake, alleged that national pharmaceutical chains “created, perpetuated, and maintained” the opioid epidemic by filling prescriptions for opioids without controls in place to stop the distribution of those that were illicitly prescribed and that conduct caused an absolute public nuisance remediable by abatement under Ohio common law.The district court ordered a bellwether trial, after which a jury concluded that the “oversupply of legal prescription opioids, and diversion of those opioids into the illicit market” was a public nuisance in those counties and that defendants “engaged in intentional and/or illegal conduct which was a substantial factor in producing" that nuisance. The district court entered a $650 million abatement order and an injunction requiring defendants to “ensure they are complying fully with the Controlled Substances Act and avoiding further improper dispensing conduct.” On appeal, the Sixth Circuit certified a question of law to the Ohio Supreme Court: Whether the Ohio Product Liability Act, Ohio Revised Code 2307.71, abrogates a common law claim of absolute public nuisance resulting from the sale of a product in commerce in which the plaintiffs seek equitable abatement, including both monetary and injunctive remedies? View "Trumbull County v. Purdue Pharma, L.P." on Justia Law

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Delaware Supreme Court. The question arose in connection with a toxic tort class action in the federal district court for the District of Delaware that was appealed to the Third Circuit. Delaware resident Catherine Baker filed suit individually and on behalf of fellow residents who lived near Atlas Point, a chemical plant that regularly used and emitted ethylene oxide, a dangerous chemical. The question asked whether an increased risk of illness, without present manifestation of a physical harm, was a cognizable injury under Delaware law. Put another way: did an increased risk of harm only constitute a cognizable injury once it manifested in a physical disease? To this, the Supreme Court answered: an increased risk of illness without present manifestation of a physical harm is not a cognizable injury under Delaware law. View "Baker v. Croda Inc." on Justia Law