Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

In this consolidated appeal of multiple toxic tort cases, approximately 170 plaintiffs alleged harm from exposure to white lead carbonate (WLC), a lead paint pigment, during their childhood in the 1990s and early 2000s. They sued several manufacturers of WLC for negligence and strict liability. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court upheld the district court’s application of the law of the case doctrine to dismiss many of the plaintiffs' claims, finding that the plaintiffs had chosen to bring their claims under a single complaint and were therefore bound by the court's earlier rulings. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against a small group of plaintiffs who had filed their own cases, ruling that due process protected their right to try their claims. View "Gibson v. Armstrong Containers, Inc." on Justia Law

In this toxic tort case, a group of plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by exposure to white lead carbonate (WLC), a lead paint pigment, while growing up in Milwaukee homes in the 1990s and early 2000s. They sought to hold several manufacturers of WLC liable under state-law negligence and strict liability theories. The case was managed such that groups of plaintiffs would try their claims in a series of waves. The initial waves of plaintiffs met defeat in both the district court and the Court of Appeals, resulting in summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. The district court then extended these rulings to the remaining plaintiffs based on the law of the case and issue preclusion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that most of the plaintiffs indeed were bound by the district court's rulings due to their decision to proceed under a single complaint. However, a small group of plaintiffs who filed their own cases were found to be entitled to try their claims, as due process protected their rights. The court affirmed the district court's decision in large part, but reversed it in small part, sending the case back to the district court for further proceedings with respect to this small group of plaintiffs. View "Cannon v. Armstrong Containers Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, John Edward Griffith II and Christina M. Griffith sued LG Chem America, Inc., and Shoemaker’s Truck Station, Inc., after lithium-ion rechargeable batteries purchased at a Shoemaker's Truck Station store in Nebraska exploded in Mr. Griffith's pocket in Pennsylvania, causing him serious burns and permanent injuries.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that Nebraska lacked personal jurisdiction over LG Chem America, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. The court found that LG Chem America had no substantial connection to Nebraska related to the case. The company's activities in Nebraska, which included renting warehouse space for the storage of petrochemical products and selling those products to two customers in the state, were unrelated to the sale and distribution of the lithium-ion batteries at issue in the case.The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to apply Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations to the Griffiths' negligence and loss of consortium claims, given that the injury occurred in Pennsylvania. The court found that Pennsylvania had a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties than Nebraska, where the batteries were purchased. As a result, the Griffiths' claims, filed more than two years after the injury, were time-barred under Pennsylvania law. View "Griffith v. LG Chem America" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals considered an indemnification case between Nissan, an automobile manufacturer, and Continental, a brake parts supplier. Nissan sought indemnification from Continental for a $24 million jury award and $6 million in attorney fees and costs resulting from a products liability lawsuit in California. The lawsuit arose after an accident involving a Nissan vehicle, with the jury finding that the design of the vehicle’s braking system caused harm to the plaintiffs. Nissan argued that a provision in their contract with Continental obligated Continental to indemnify them for the jury award and litigation costs. Both the district court and the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the contract required Nissan to show that a defect in a Continental-supplied part caused the injury, which Nissan failed to do. The Appeals Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Continental. View "Nissan North America, Inc. v. Continental Automotive Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four, the plaintiffs, thousands of individuals who suffered adverse effects from the use of a prescription drug, TDF, made by Gilead Life Sciences, Inc., brought a claim of negligence and fraudulent concealment against Gilead. The plaintiffs alleged that while Gilead was developing TDF, it discovered a similar, but chemically distinct and safer potential drug, TAF. However, Gilead allegedly decided to defer development of TAF because it was concerned that the immediate development of TAF would reduce its financial return from TDF. Gilead sought summary judgment on the ground that in order to recover for harm caused by a manufactured product, the plaintiff must prove that the product was defective. The trial court denied Gilead's motion for summary judgment in its entirety.In reviewing this case, the appellate court held that the trial court was correct to deny Gilead's motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim. The court reasoned that a manufacturer's duty of reasonable care can extend beyond the duty not to market a defective product. The court found that the factual basis of the plaintiffs' claim was that Gilead knew TAF was safer than TDF, but decided to defer development of TAF to maximize its profits. The court held that if Gilead's decision to postpone development of TAF indeed breached its duty of reasonable care to users of TDF, then Gilead could potentially be held liable.However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision regarding plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent concealment. The court concluded that Gilead's duty to plaintiffs did not extend to the disclosure of information about TAF, as it was not available as an alternative treatment for HIV/AIDS at the time the alleged concealment occurred. Consequently, the court granted in part and denied in part Gilead's petition for a writ of mandate, directing the superior court to vacate its order denying Gilead's motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order denying summary adjudication of the negligence claim but granting summary adjudication of the fraudulent concealment claim. View "Gilead Tenofovir Cases" on Justia Law

The case arises from severe burns suffered by a minor, B.D., when a Samsung SDI battery exploded in his pocket in Indiana. B.D. sued Samsung SDI, a corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of Korea with no physical presence in Indiana, in Indiana state court for product liability. Samsung SDI moved the case to federal court and sought to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court denied Samsung SDI's motion to dismiss, finding that specific personal jurisdiction existed over Samsung SDI in Indiana. Samsung SDI subsequently appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court's record did not contain sufficient facts to assess whether the requirements of the stream-of-commerce theory, which may establish a defendant's minimum contacts with a forum state, were met in this case. The court also found that the district court's reliance on the Supreme Court case of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eight Judicial District Court was distinguishable as Samsung SDI did not advertise, sell, or service the specific batteries in question in Indiana. The court noted that the extent of Samsung SDI's knowledge and expectations about the 18650 batteries entering Indiana was unclear.The court also found that the record did not clearly show whether Samsung SDI's contacts with Indiana were related to the alleged injury. Lastly, the court determined that more facts were needed to assess whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be fair.Given these uncertainties, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for further jurisdictional discovery to gather more information about Samsung SDI's contacts with Indiana concerning B.D.'s claimed injuries. The court clarified that this remand was limited to the question of personal jurisdiction and did not obligate the district court to consider or reconsider any non-jurisdictional issues. View "B. D. v. Samsung SDI Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, plaintiff Carla J. Kappel, acting on behalf of her deceased ex-husband's estate and as mother to their minor children, sued LL Flooring, Inc., alleging that the company's Chinese-manufactured laminate flooring caused her ex-husband's death due to exposure to formaldehyde.The district court dismissed Kappel's wrongful death lawsuit, arguing that her claim was barred by a settlement agreement that had been reached in connection with two multidistrict litigation (MDL) actions related to LL Flooring's products. The court maintained that the deceased, Mr. Tarabus, was a class member subject to that settlement agreement and thus his claims, including any claims involving bodily injuries or death caused by the subject flooring, had been settled.On appeal, Kappel argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make the dismissal order and that the MDL settlement agreement did not bar her wrongful death lawsuit on behalf of the children. The Court of Appeals agreed with Kappel's latter argument and held that the settlement agreement failed to resolve Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit.The Court found that the claims in Kappel's lawsuit, which concerned the bodily injuries Mr. Tarabus experienced and the alleged causal connection between the laminate flooring and his cancer diagnosis, were materially distinct from the claims in the MDL proceedings. Notably, the settlement class representatives had twice made clear that they were not pursuing personal injury claims on a class-wide basis, and at no point did any class representative ever allege or pursue a wrongful death lawsuit.Therefore, the Court vacated the lower court's dismissal of Kappel's lawsuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kappel v. LL Flooring, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around injury suffered by a swimmer, Dr. Jennifer Pennington, who collided with the corner of a swimming-pool wall at a health and fitness center owned and operated by Memorial Hospital of South Bend, doing business as Beacon Health and Fitness. The design and construction of the swimming pool was carried out by Spear Corporation and Panzica Building Corporation. The Penningtons filed a suit against Beacon, Spear, and Panzica, alleging negligent design, failure to warn, negligent maintenance and operation, negligent construction, and deprivation of companionship due to the injury. The trial court granted summary judgment to Panzica and Spear on all counts and to Beacon on some counts, but denied summary judgment to Beacon on the count of negligent maintenance and operation and failure to provide adequate warnings and instructions. The Indiana Supreme Court held that Beacon was not entitled to summary judgment on any count, except as to the single issue of the level of the water within Count III. The court affirmed summary judgment for Spear and Panzica, stating that the Penningtons failed to provide admissible evidence regarding Spear or Panzica's breach of their professional duty of care. However, the court found that there were issues of fact regarding Beacon's role in the pool’s design and its maintenance and operation that required a trial. View "Pennington v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc." on Justia Law

In a case brought before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Michael and Melissa Sullivan sued Werner Company and Lowe's Companies, Inc. over a mobile scaffold that collapsed and caused serious injury to Michael Sullivan. The Sullivans claimed the scaffold was defectively designed because it was possible for a user to inadvertently rotate the deck pins off the platform during normal use.Before trial, the Sullivans filed a motion to preclude Werner and Lowe’s from admitting into evidence any industry or government standards, which the trial court granted. The jury ultimately found Werner and Lowe’s liable for the design defect and awarded the Sullivans $2.5 million in damages.Werner and Lowe's appealed, arguing that they should have been allowed to present evidence that the mobile scaffold complied with industry and governmental safety standards. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that such compliance evidence remained inadmissible in products liability cases.The court applied the risk-utility test, which asserts that a product is in a defective condition if a ‘reasonable person’ would conclude that the probability and seriousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the burden or costs of taking precautions. The court concluded that evidence of a product’s compliance with governmental regulations or industry standards is inadmissible in design defect cases to show a product is not defective under the risk-utility theory because such evidence goes to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct in making its design choice, not to whether the product was defectively designed. View "Sullivan v. Werner Co." on Justia Law

In this case before the Supreme Court of Alabama, the plaintiffs were the children of Robert Crum Jr., who was killed when the concrete truck he was driving overturned due to a tire failure. The tire was a 10-year-old Hankook AH10 tire, and the plaintiffs sued the companies that allegedly designed, manufactured, and distributed the tire, Hankook Tire America Corporation and Hankook Tire & Technology Co., Ltd. ("Hankook"). The plaintiffs alleged that the tire was defective and caused the accident. They sought to depose Hankook's designated corporate representative, Won Yong Choi, and claimed that he provided evasive answers or did not answer at all. They also alleged that Hankook's attorney consistently interrupted the deposition, objected to questions, and instructed Choi not to answer. As a result, the plaintiffs moved the trial court to impose sanctions against Hankook.The trial court granted the motion and imposed sanctions that included prohibiting Hankook from having any corporate representative give testimony at trial that went beyond Choi's deposition testimony, barring Hankook from disputing at trial that the failed tire was defective, and striking 10 of Hankook's affirmative defenses. The trial court also ordered the plaintiffs to submit evidence of the attorneys' fees and costs they had incurred in preparing for and taking Choi's deposition. After they did so, the trial court entered an order awarding the plaintiffs $66,550 in attorneys' fees.Hankook petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, asking the court to direct the trial court to vacate the sanctions order and the fee order. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition, holding that the sanctions imposed by the trial court were not authorized by Rule 37(d) because Choi did not fail to appear for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Therefore, the court directed the trial court to vacate both its initial order sanctioning Hankook and its later order imposing a monetary sanction. View "Ex parte Hankook Tire America Corporation PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS" on Justia Law