Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Defendants, makers of valves and pumps, were sued for a wrongful death allegedly caused by asbestos released from external insulation and internal gaskets and packing, all of which were made by third parties and added to the pumps and valves post sale. This case involved the limits of a manufacturer's duty to prevent foreseeable harm related to its product. At issue was when was a product manufacturer liable for injuries caused by adjacent products or replacement parts that were made by others and used in conjunction with defendant's product. The court held that a product manufacturer could not be held liable in strict liability or negligence for harm caused by another manufacturer's product unless defendant's own product contributed substantially to the harm, or defendant participated substantially in creating a harmful combined use of the products. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment of nonsuit in favor of defendants.View "O'Neil, et al. v. Crane Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product liability claims against Appellants, manufacturers of an anethestic drug that may have exposed patients to serious diseases. Before the beginning of the trial, Appellants filed a motion to change venue from Clark County to Washoe County, arguing that the adverse pretrial publicity reasonably prevented Appellants from receiving a fair trial in Clark County. The district court concluded that a change of venue was not warranted at that time and reserved ruling on the motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal because the district court had not issued a final ruling on the change of venue motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court order deferring a final ruling on a change of venue motion based on adverse pretrial publicity until after jury selection begins does not finally decide the motion; and (2) because the court did not finally rule on the motion in this case, the matter was not ripe for appeal.View "Sicor, Inc. v. Sacks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product liability claims against Appellants, manufacturers of an anethestic drug that may have exposed patients to serious diseases. Before the beginning of the trial, Appellants filed a motion to change venue from Clark County to Washoe County, arguing that the adverse pretrial publicity reasonably prevented Appellants from receiving a fair trial in Clark County. The district court concluded that a change of venue was not warranted at that time and reserved ruling on the motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made. After the jury was empaneled, Appellants renewed their motion for a change of venue, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court must apply a multifactor test to determine whether there is a reason to believe that the party seeking a change of venue will not receive a fair trial in the community where the case originated; and (2) because Appellants did not demonstrate that the circumstances in this case presented a reasonable belief that a fair trial could not be had in Clark County, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' motion for a change of venue.View "Sicor, Inc. v. Hutchison" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who had purchased a truck from an automobile dealership, filed a products liability suit in 2007 against the manufacturer and the dealership, as Seller. Later, Plaintiff entered a voluntary nonsuit as to Seller and proceeded only against the manufacturer. Over one year later, the manufacturer declared bankruptcy. In 2009, Plaintiff again sued Seller, alleging negligence and strict liability in tort. Seller filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals denied the appeal. The Supreme Court granted Seller's application for permission to consider the application of the saving statute to the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff could proceed under the strict liability claim because that cause of action did not accrue until the manufacturer was judicially declared insolvent; and (2) because the second suit alleged acts of negligence on the part of Seller, an exception to the statutory rule prohibiting products liability suits against sellers, and could have been brought in 2007, the statute of limitations was a bar to recovery under that theory. Remanded for trial.View "Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Kia Motors America, Inc. unsuccessfully defended a class action lawsuit for breach of express warranty. It appealed a superior court's decision to affirm certification of the class by the trial court, and the amount of damages and litigation costs awarded to the class. Costs included a significant legal fee, entered pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act (MMWA). Appellee Shamell Samuel-Bassett, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated filed this class action lawsuit in January 2001, alleging that her Kia had an unsafe manufacturing defect in the braking system. In 2005, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the class for breach of express warranty, and awarded damages in the amount of $600 per class member. The court molded the verdict to account for the 9,402 class members to which the parties had stipulated and recorded a $5.6 million verdict. Represented by new counsel, Kia filed an unsuccessful post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the class was properly certified; (2) whether evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict and whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (3) whether the jury’s verdict was properly molded to account for the 9,402 members of the class; (4) whether the trial court had authority to award attorneys’ fees after Bassett entered judgment on the class verdict; and (5) whether the risk multiplier was properly applied to an award of counsel fees under the MMWA. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the trial court's decision. The Court reversed the trial court to the extent that its order provided for enhancement of the attorneys' fees award beyond the amount permitted in the MMWA.View "Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' 1993 Lincoln Town Car was hit while stopped. A pipe wrench in the trunk penetrated the gas tank. The car burst into flames. Husband was killed, wife was severely injured. A jury awarded wife compensatory damages totaling $23.1 million and punitive damages of $15 million and awarded compensatory damages to the estate in excess of $5 million. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The duty analysis in a negligent-product-design case encompasses a risk-utility balancing test. Compliance with industry standards (NHTSA) is a relevant, but not dispositive. Plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence that Ford breached its duty of reasonable care on three negligent-design theories. Balancing foreseeable risks and utility factors, plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that, at the time of manufacture, Ford's conduct was unreasonable or that it had acted unreasonably in failing to warn about the risk of trunk contents puncturing the tank. There was no evidence of a feasible shield that would have prevented this injury. Plaintiffs' fourth theory, premised on a postsale duty to warn, was not cognizable under Illinois law and its voluntary undertakings with respect to law enforcement vehicles did not create a duty to civilian customers.View "Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota certified a question to the Supreme Court on whether North Dakota applies the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine to N.D.C.C. ch. 28-01.3. Plaintiffs Ruth and Nathan Bornsen brought a products liability action in state district court against Pragotrade, LLC, Pragotrade, Inc., and Cabela's Retail, Inc., for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty, alleging Ruth Bornsen injured her hand on while using a meat grinder manufactured by Pragotrade and purchased from Cabela's. At a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the Bornsens cited "Reiss v. Komatsu Am. Corp.," and argued Cabela's was an "apparent manufacturer" of the meat grinder under the Restatement of Torts and was not entitled to dismissal under N.D.C.C. 28-01.3-04. After supplemental briefing by the parties, the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota certified: "[w]hether the North Dakota Supreme Court intends to adopt the 'apparent manufacturer' doctrine set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 400 or more recently, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability Sec.14." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: "[t]o the extent that a statute specifies responsibilities, the statutory terms control. But to the extent that a statute does not, the rule in this Section states the common-law rule." Here, the North Dakota Products Liability Act treats nonmanufacturing sellers "more leniently" than did the common law rule. "That is a legislative determination which we are bound to follow." On the record certified in this case, the Supreme Court answer the certified question "No."View "Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, brought a product liability action against Defendant, Deere and Company, claiming that a lawn tractor manufactured by Defendant contained a manufacturing defect in its electrical system that caused a fire resulting in the destruction of the home of Plaintiff's insureds. Following a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a plaintiff may base a product liability action on the "malfunction theory," which allows a jury to rely on circumstantial evidence to infer that a product that malfunctioned was defective at the time it left the manufacturer's or seller's control if the plaintiff establishes certain elements; and (2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict because Plaintiff's evidence in the present case was insufficient to establish its products liability claim. View "Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deere & Co." on Justia Law

In this personal-injury products-liability case, a jury awarded plaintiff Trellvion Gaines $7 million, finding that he had been brain-damaged from exposure to lead. In an effort to convince the Supreme Court to reverse the trial judgment and to render judgment in its favor, Defendant Sherwin-Williams Company challenged the reliability of Plaintiff's causation experts and fact witnesses. In the alternative, Sherwin-Williams alleged that unreliable, unfairly prejudicial, and untimely disclosed expert testimony and a biased jury pool required a new trial. Because Plaintiff's experts' speculation was inadmissible, and because the Plaintiffs' experts did not present any scientific authority that an acute, asymptomatic ingestion of lead could lead to the alleged injuries, Plaintiff did not offer sufficient proof of causation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case on the causation issue. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects.View "Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Gaines" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case ruled that under the Washington courts' application of "Frye v. United States," there must be general acceptance in the relevant scientific community that a particular type of in utero toxic exposure can cause a particular type of birth defect before expert testimony on causation is admissible. Plaintiff Julie Anderson worked for Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., from 1998 until she filed a safety complaint with the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) and was fired. While it was not officially part of her job, Plaintiff regularly mixed paint. Employees were required by official company policy to wear respirators when mixing paint, but there was reason to believe that the policy was not rigorously enforced and may have been actively undermined by management. Plaintiff gave birth to a son in January 2000. By 2003, it was clear the child suffered from "medical abnormalities." He was diagnosed with a neuronal migration defect, congenital hemiplegia, microcephalus, and a multicystic dysplastic kidney, among other things, along with "delays in motor, communication, cognitive, and adaptive behavior." Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's interpretation and subsequent ruling on the issue. The Court held that the Frye test is not implicated if the theory and the methodology relied upon and used by the expert to reach an opinion on causation is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. The Court affirmed the trial court's rulings on comparative fault and wrongful discharge. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings.View "Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc." on Justia Law