Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, Nelson and Elaine Cruz, filed a complaint against the car dealership where Nelson purchased his vehicle (Ricky Smith), alleging that while Nelson was cleaning the inside of his minivan, both front airbags unexpectedly deployed, injuring him. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged negligence, strict products liability, negligent misrepresentation, and res ipsa loquitur. In addition, Elaine sought damages for loss of consortium. The trial justice granted Ricky Smith's motion for summary judgment on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice properly granted summary judgment in Ricky Smith's favor on Nelson's claims of negligence and misrepresentation, and consequently, Elaine was barred from recovering damages for loss of consortium. View "Cruz v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp." on Justia Law

A concrete truck collided with a shuttle bus used to transport passengers between an airport and a rental car facility. A passenger who was injured during the collision and his wife filed an action against the bus owner, bus manufacturer, manufacturer of the bus windows, and franchisor of the rental car business. Plaintiffs based their claims in negligence and products liability, arguing that the bus was unsafe because it did not have passenger seatbelts, had windows made of tempered glass, and provided perimeter seating instead of forward-facing rows. A jury found Plaintiffs had sustained damages but assessed 100 percent of the fault to the corporate owner of the concrete truck, which had previously settled with Plaintiffs. On appeal, the court of appeals held that federal law preempted the seatbelt and window-glass claims and ruled that the trial court erred by failing to grant a directed verdict on the perimeter-seating claim. The Supreme Court remanded. On remand, the court of appeals affirmed its prior judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the seatbelt and window-glass claims were not preempted by federal law; and (2) the evidence sufficiently demonstrated causation in fact as to the perimeter-seating claim. Remanded.View "Lake v. The Memphis Landsmen, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2003, Russell, the sole occupant and pilot of an Agusta 109C helicopter, died after his helicopter crashed in Illinois. Russell, a resident of Georgia, was living in Illinois and working for an Illinois air ambulance service operating in the Chicago area. The helicopter was manufactured in Italy in 1989. The trial court dismissed claims against SNFA, a French company that manufactured a custom tail-rotor bearing for the helicopter, for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that Agusta and its American subsidiary, AAC, effectively operated as an American distributor for the tail-rotor bearings in the U.S. market and that SNFA custom manufactured the bearings at issue specifically for Agusta. By engaging a business entity located in Illinois, SNFA undoubtedly benefitted from Illinois’ system of laws, infrastructure, and business climate and has the requisite minimum contacts with Illinois for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable; Illinois has an indisputable interest in resolving litigation stemming from a fatal Illinois helicopter accident.View "Russell v. SNFA" on Justia Law

Tiara Condominium Association (Tiara) retained Marsh & McLennan (Marsh) as its insurance broker. Marsh secured windstorm coverage through Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), which issued a policy that contained a loss limit in an amount close to $50 million. Tiara's condominium subsequently sustained damages caused by two hurricanes. After being assured by Marsh that the loss limits coverage was per occurrence, Tiara spent more than $100 million in remediation efforts. However, when Tiara sought payment from Citizens, Citizens claimed that the loss limit was $50 million in the aggregate, not per occurrence. Tiara filed suit against Marsh, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Marsh on all claims. The appeals affirmed with the exception of the negligence and breach of fiduciary claims, as to which it certified a question to the Supreme Court to determine whether the economic loss rule prohibits recovery, or whether an insurance broker falls within the professional services exception that would allow Tiara to proceed with the claims. The Court answered by holding that the application of the economic loss rule is limited to products liability cases.View "Tiara Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos. " on Justia Law

Peter Carter was driving a Ford Explorer rented from Overland West when Todd Durham's vehicle collided with Carter's vehicle. The impact caused the Explorer to roll five times, partially ejecting Carter and killing him. Carter's estate filed a wrongful death and survival claim against Ford, Overland, and Durham (collectively, Defendants) under strict products liability and negligence theories. After a jury trial, the district court concluded that Durham was liable in negligence and that Ford and Overland were not liable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying the estate's motion for default judgment on liability as a sanction against Ford for withholding evidence of other incidents; (2) excluding the estate's proffered evidence of other incidents; (3) excluding evidence related to Ford's actions in making a Safe Canopy System a standard feature in the United States in 2007 and some other countries in 2002, and by permitting Ford to present a "consumer-choice" defense; and (4) excluding an indemnity agreement between Ford and Overland and limiting questioning about the agreement and the parties' prior adversarial position.View "Stokes v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, may a drug company be held liable for fraud or misrepresentation (by misstatement or omission), based on statements it made in connection with the manufacture or distribution of a brand-name drug, by a plaintiff claiming physical injury from a generic drug manufactured and distributed by a different company?" Plaintiffs Danny and Vicki Weeks filed this action against five current and former drug manufacturers for injuries that Mr. Weeks allegedly suffered as a result of his long-term use of the prescription drug product metoclopramide, the generic form of the brand-name drug "Reglan." The Weekses contended that the Wyeth defendants had a duty to warn Danny's physician about the risks associated with the long-term use of metoclopramide and that the Weekses, as third parties, have a right to enforce the alleged breach of that duty. The Supreme Court concluded: "[i]n the context of inadequate warnings by the brand-name manufacturer placed on a prescription drug manufactured by a generic-drug manufacturer, it is not fundamentally unfair to hold the brand-name manufacturer liable for warnings on a product it did not produce because the manufacturing process is irrelevant to misrepresentation theories based, not on manufacturing defects in the product itself, but on information and warning deficiencies, when those alleged misrepresentations were drafted by the brand-name manufacturer and merely repeated by the generic manufacturer."View "Wyeth, Inc., et al. v. Weeks " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this case to determine, as a matter of first impression, whether a defendant in a products liability action must plead and prove as an affirmative defense that an injured party's alleged "highly reckless conduct" was the sole or superseding cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Upon review of the Superior Court record, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that in order to avoid liability, a defendant raising a claim of highly reckless conduct must indeed plead and prove such claim as an affirmative defense. "Moreover, this evidence must further establish that the highly reckless conduct was the sole or superseding cause of the injuries sustained." The Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court. View "Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant and Appellee jointly petitioned the Supreme Court for rehearing following the dismissal of Appellant's appeal without prejudice due to lack of a final order. In the dismissal, the Supreme Court denied Appellee's motion to nonsuit her claims against another defendant because no order dismissing the defendant from the case was entered. In their petition, Petitioners contended that, pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 3, the order in the appeal was final because they abandoned any pending but unresolved claim in their notices of appeal and cross-appeal. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) Rule 3 requires appellants and cross-appellants to abandon pending and unresolved claims, but it does not permit appellants and cross-appellants to dispose of parties in the same fashion; and (2) in this case, the voluntary nonsuit was effective only upon entry of court order dismissing the action.View "Ford Motor Co. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendant Ford Motor Company appealed from the judgment of the circuit court reflecting the jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages in favor of Plaintiff, individually and as administratrix of her husband's estate, and as parent and legal guardian of the couple's child. Plaintiff's action arose out of an automobile accident that killed her husband. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ford, the manufacturer of the automobile the couple was driving, and Freeway Ford Lincoln Mercury, the dealer that sold the vehicle. At trial, Plaintiff moved to nonsuit her claims against Freeway. Although the circuit court granted the motion orally, no written order to that effect was in the record. Because no order dismissing Freeway from the case was entered, there was no final judgment as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice because the failure to comply with Rule 54(b) deprived the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.View "Ford Motor Co. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jamie and Rebecca Gannon, maintained that plaintiff Jamie Gannon developed a form of brain cancer because of a series of polio vaccines he was given as a child. Plaintiffs pursued various forms of relief in both federal and state courts. In the federal court action, they sought relief from the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, contending that the federal government was negligent in permitting the polio vaccine to be sold to the public. Plaintiffs' federal action was dismissed following a partial bench trial, based on the government's motion for judgment on partial findings, and that judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Proceeding on a parallel track, plaintiffs sought relief in New Jersey state courts. In the state court action, they raised product liability claims against defendants American Home Products, Inc., American Cyanamid Company, Lederle Laboratories, and Wyeth-Lederle Vaccines, which they asserted were the entities that had manufactured or distributed the polio vaccine given to plaintiff Jamie Gannon. In the state court litigation, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on two grounds: (1) the trial court concluded that plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence to prove the identity of the manufacturer of the polio vaccine that plaintiff Jamie Gannon was given; (2) the trial court concluded that plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from bringing the cause of action based on the prior judgment entered in federal court. The Appellate Division reversed both aspects of the trial court's judgment and remanded the matter for further discovery and for trial. The panel first concluded that the trial court had utilized an incorrect standard in evaluating the sufficiency of the product identification evidence because it failed to afford plaintiffs the benefit of the inferences to which they were entitled as the non-moving parties in the context of a summary judgment motion. The panel then concluded that there were equitable considerations that militated against granting collateral estoppel effect to the judgment of the federal court, including the status of discovery in the state court matter and the pendency of similar state court litigation involving other plaintiffs. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Appellate Division’s collateral estoppel analysis was in error, the Court reversed. View "Gannon v. American Products, Inc." on Justia Law