Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

After sustaining serious internal injuries in a personal watercraft (PWC) accident, plaintiff filed suit against the manufacturers of the PWC (Yamaha). On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in requiring expert testimony on her claims and in failing to conduct an appropriate Daubert analysis before excluding her expert's testimony. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the expert's inadequate warning opinion and the district court properly concluded that the PWC's warnings were adequate as a matter of law. In this case, plaintiff based her claims of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranties on theories of warning and design defects. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Yamaha on all claims because the record was devoid of admissible evidence on either theory of defect. View "Hickerson v. Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against ZOLL, alleging that claims for strict products liability, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent marketing and promotion, breach of express warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress all related to the operation (or failure to operate) of the deceased's LifeVest. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. However, in light of developing and binding precedent in this circuit, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the remaining claims. The court held that these claims were cognizable Florida common law causes of action and were not preempted by federal law. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Godelia v. ZOLL Services, LLC" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs were injured when oil from an airplane's air cycle machine leaked into the cabin and caused the cockpit to fill with smoke and fumes, they filed suit against several defendants. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Fairchild Controls, holding that plaintiffs' design defect theory failed where the limited expert testimony about the air-foil bearing technology did not prove that a safer design was feasible. The court also held that the failure to warn claim failed because plaintiffs were knowledgeable users, and a warning would have been superfluous. View "Davidson v. Fairchild Controls Corp." on Justia Law

In this wrongful death action, plaintiff filed suit against R.J. Reynolds to recover damages based on the death of his wife from tobacco-related diseases caused by her decades-long history of smoking R.J. Reynolds' cigarettes. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly interpreted Florida law in ultimately deciding that plaintiff's damages could not be reduced, even though the jury found his wife to be 45% at fault for her injuries; plaintiff did not waive his right to insist that the Florida intentional tort exception be applied to prevent reduction of compensatory damages based on the wife's degree of fault; and the district court's repudiation of its own charge to the jury concerning the reduction of damages did not justify a reversal of its ultimate decision not to reduce those damages. View "Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

In this wrongful death action, plaintiff filed suit against R.J. Reynolds to recover damages based on the death of his wife from tobacco-related diseases caused by her decades-long history of smoking R.J. Reynolds' cigarettes. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly interpreted Florida law in ultimately deciding that plaintiff's damages could not be reduced, even though the jury found his wife to be 45% at fault for her injuries; plaintiff did not waive his right to insist that the Florida intentional tort exception be applied to prevent reduction of compensatory damages based on the wife's degree of fault; and the district court's repudiation of its own charge to the jury concerning the reduction of damages did not justify a reversal of its ultimate decision not to reduce those damages. View "Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

Turley sued multiple defendants, alleging that he has an asbestos-related disease caused by exposure to asbestos-containing products, including valve gaskets, during his 36-year employment at PG&E. Interrogatory responses stated that Turley was exposed to asbestos-containing pipe products supplied by Familian, including “asbestos cement transite pipe, pipe collars, gaskets, elbows, pipe-repair products and other asbestos products.” Familian moved for summary judgment. arguing that plaintiffs could not show exposure to asbestos in a Familian-related product. Turley submitted a declaration from a third-party witness, Scott, who had not been deposed. The court allowed Scott to be deposed. Familian used portions of the deposition in its reply. The court concluded that the deposition testimony “conclusively negates” Scott’s declaration testimony as to exposure, refused to consider it, and granted summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed, stating that ambiguity in the evidence should be resolved at trial. Scott’s testimony established that Familian-supplied asbestos-containing gaskets were frequently used at Turley’s worksite and that Turley used them. That Familian was not the only supplier did not warrant the conclusion that Turley did not establish exposure. There was no direct contradiction between Scott’s declaration and his deposition testimony with respect to several areas, so his testimony should not have been disregarded. View "Turley v. Familian Corp." on Justia Law

Arun Gopalratnam purchased an HP laptop computer that contained a DynaPack battery pack with Samsung lithium-ion battery cells. Months later, the Menomonee Falls Fire Department responded to a major fire in a basement bedroom of the Gopalratnam’s home. After the fire was extinguished, firefighters discovered Arun deceased on the floor of the room. Am autopsy classified smoke inhalation as the cause of death, with no evidence of pre-fire injury or disease, and no drugs or alcohol in Arun’s system. Special Agent Martinez concluded that the fire originated in the basement bedroom where Arun’s body was located. Martinez excluded multiple potential sources of the blaze (electrical and gas meters, electrical distribution panels, gas-fueled furnaces, electrical plugs, light switch, and ceiling light fixture) but could not ascertain the fire’s ultimate cause. He did not eliminate a possible mattress fire. The remains of Arun’s HP laptop, cell phone, and the laptop battery cells, were in the debris. In the Gopalratnams’ suit, alleging negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranty, the plaintiffs claimed that a defective battery cell in Arun’s laptop caused the fire. The district court granted motions to exclude plaintiffs’ expert witnesses on causation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court applied the proper legal standard: The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert. The experts failed to account for other possible explanations. View "Gopalratnam v. ABC Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this products liability case, the issue before the Colorado Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred when it gave a jury instruction that allowed the jury to apply either the "consumer expectation test" or the "risk-benefit test" to determine whether a driver’s car seat was unreasonably dangerous due to a design defect. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did err by instructing the jury separately on the consumer expectation test, because the test already comprises an element of the risk-benefit test. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds. Previously, the Court determined the risk-benefit test was appropriate test to assess whether a product was unreasonably dangerous due to a design defect where the dangerousness of the design is “defined primarily by technical, scientific information.” The consumer expectation test, by contrast, was “not suitable” in such a case. Here, the jury was tasked with determining whether a car seat was unreasonably dangerous due to a design defect - a determination that, as evidenced by the extensive expert testimony at trial, required consideration of technical, scientific information. Thus, the Court surmised the proper test under which to assess the design’s dangerousness was the risk-benefit test, not the consumer expectation test. Therefore it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on both tests, thereby allowing it to base its verdict on the consumer expectation test alone. Furthermore, the Court held that the jury’s separate finding of negligence did not render the instructional error harmless. View "Walker v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Lyons sued Colgate, alleging that she developed mesothelioma from the use of Colgate’s Cashmere Bouquet cosmetic talcum powder. Colgate manufactured Cashmere Bouquet from 1871 to 1985 and continued marketing it until 1995 when the Environmental Protection Agency reported that the presence of asbestos in talc makes it a human carcinogen. The talc used in Cashmere Bouquet came from three different sources. Lyons presented evidence that talc from each of the sites contained some form of asbestos. The court of appeal reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Colgate. The trial court failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g), requiring a written order specifying the reasons for its determination and “specifically refer[ring] to the evidence proffered in support of and, if applicable, in opposition to the motion that indicates no triable issue exists.” Its tentative ruling indicated only its view that “Plaintiff failed to submit evidence to create a triable issue whether she was exposed to asbestos-containing products or materials attributable to defendant.” The record contains substantial evidence creating a triable issue as to whether Cashmere Bouquet contained asbestos that may be found to have been a substantial cause of plaintiff’s mesothelioma. View "Lyons v. Colgate-Palmolive Co." on Justia Law

This products liability lawsuit centered on Risperdal. Louise Taylor began suffering psychotic episodes when she was seventy-one years old, in early 1998. From March 1998 to January 2001, Psychiatrist Richard Rhoden prescribed Risperdal to Taylor for the treatment of her recurrent psychotic manifestations. In February 2001, Taylor developed tardive dyskinesia, a syndrome of potentially irreversible, involuntary, dyskinetic movements in patients treated with antipsychotic drugs. In 2002, Taylor filed a complaint against Ortho-McNeil Janssen Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer, seller, and distributer of Risperdal, and its parent company Johnson & Johnson (collectively “Janssen”), claiming that Risperdal caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia. Taylor also named her treating physician, Dr. Richard Rhoden, as a defendant in her complaint. Taylor settled her claims against Dr. Rhoden prior to trial. The case went to trial oin 2014. The jury, in a nine to three decision, found that Taylor was harmed by Risperdal due to: (1) Janssen’s “failure to provide adequate warnings/instructions” and (2) Janssen’s “negligent marketing/misrepresentation.” The jury awarded Taylor $650,000 in actual economic damages and $1.3 million in noneconomic damages, for a total damages award of $1,950,000. On review, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, the Risperdal in question contained an adequate warning; the Court reversed and rendered the statutory inadequate warning judgment. Furthermore, the Court held that various errors in the jury instructions required reversal of the plaintiff’s verdict that sounded in negligent misrepresentation, and the Court reversed and remanded the negligent misrepresentation claim. View "Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Fortenberry" on Justia Law