Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

In this products liability matter involving “pelvic mesh” medical devices, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether defendant C.R. Bard, Inc., was denied a fair trial by the trial court’s determination that defendant could not present 510(k) clearance evidence -- evidence that, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 360c, the devices were allowed to be marketed without premarket clinical trials -- to counter the product liability claims brought by plaintiffs Mary and Thomas Walsh McGinnis. North Carolina surgeon Dr. Elizabeth Barbee implanted Bard’s “Align TO” and “Avaulta Solo” pelvic mesh devices. In the months following surgery, McGinnis had to undergo numerous invasive surgeries to remove the mesh and repair internal damage, with limited success. In 2011, plaintiffs filed suit against defendant Bard under North Carolina law. Counsel agreed that the substantive issues would be tried under the law of North Carolina but that the issue of damages would be tried under New Jersey law. Plaintiffs moved in limine to bar defendant from presenting any evidence of the devices’ 510(k) clearance to the jury. The trial court found the 510(k) evidence inadmissible. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the exclusion of any 510(k) evidence deprived defendant of a fair trial on the issue of negligence. The Supreme Court agreed that 510(k) evidence was generally inadmissible because the 510(k) clearance process solely determines substantial equivalency, and not safety and efficacy. However, in a products liability claim premised on the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies, the Court held evidence of 510(k) clearance had significant probative value under N.J.R.E. 401 that was not substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice and potential juror confusion under N.J.R.E. 403. Therefore, under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division and remanded for a new trial. The Court disagreed with the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence and a Rule 104 hearing. To this, the Supreme Court believed the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence should be resolved at the hearing on a motion in limine, which was how the issue was and, presumably, would be raised. View "Hrymoc v. Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

Five people were killed when a commercial truck rear-ended a line of traffic on an interstate highway. The truck driver was prosecuted and sentenced to prison for his misconduct. The issue on this appeal was the liability, if any, of the manufacturer of the truck. Plaintiffs, suing on behalf of the heirs and estates of the decedents, contended the manufacturer, Daimler Trucks North America, should have been held liable in tort under design-defect and warning-defect theories of products liability because it failed to equip the truck with two collision-mitigation systems—forward-collision warning and automatic emergency braking—and did not warn of the dangers caused by that failure. The district court granted summary judgment to Daimler. After its review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding many of the arguments made by Plaintiffs on appeal were inadequately preserved for appellate review, and the remaining arguments lacked merit. View "Butler, et al. v. Daimler Trucks North America" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a dispute about CoolSculpting, a medical device intended to minimize the appearance of fat. When Plaintiff tried CoolSculpting, he developed a rare condition called Paradoxical Adipose Hyperplasia (“PAH”), which enlarges the targeted fat tissue. Needless to say, Plaintiff was unhappy that CoolSculpting maximized the fat he wanted to minimize. So Plaintiff sued Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc., the manufacturer of the CoolSculpting system, for failure to warn and design defects under Florida law. The district court granted Zeltiq summary judgment. On failure to warn, the district court concluded that Zeltiq’s warnings about PAH were adequate as a matter of law. On design defect, the court determined that Plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony that the risk of CoolSculpting outweighed its utility. Plaintiff challenged both of the district court’s rulings on appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Zeltiq warned medical providers in its user manual and training sessions about the exact condition Plaintiff experienced: PAH is an increase of adipose tissue in the treatment area that may require surgery to correct. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded Zeltiq’s warnings were adequate as a matter of law. Further, the court held that it is convinced that Plaintiff’s defect claim fails under either test. View "Terrance Nelson Cates v. Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc." on Justia Law

Raul Camacho was installing glass panels when he fell out of a scissor lift manufactured by JLG Industries Inc. (JLG). Camacho failed to latch a chain that was designed to guard the lift’s entrance. Camacho sued JLG for strict products liability, failure to warn, and related claims. At a jury trial, Camacho alleged the scissor lift as designed with the chain invited human error, and the foreseeable risk of harm could have been avoided if JLG had marketed only its alternative design with a self-closing gate. Camacho also alleged there was a defective warning label on the lift. At the close of evidence, JLG moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion. The court ruled in order to show causation Camacho needed to prove if the chain been latched, “the accident would have happened anyway.” To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: "Camacho only needed to make a prima facie showing that the alternative design with the self-closing gate would have prevented his fall. Under a risk-benefit test, it was then JLG’s burden to prove the benefits of the chain outweighed its risks." The Court found Camacho made a prima facie showing of causation, and the jury could have reasonably inferred that had a self-closing gate been in place, Camacho’s fall would have been prevented. The Court also found the jurors could have reasonably inferred JLG’s allegedly defective warning label was also a substantial factor in causing Camacho’s injuries. Thus, the Court reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting JLG’s motion for a directed verdict. View "Camacho v. JLG Industries" on Justia Law

Several cities in Minnesota alleged that a chemical in refined coal tar that was used in pavement sealants contaminated their stormwater ponds. They filed an action seeking damages from refiners and manufacturers of the tar. The “refiner” defendants take raw coal tar and refine it into a product used by the “manufacturer” defendants to create pavement sealants. The district court dismissed all of the claims against the refiners and dismissed all but three of the claims against the manufacturers. The Cities moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for entry of final judgment against the refiners. The district court, however, denied the motion because the Cities had not “demonstrated a danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.” The Cities then entered into an agreement with the manufacturers, which provided that the Cities would conditionally dismiss their claims against the manufacturers. The Cities then appealed the district court’s decision dismissing claims against the refiners, and some of the refiners cross-appealed.   The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that this conditional dismissal of the Cities’ claims against the manufacturers does not create a final decision under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291. The whole purpose of pairing the voluntary dismissal with the tolling agreement was to provide for reinstatement of the claims in the event of reversal—that is, to make the dismissal conditional. The court wrote that its only power to prevent the manipulation of appellate jurisdiction is a rigorous application of the final judgment requirement. View "City of Burnsville v. Koppers, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff used Roundup on his lawn for thirty years until 2016, when he was diagnosed with malignant fibrous histiocytoma, a form of cancer. He sued Monsanto, Roundup’s manufacturer, in the district court. He alleged that Monsanto knew or should have known that Roundup was carcinogenic but did not warn users of that danger. The question on appeal is whether, under an express preemption provision, a federal agency action that otherwise lacks the force of law preempts the requirements of state law. The district court ruled that a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. Section 136v(b), expressly preempts some of Plaintiff’s claims under Georgia law because the Environmental Protection Agency had approved a label for Roundup that lacked a cancer warning and the Agency classifies Roundup’s main ingredient—glyphosate—as “not likely to be carcinogenic.” Plaintiff argued that his suit is not preempted.   The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the question at issue must be answered by recourse to ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, and the court remanded this appeal to the panel to decide whether Plaintiff’s suit is preempted. The court explained that a conflict between a state-law rule that has the force of law and a federal agency rule that does not have the force of law is not the type of conflict between state and federal legal obligations that the Supremacy Clause addresses. But this reasoning does not extend to express-preemption cases the meaning of the express-preemption provision—not conflicting federal and state legal obligations—triggers preemption. View "John D. Carson v. Monsanto Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, through his estate, sued Ford Motor Company, inter alia, for wrongful death and product liability pursuant to the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (AEMLD). He alleged that a faulty seatbelt design in his 2003 Ford Mustang caused his fatal injury. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ford. Plaintiff now appealed, arguing that the district court erroneously ruled on several evidentiary issues, a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), and a motion for a new trial. Ford filed a cross-appeal in anticipation of a possible reversal, challenging the district court’s denial of its motion to exclude expert testimony at trial.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the rulings challenged by Plaintiff. As for Ford’s cross-appeal,  the court dismissed for lack of standing. Here, the working seatbelt from the crash was admitted into evidence alongside expert testimony opining that the driver likely caused the excess webbing. A reasonable jury could have weighed this evidence against the evidence introduced by Plaintiff and “might reach different conclusions” about whether Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Id. Therefore, JMOL is not proper, and the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion. Further, the court explained that although Ford has identified cases where the court has addressed a victorious Plaintiff’s cross-appeal, the court is not bound by a prior decision’s sub silentio treatment of a jurisdictional question. View "Mark Henderson v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) centralized cases arising out of alleged defects in Cook’s inferior vena cava (IVC) filters, 28 U.S.C. 1407(a). Many plaintiffs in the MDL claim that Cook’s filters cause pain and suffering, disabilities, emotional injuries, lost earnings, increased medical bills, and in some cases death. To help manage the litigation, the district court adopted direct filing and case categorization procedures. Parton and Sykes were each implanted with a Cook IVC filter. Years later, CT scans revealed that their filters had perforated their IVC walls. They experienced no pain or other symptoms, but they pursued product liability claims against Cook. The direct-filing procedure did not require Parton or Sykes to file a standard complaint; each filed a short-form complaint, which incorporated allegations from a master complaint that ostensibly applied to all direct-filing plaintiffs.The district court granted Cook summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in these cases is based solely on diversity of citizenship, which requires the amount in controversy in each case to exceed $75,000, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Parton and Sykes allege the proper amount in controversy, but the nature of their alleged injuries indicates that no more than $75,000 is at stake in either case. They have not suffered the injuries alleged in the master complaint; the allegations in their short-form complaints were inadequate. View "Parton v. Cook Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

In November 2018, a Cessna Model 525 corporate jet tried to fly from Sellersburg, Indiana, to Chicago, Illinois. It never made it to Chicago. It crashed a few minutes after takeoff in Clark County, Indiana. The pilot of the plane and the two passengers were killed instantly. Representatives for the three decedents brought this wrongful death and product liability suit against Cranfield Aerospace Solutions, LLC, in the District of Idaho. Cranfield is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in England. Appellants alleged that a load alleviation system, the Tamarack Active Winglet Load System—trademarked as the ATLAS system—caused the plane crash. Cranfield helped Tamarack obtain the Federal Aviation Administration supplemental type certification for the ATLAS system.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Idaho federal district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction over. The panel held when considering specific jurisdiction under the first prong, courts should comprehensively evaluate the extent of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state and those contacts’ relationship to the plaintiffs’ claims—which may mean looking at both purposeful availment and purposeful direction. The panel held that under either approach, jurisdiction over Cranfield in Idaho was lacking. The purposeful direction test cannot support jurisdiction here because Appellants failed to allege that Cranfield injured them in Idaho. The panel agreed with the district court that Appellants failed to establish that Cranfield purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Idaho. The panel declined to proceed to the remaining two prongs of the specific jurisdiction test and held that the district court properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over Cranfield. View "ERICA DAVIS, ET AL V. CRANFIELD AEROSPACE SOLUTIONS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband purchased a ladder at Home Depot some years ago. Plaintiff’s husband was found dead near the ladder with injuries consistent with a fall. Plaintiff sued Home Depot, alleging that a defect in a ladder caused her husband’s death. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Home Depot, concluding that Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to show causation. On appeal, Plaintiff asserted that she provided sufficient evidence that establishes her claims against Home Depot, and, at a minimum, her evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact making a grant of summary judgment improper.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Plaintiff has failed to negate other causes of the accident. In addition to the unaccounted-for 11-year period between the purchase of the ladder and the accident, the expert hypothesized that an electrical malfunction may have caused the fall. Plaintiff replied that this sort of malfunction would have given her husband electrical burns, which were not observed by the coroner. However, a minor spark that did not contact her husband could have startled him and caused him to lose his balance. Plaintiff has provided no evidence to refute this. The court concluded that there is no proof here sufficient to induce the mind to pass beyond conjecture. View "Martha Hunt v. Home Depot, Inc." on Justia Law