Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

A group of companies that are frequently sued in asbestos litigation brought an action against several settlement trusts and a claims processing facility. These trusts were established as part of bankruptcy reorganizations by former asbestos manufacturers to handle and pay out current and future asbestos-related claims. The plaintiffs rely on information held by these trusts—specifically, data about claimants’ other asbestos exposures—to defend themselves in ongoing and anticipated lawsuits. In January 2025, the trusts announced new document retention policies that would result in the destruction of most existing claims data after one year, which the plaintiffs argued would severely impair their ability to defend against asbestos claims and seek contribution or indemnification from the trusts.Previously, the trusts notified claimants of the impending data destruction, and the plaintiffs, upon learning of this, requested that the trusts not implement the new policies. When the trusts refused, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, seeking a declaratory judgment that the trusts have a duty to preserve the claims data and a permanent injunction to prevent the destruction of this information. The trusts moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and that the complaint failed to state a claim.The Court of Chancery denied the motions to dismiss. It held that it had subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and because the case fit within the court’s traditional equitable powers, including the authority to grant a bill of discovery to preserve evidence for use in litigation. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, as they faced a concrete and imminent injury from the threatened destruction of data essential to their defense and contribution claims. The court also held that the complaint stated a claim for relief, allowing the case to proceed beyond the pleading stage. View "DBMP LLC v. Delaware Claims Processing Facility, LLC" on Justia Law

David and Bonnie Faulk, residents of Alaska, purchased over one hundred windows from Spenard Builders Supply for their custom-built home and alleged that the windows, manufactured by JELD-WEN, were defective in breach of an oral warranty. They filed a class action in Alaska state court against Spenard Builders Supply, an Alaska corporation, and JELD-WEN, a Delaware corporation, asserting state-law claims. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which allows federal jurisdiction based on minimal diversity in class actions.After removal, the Faulks amended their complaint to remove all class action allegations and sought to remand the case to state court. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska denied their motion to remand, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent that held federal jurisdiction under CAFA is determined at the time of removal and is not affected by post-removal amendments. The district court allowed the amendment to eliminate class allegations but ultimately dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice, finding most claims time-barred and one insufficiently pled.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, which held that federal jurisdiction depends on the operative complaint, including post-removal amendments. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, after the Faulks removed their class action allegations, the sole basis for federal jurisdiction under CAFA was eliminated, and complete diversity was lacking. The court vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint and remanded with instructions to remand the case to state court unless another basis for federal jurisdiction is established. View "FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC." on Justia Law

A group of former coal miners brought products liability lawsuits against several manufacturers and distributors of respirators, alleging that the devices failed to protect them from dust exposure and caused them to develop occupational lung diseases. Each plaintiff had used specific respirators during their mining careers and claimed that the products were defective. The cases were consolidated for discovery due to common factual and legal issues. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by West Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.The Circuit Court of McDowell County granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that each plaintiff knew or should have known of their injury and its possible connection to the respirators more than two years before filing suit. The court used certain “triggering” dates—such as the date of medical diagnosis, receipt of disability benefits, or application for federal black lung benefits—to determine when the statute of limitations began to run. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly resolved factual disputes and applied an incorrect standard for latent disease cases. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s decision, concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of the claims.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower courts’ rulings. The Court held that, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations in products liability cases begins when a plaintiff knows or should know of their injury, the identity of the product’s maker, and the product’s causal relation to the injury. The Court found no genuine dispute of material fact as to when each plaintiff was on notice of their injury and its possible cause, and rejected arguments for tolling based on fraudulent concealment. The summary judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Hardy v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

A young woman was seriously injured when the passenger airbag in a 1998 Infiniti QX4 deployed during a low-speed collision, causing permanent vision loss in one eye. She was wearing her seatbelt at the time. The accident occurred when another vehicle exited a parking lot and collided with the Infiniti. The injured party, initially represented by her mother as next friend, sued the vehicle’s manufacturer, alleging that the airbag system was defectively designed and that safer alternative designs were available at the time of manufacture.The case was tried in the Mobile Circuit Court. During voir dire, two jurors failed to disclose their prior involvement as defendants in civil lawsuits, despite being directly asked. After a jury awarded $8.5 million in compensatory damages to the plaintiff on her Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (AEMLD) claim, Nissan discovered the nondisclosures and moved for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur. The trial court denied all motions, finding that substantial evidence supported the verdict and, although it believed probable prejudice resulted from the jurors’ nondisclosures, it felt bound by Alabama Supreme Court precedent to deny a new trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the denial of Nissan’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the plaintiff presented substantial evidence of a safer, practical, alternative airbag design. However, the Court reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in believing it lacked discretion due to prior case law. The Supreme Court clarified that the trial court retained discretion to determine whether the jurors’ nondisclosures resulted in probable prejudice and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise that discretion. View "Nissan North America, Inc. v. Henderson-Brundidge" on Justia Law

Three public school teachers in Washington developed health problems after working in an older school building that contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) manufactured by Monsanto. The teachers sued Pharmacia, Monsanto’s successor-in-interest, alleging injuries from PCB exposure and brought claims under the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA) for design defect, construction defect, and failures to warn, while also seeking punitive damages under Missouri law. After a seven-week trial, the jury found for the teachers on all claims, awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages.The Snohomish County Superior Court, where the case was tried, ruled that Missouri law governed the issues of repose and punitive damages, while Washington law governed the substantive elements of liability. The court also admitted expert testimony estimating historic PCB exposure levels. Pharmacia challenged the verdict, but the trial court denied its post-trial motions. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Washington’s statute of repose applied, limiting the plaintiffs’ claims, and that the verdict form was insufficient for punitive damages because it did not specify which theory of liability supported the award. The Court of Appeals also found error in the admission of certain expert testimony.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and partially reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under Washington’s established choice of law principles, Missouri law governs both the issues of repose and punitive damages because Missouri has the most significant relationship to those issues. The Court also held that the jury instructions and special verdict form were sufficient to sustain the punitive damages award under Missouri law, and that the challenged expert testimony was admissible under the Frye standard and ER 702. The Supreme Court reinstated the jury’s verdict and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Erickson v. Pharmacia LLC" on Justia Law

Carlos Pellecer died after falling from a Werner brand aluminum extension ladder while working as a handyman in New Orleans. His family sued Werner Co., a Delaware corporation, and New Werner Holding Co., Inc., alleging that the ladder was unreasonably dangerous under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) and that the defendants failed to warn about a 2018 recall. The ladder in question was manufactured in 1991 by Werner Co., a Pennsylvania corporation (later renamed Old Ladder), which filed for bankruptcy in 2006. The defendants had purchased certain assets, including the Werner name and trademark, from Old Ladder in 2007, but did not manufacture or sell the specific ladder model involved in the accident.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and, after a jury trial, entered judgment on a verdict finding the defendants to be manufacturers of the ladder under the LPLA. The jury awarded over $5 million in damages, apportioning fault equally between the defendants and Old Ladder. The defendants’ post-trial motions were denied. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the jury could reasonably find the defendants to be manufacturers under the LPLA’s apparent manufacturer doctrine.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari and held that the defendants were not manufacturers of the ladder under the LPLA. The court found no evidence that the defendants labeled the ladder as their own, held themselves out as its manufacturer, or exercised control over its design, construction, or quality. The court concluded that merely acquiring the Werner name and trademark did not make the defendants manufacturers of the subject ladder. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, vacated the trial court’s judgment, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. View "PELLECER VS. WERNER CO." on Justia Law

Delta Airlines contracted with Lands’ End to supply new uniforms for its employees, which were manufactured overseas and distributed to approximately 64,000 workers. After the uniforms were issued, many employees reported that the garments transferred dye onto other surfaces and caused a range of health symptoms, including skin irritation and respiratory issues. Two groups of Delta employees filed lawsuits: one group sought damages for property damage and breach of express warranty as intended beneficiaries of the contract between Delta and Lands’ End, while the other group pursued personal injury claims, alleging the uniforms were defectively manufactured or designed and that Lands’ End failed to warn of these defects.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin consolidated the actions and, after discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of Lands’ End on all claims. For the personal injury claims, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony on defect and causation, finding the opinions unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that the uniforms were defective or that any defect caused their injuries. On the breach of warranty claim, the court determined that Lands’ End had not breached the contract’s satisfaction guarantee because plaintiffs had not returned their uniforms as required by the contract’s terms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion, as the experts failed to reliably establish defect or causation. The court also held that summary judgment on the breach of warranty claim was proper because the contract’s return requirement was reasonable and not an unlawful limitation on the express warranty. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in full. View "Gilbert v Lands' End, Inc." on Justia Law

A Kentucky resident purchased a firearm from a local pawn shop and, shortly after, suffered severe injuries when the gun allegedly discharged unexpectedly while the safety was engaged. The gun had been manufactured by a Utah-based company, which sold it to a Texas distributor. The distributor then sold the firearm to a Kentucky merchant, and it eventually reached the plaintiff through a Kentucky pawn shop. The injured party filed a products liability lawsuit in Fayette Circuit Court against both the manufacturer and the pawn shop, alleging the manufacturer’s product caused his injuries.The Fayette Circuit Court initially held the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in abeyance to allow for limited discovery. However, the manufacturer failed to timely respond to discovery requests, only providing responses after being compelled by court order and after significant delay. Despite this, the trial court granted the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss, finding that the manufacturer had not purposefully availed itself of doing business in Kentucky and that exercising personal jurisdiction would not comport with due process. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that due process would be offended, though it found the manufacturer fell within the state’s long-arm statute due to deriving substantial revenue from Kentucky sales.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that the evidence was sufficient to show the manufacturer derived substantial revenue from sales in Kentucky and that the plaintiff’s claims arose from those sales, thus satisfying the long-arm statute. However, the Court determined that the manufacturer’s failure to comply with discovery obligations deprived the plaintiff of an adequate opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. The Court reversed the dismissal in part and remanded the case to the Fayette Circuit Court, instructing it to allow the plaintiff ample opportunity to complete jurisdictional discovery before ruling on personal jurisdiction. View "BRAUN V. BEARMAN INDUSTRIES, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff in this case alleged that she developed uterine fibroids as a result of using chemical hair relaxer products manufactured by two companies over a period spanning from 1995 to 2014. She purchased and used different products from each manufacturer at various times, applying them every six to eight weeks, with a brief pause between 2001 and 2002. She was diagnosed with uterine fibroids in 2018 and filed suit in 2022, claiming that the products contained harmful chemicals that caused her injury.The Superior Court denied the manufacturers’ motions to dismiss her strict products liability claims, which were based on Georgia’s ten-year statute of repose for such actions. The manufacturers argued that the statute of repose began running from the date the plaintiff first purchased any product from each manufacturer, which would bar her claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that the statute of repose for all units sold by each manufacturer to the plaintiff began with the earliest sale to her, and thus her claims were time-barred.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine how the statute of repose under OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2) applies when a plaintiff alleges injury from multiple consumable products sold over time. The Court held that the statute of repose applies on a per-unit basis, meaning the ten-year period begins with the sale of each individual unit as new to the end user. Therefore, claims are not barred for units sold within ten years of the lawsuit, even if earlier units were sold outside that period. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision in part and remanded the case, allowing the strict liability claims to proceed for units sold within the statutory period. View "BURROUGHS v. STRENGTH OF NATURE GLOBAL, LLC" on Justia Law

A patient with a long history of severe depression and multiple suicide attempts underwent 95 electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) treatments at a Nebraska hospital between 2014 and 2016. The ECT was administered using a device manufactured by Somatics, LLC. After the treatments, the patient experienced significant memory loss and was diagnosed with a neurocognitive disorder. In 2020, he filed suit against Somatics in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging negligence, strict product liability, breach of warranties, violation of Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act, and fraudulent misrepresentation, primarily claiming that Somatics failed to adequately warn of the risks associated with ECT.The district court dismissed the claims under Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act and for fraudulent misrepresentation, merged the strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims, and granted summary judgment to Somatics on the design defect, manufacturing defect, and breach of express warranty claims. The remaining claims for negligence and strict liability, both based on failure to warn, were merged for trial. The jury found that while Somatics failed to provide adequate warnings, this failure was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and awarded no damages. The district court denied the plaintiff’s post-trial motions, including for a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions de novo for summary judgment and for abuse of discretion on evidentiary and procedural rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the design defect claim, correctly merged the negligence and strict liability claims, gave an appropriate jury instruction on proximate cause, and did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence and expert testimony. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Thelen v. Somatics, LLC" on Justia Law