Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Maryland Supreme Court
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Katharine Blackwell, a regular customer at a car dealership, slipped and fell on a wet floor that had just been mopped by a dealership employee. The employee did not place a wet-floor sign before or during mopping and left the area unattended while retrieving a sign, which was stored about a minute away. While the employee was gone, another employee called Ms. Blackwell to the service desk, leading her to walk across the freshly mopped, unmarked area and fall. She had not seen the mopping take place and received no warning about the hazard.Ms. Blackwell filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, asserting negligence under premises liability and negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision. After discovery, the dealership moved for summary judgment, arguing it had insufficient time to warn Ms. Blackwell before she fell, relying on precedent from Rehn v. Westfield America. The circuit court granted summary judgment on both claims, finding that although the dealership had notice of the wet floor, there was no genuine dispute that it lacked time to post a warning sign.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed summary judgment on the negligent hiring and supervision claim but reversed with respect to premises liability, concluding that a jury could find the dealership failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the hazard. The dealership sought review by the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that, under Maryland law, the knowledge element for an invitee’s premises liability claim is satisfied when an owner’s employee knowingly creates a dangerous condition. Where creating the hazard is a foreseeable consequence of an assigned task, whether the owner acted reasonably to prevent or warn of the danger is a jury question unless only one reasonable conclusion is possible. The Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment, allowing the premises liability claim to proceed. View "DARCARS Toyota of Silver Spring v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

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A woman developed mesothelioma and lung cancer, allegedly due to exposure to asbestos dust brought home on her husband’s work clothing. Her husband, a professional insulator, installed asbestos-containing insulation on turbines manufactured by a defendant company at a Maryland power plant in the 1960s. Facilities for workers to shower or change at the worksite were not provided, so he regularly brought dusty work clothes home. The woman, who never visited the worksite, handled and laundered these clothes, potentially exposing herself to asbestos fibers. After her death, her estate continued the personal injury and wrongful death action against the manufacturer and others.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment to the defendant on all claims, including strict liability for design defect. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the summary judgment concerning the design defect claim and remanded the case. Following further proceedings, the Superior Court again granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that as a bystander, the plaintiff could not recover on a strict liability theory. This led to a second appeal, after which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court of Maryland the question of whether, under Maryland law, a household member exposed to asbestos dust brought home by a worker must prove an additional element of duty in a strict liability design defect claim.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a household member in the plaintiff’s position is not required to prove the additional element of duty beyond the four elements of strict liability for design defect as set forth in Phipps v. General Motors Corp. The court clarified that, unlike failure to warn and negligence claims, duty is not a required element for strict liability design defect claims, whether for users, consumers, or household members exposed through no fault of their own. View "Quinn v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

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A woman developed mesothelioma and lung cancer, allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos dust brought home on her husband’s work clothing. Her husband had applied asbestos-containing insulation to power generation turbines manufactured by a company at a Maryland power plant in the 1960s. The plaintiff did not work at the plant or use the product herself but routinely shook out and laundered her husband’s dusty clothes. After her death, her estate continued the lawsuit, asserting a strict liability design defect claim against the turbine manufacturer and others.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment for the manufacturer on all claims. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment as to the strict liability design defect claim and remanded the case. Following remand, the Superior Court again granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, concluding that, under Maryland law, the plaintiff could not recover as a bystander. The plaintiff appealed, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Supreme Court of Maryland, asking whether a household member claiming injury from asbestos dust must prove an additional element of “duty” beyond the four elements of strict liability under Maryland law.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a household member in the plaintiff’s position need not prove the additional element of duty to recover on a strict liability design defect claim in an asbestos case. The court emphasized that, unlike negligence or failure to warn claims, strict liability design defect actions require only the four elements identified in Phipps v. General Motors Corp. The court clarified that “duty” is not an additional element for such claims, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a “user,” “consumer,” or a household member exposed through no fault of their own. View "Quinn v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law