Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

In 2008, four years after appellants Ramona Christensen and Jack Scott purchased a new car, it collided with two moose on the Parks Highway. After the collision Christensen called the police to report the accident and called Scott to come pick her up at the scene. When Scott arrived Christensen said she felt nauseated, and Scott noticed a red mark on her forehead. Christensen could not remember many details of the collision, including whether she hit her head on something inside the car. During the days following the accident, Christensen reported feeling light-headed and dizzy. Christensen’s speech became disfluent and broken, and her gait became unsteady, causing her to fall repeatedly. About one week after the accident, Christensen sought medical attention to address her worsening symptoms. A neurologist examined Christensen and ordered an MRI spectroscopy. The spectroscopy showed evidence of bilateral frontal lobe brain damage. Since 2008 numerous other physicians and psychiatrists have examined and treated Christensen for her continuing speech, short-term memory, and mobility problems. The couple sued the car dealership for product liability, alleging that the car’s seat belt failed to restrain the driver in the accident. The superior court granted summary judgment to the dealership, concluding that "no reasonable jury could find that the Plaintiffs have proven that the seat belt . . . was defective." The couple appealed, arguing that the superior court applied an incorrect summary judgment standard and that genuine issues of material fact made summary judgment inappropriate. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the couple raised genuine issues of material fact regarding a seat belt defect and causation of the driver’s injury, it reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Service, Inc." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concern the ongoing tobacco litigation that began as a class action in Florida courts more than two decades ago. At issue is the fate of 588 personal injury cases filed on behalf of purportedly living cigarette smokers who, as it turns out, were dead at the time of filing (predeceased plaintiffs), 160 loss of consortium cases filed on behalf of spouses and children of these predeceased plaintiffs, and two wrongful death cases filed more than two years after the decedent-smoker's death. Plaintiffs' counsel sought leave to amend the complaints, but the district court denied those requests and dismissed the cases. The root of the problem occurred back in 2008 when these cases were originally filed where the law firm that brought the cases did not have the time or resources required to fully investigate all the complaints. Consequently, problem after problem cropped up once the district court started going through the inventory of cases. The defects that led to these consolidated appeals stemmed from counsel's failure to obtain accurate information regarding whether or when certain smokers died. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of these cases where, among other reasons, the problems could have been avoided if counsel had properly investigated the claims, and even if that lack of diligence were somehow excusable, counsel failed to inform the court that so many complaints were defective. View "4432 Ind. Tobacco Plaintiffs v. Various Tobacco Companies, et al." on Justia Law

Decades ago, BASF’s predecessor, Engelhard, discovered that its talc products contained disease-causing asbestos. Plaintiffs allege that Engelhard, with the help of the Cahill law firm, destroyed or hid tests and reports that documented the presence of asbestos in Engelhard talc; when new plaintiffs focused on Engelhard’s talc as a possible cause of their disease, Engelhard represented that its talc did not contain asbestos and that no tests ever said it did. Most of the original plaintiffs have died. Spurred by recent testimony that Engelhard’s talc contained asbestos and that the company knew it, survivors and successors brought claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment, and violation of the New Jersey Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The district court dismissed, finding that each was inadequately pled or barred by law. The court found the requested declarations and injunctions-ranging from an injunction against the future invocation of res judicata to a declaration that BASF and Cahill committed fraud—beyond its power to grant, but rejected defendants’ argument that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it of jurisdiction. The Third Circuit reversed as to the fraud and fraudulent concealment claims, but affirmed dismissal of the RICO claim. To the extent that plaintiffs attempt to have the court decide, now, statute of limitations, laches, and preclusion issues that will arise in future cases, they fail to present a whole or ripe controversy. View "Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC" on Justia Law

Payne sued Novartis for failing to warn her doctor that two of the drugs it manufactures, Aredia and Zometa, could cause serious damage to a patient’s jaw bones. The drugs are given intravenously, most often to patients with cancerous conditions, and are effective in preventing pathological fractures and other bone pains. Payne took both in 1999-2001 and had to have part of her jaw removed in 2007 because of osteonecrosis, which results in the gums being eaten away until the bone is exposed The connection between the drugs and the condition began to come to light to the medical community in the early 2000’s. The district court entered summary judgment for Novartis. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under Tennessee law, the question of whether Novartis’s failure to warn was a cause of Payne’s injuries is for a jury to determine. Payne’s testimony, combined with that of her doctor, could establish a sufficient causal link between Novartis’s failure to warn and Payne’s jaw death. A reasonable jury could conclude that Payne would not have taken Aredia or Zometa had her doctor warned her of the risk View "Payne v. Novartis Pharm. Corp." on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were driving a 2004 Jeep Cherokee in San Joaquin County, when the vehicle rolled over and the roof collapsed. Young sustained injuries, rendering her a permanent quadriplegic. Young’s daughter allegedly suffered physical and emotional harm. They filed suit, claiming that the roof and restraint systems were defectively designed. The vehicle at issue was designed, manufactured, and distributed by DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC), a former indirect subsidiary of Daimler. Among others, the complaint named Daimler and DCC as defendants. Daimler is a German public stock company that designs and manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and has its principal place of business in Stuttgart. Before 1998, DCC was known as Chrysler Corporation. After a 1998 agreement, Chrysler Corporation became an indirect subsidiary of Daimler and changed its name to DCC. DCC was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. It ceased to be a subsidiary of Daimler in 2007, changing its name to Chrysler LLC. Daimler is not a successor-in-interest to DCC or Chrysler LLC. Plaintiffs served Daimler with the complaint in accordance with the Hague Convention. The trial court quashed service for lack of personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG. The court of appeal affirmed, relying on the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. View "Young v. Daimler AG" on Justia Law

Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) was sued in a coordinated proceeding before the San Francisco Superior Court for alleged defects in Plavix, a drug BMS manufactures and sells throughout the country. BMS moved below to quash service of the summons regarding the complaints concerning plaintiffs who are not California residents, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied BMS’s motion, finding that California had general jurisdiction over BMS, and did not address the issue of specific jurisdiction. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) which limited the application of general jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, the California Supreme Court remanded to the court of appeals, which affirmed denial of the motion to quash. California does not have general jurisdiction over BMS in this case, but, applying the International Shoe Co. v. Washington test of “fair play and substantial justice,” the court reasoned that BMS has engaged in substantial, continuous economic activity in California, including the sale of more than a billion dollars of Plavix to Californians. That activity is substantially connected to claims by non-residents, which are based on the same alleged wrongs as those alleged by California-resident plaintiffs. BMS has not established that it would be unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over it. View "Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her kids filed a wrongful death action in state court against R.J. Reynolds and others after her husband died from throat cancer. Defendants removed to federal court, arguing that both of the nonmanufacturers had been fraudulently joined. The district court then granted defendants' motion to dismiss because the family's claims were barred by res judicata. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding fraudulent joinder, denying plaintiff's motion for remand, and then dismissing the nonmanufacturers from the case. The court also concluded that the "one recovery" rule of Missouri Revised Statutes 537.080 barred recovery against defendants in plaintiff's earlier suit for a wrongful death caused by the same conduct. Therefore, the district court was correct in dismissing the claims against the manufacturing defendants under the more demanding of the dismissal standards. As a result of the prior judgment, the husband no longer had a viable claim against the cigarette manufacturers at the time of his death, and his family is barred from bringing such a claim now. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Thompson, et al. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., et al." on Justia Law

Lee was injured while shooting a revolver made by Smith & Wesson. In his product liability suit alleging a defect in the firearm, the only expert evidence regarding how a defect in the firearm could have caused the injury was excluded because the expert’s theory was not consistent with aspects of plaintiff’s own memory of what happened. Lee reserved the right to challenge that evidentiary decision and stipulated to dismissal. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Smith & Wesson identified no judicial admission on the part of Lee in his represented status as plaintiff. Lee as a witness testified as to what he remembered. A tort plaintiff should be able to testify honestly to his memory of what happened and still have his lawyer argue that on the evidence as a whole it is more probable than not that the memory was faulty. If no jury could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff’s memory was faulty, dismissal would be warranted. View "Lee v. Smith & Wesson Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant-cross-appellee R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc. appealed a Superior Court judgment on a jury verdict of $2,864,583.33 plus interest to Plaintiff-appellees-cross-appellant Darcel Galliher, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Michael Galliher. The decedent, Michael Galliher, contracted and died from mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos or asbestiform material while employed by Borg Warner at a bathroom fixtures facility. Vanderbilt provided industrial talc to Borg Warner, which was alleged to be the source of the substance that caused Michael's illness. At trial, Vanderbilt denied causation and claimed that Borg Warner was responsible because it did not operate the facility in a manner that was safe for employees like Michael. Vanderbilt argued: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the duty of care required of Borg Warner, as Michael's employer; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to grant a new trial based on the admission of unreliable and inflammatory evidence that previously was ruled inadmissible. Galliher argued on cross-appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it disallowed post-judgment interest for a certain period of months. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it failed to provide any instruction to the jury on Borg Warner's duty of care to Michael, despite Vanderbilt's request that it do so. The trial court also abused its discretion when it denied Vanderbilt's motion for a new trial based upon the substantial prejudice resulting from the admission of evidence, not subject to cross-examination, that it had engaged in criminal conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., v. Galliher, et al." on Justia Law

Gibson, sued former manufacturers of white lead carbonate pigments, which were used, before the federal government banned them in the 1970s, in paints, including paints applied to residences. Gibson claimed negligence and strict liability, but cannot identify which manufacturer made the white lead carbonate pigment that injured him. He relied on the “risk contribution” theory of tort liability fashioned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Thomas v. Mallet in 2005, under which plaintiffs are relieved of the traditional requirement to prove that a specific manufacturer caused the plaintiff’s injury. The district court held that risk-contribution theory violates the substantive component of the Due Process Clause and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting the broad deference that the Constitution grants to the development of state common law. The risk-contribution theory survives substantive due process scrutiny and the manufacturers’ other constitutional challenges. View "Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co." on Justia Law