Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

From 1978 to 2008 Stanley worked as a hauler for Allied and was responsible for loading and unloading cars from his trailer. In 2008, Stanley attempted to unload a car from the upper deck of a 55 foot, eight car trailer manufactured by Cottrell. He lifted himself onto the upper deck railing of the trailer, moved sideways across the railing, and placed his right hand on the trunk of the car. As he reached for the car door with his left hand, he lost his hold and fell, landing on his back and leg. His back was not seriously injured, but his leg has been operated on seven times, resulting in $642,797.38 in medical costs. Stanley sued, alleging negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and outrage, claiming that his trailer was defective under Missouri law because it was not equipped with additional fall protections such as ladders, handholds, and extended catwalks. After contrasting expert testimony, a jury found for Cottrell. Stanley moved for a new trial, arguing that the court erred by refusing to allow the testimony of rebuttal witnesses and by its jury instructions on his negligence and strict liability claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of his motions and award of $11,171.92 in costs to Cottrell. View "Stanley v. Cottrell Inc." on Justia Law

A fire destroyed the Kostecki home. Their insurer, AAIC, reimbursed their loss, received an assignment of rights, and filed a products liability action against Omega, the manufacturer of TracPipe, a corrugated stainless steel tubing product that brought propane gas from an underground storage tank into the Kosteckis’ home. The court granted Omega summary judgment on breach of warranty and failure to warn. The case proceeded to trial on claims of negligent design and strict liability for an unreasonably dangerous product. All experts agreed that the fire started when lightning struck a tree near the underground propane tank, causing electric energy to enter the Kostecki home and ignite combustible materials in the space between the basement and the first floor. Fire investigators found holes in the TracPipe running through that space. A jury returned a verdict for Omega, finding that it did not fail to use ordinary care in designing the product or sell the product in an unreasonably dangerous and defective condition. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the court abused its discretion when it excluded the opinion of AAIC’s metallurgical expert, that the product was defectively designed, and admitted testimony by a defense expert, criticizing the fire causation theory. View "Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Omega Flex, Inc." on Justia Law

Nineteen unrelated mothers brought in the Circuit Court of Wayne County claims against Pfizer, Inc. and related entities (collectively, Respondents) on behalf of their respective minor children, alleging that their ingestion of Zoloft during their pregnancies caused their children to suffer birth defects. Petitioners hailed from fifteen different states. Respondents moved to refer the litigation to the Mass Litigation Panel. After the motion was denied, a virtually identical complaint was filed in the Wayne County Circuit Court by six unrelated plaintiff families against Respondents. The circuit court consolidated the two civil actions. The twenty-five plaintiff families then moved to refer the litigation to the Panel. The chief justice transferred the two civil actions to the Panel. Respondents filed a motion seeking to dismiss twenty-two non-resident plaintiff families on the basis of forum non conveniens. The Panel granted, in part, the motion to dismiss and dismissed twenty of the twenty-two plaintiff families. Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the Panel’s dismissal order. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that there was no basis to prevent the Panel from enforcing its dismissal order. View "State ex rel. J.C. v. Hon. James P. Mazzone" on Justia Law

In 1996, a Florida District Court of Appeal approved certification of a class-action lawsuit originating in the Circuit Court of Dade County that encompassed an estimated 700,000 Floridians who brought state-law damages claims against the major American tobacco companies for medical conditions, including cancer, "caused by their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine." The Florida Supreme Court then decertified the class but held that the jury findings would nonetheless have "res judicata effect" in cases thereafter brought against one or more of the tobacco companies by a former class member. Here, a member of that now-decertified class, successfully advanced strict-liability and negligence claims that trace their roots to the pre-decertified class' jury findings. Over the defendants' objection, the District Court instructed the jury that "you must apply certain findings made by the [class action] court and they must carry the same weight they would have if you had listened to all the evidence and made those findings yourselves." When the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on both claims, the defendants renewed their motion for a judgment as a matter of law, contending, among other things, that federal law preempted the jury’s imposition of tort liability as based on the class-action jury findings. The District Court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed. The Eleventh Circuit reversed: "the State of Florida may ordinarily enforce duties on cigarette manufacturers in a bid to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. But it may not enforce a duty, as it has through the [class-action] jury findings, premised on the theory that all cigarettes are inherently defective and that every cigarette sale is an inherently negligent act. So our holding is narrow indeed: it is only these specific, sweeping bases for state tort liability that we conclude frustrate the full purposes and objectives of Congress. As a result, [plaintiff's class-action]-progeny strict-liability and negligence claims are preempted, and we must reverse the District Court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law." View "Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

Nearly two years after he stopped using CIBA contact lenses, Kallal sued the company, claiming that a defect had hurt his eyes. CIBA itself had spotted a problem of poor permeability with some of its lenses and had issued a major recall. CIBA claimed that Kallal never used the recalled lenses. Noting that Kallal’s proof of defect relied entirely on the recall, and that the evidence showed that Kallal himself never purchased any of the recalled lenses, the district court granted judgment for CIBA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Once CIBA demonstrated that the lenses that it manufactured and Kallal used were not subject to the recall, the company was entitled to summary judgment View "Kallal v. CIBA Vision Corp." on Justia Law

Grebing was injured while exercising at a 24 Hour Fitness facility in La Mirada. The trial court granted 24 Hour summary judgment, holding that Grebing had signed a valid release of liability and 24 Hour did not act with gross negligence. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the release cannot relieve 24 Hour of liability for gross negligence, and that there was a triable issue of fact whether 24 Hour was grossly negligent; that the release does not relieve 24 Hour of liability for its own negligence; and that 24 Hour was in the chain of distribution for the rowing machine on which Grebing was injured and could be liable based on products liability. View "Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Piltches were traveling in their 2003 Mercury Mountaineer in February 2007 when they hit a patch of black ice, causing the car to slide off the road and into a wall. Upon impact, none of the car’s air bags deployed and both were injured. They filed suit in 2010, alleging the vehicle was defective under Indiana law. The district court granted Ford’s summary judgment motion holding that, without expert testimony, the Piltches could not create an issue of fact as to proximate cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Piltches stated a claim for relief under the Indiana Products Liability Act; there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of a defective product that expert testimony is not required; they are not required to produce expert testimony to establish proximate cause; and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, raising an inference of negligence on the part of Ford. The Piltches’ presentation of circumstantial evidence was not “one of the ‘rare instances’ where it is enough to negate all possible causes other than a product defect.” View "Piltch v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Velasquez worked at a company that made food flavorings, moving diacetyl, in closed and open containers. He breathed ambient diacetyl particles while mixing liquid and dry flavorings. Material safety data sheets attached to the containers warned that diacetyl was “harmful by inhalation,” but, consistent with industry practices at the time, did not warn of specific risks. The California Division of Occupational Safety and Health did not issue exposure limits until years later. During a 2005 incident, Velasquez inhaled fumes from a concentration that included acetaldehyde, but not diacetyl. He experienced trouble breathing and sought medical attention. Velasquez returned to the hospital twice in the next two months. In 2005, Velasquez’s supervisor took him to a clinic where a “company doctor” told him he could not continue working for the company in his condition. In 2006 Velasquez was diagnosed with bronchiolitis obliterans, a rare lung disease which is usually progressive and fatal. He filed suit. After finding the issue relevant to Velasquez’s ability to receive a lung transplant, the judge advised prospective jurors that Velasquez is an undocumented immigrant. The court entered judgment on the jury’s special verdict, including findings that the supplier’s acts were not a substantial factor in causing Velasquez’s harm. The court of appeal reversed, based on the error in disclosing Velasquez’s status to jurors. View "Velasquez v. Centrome, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against I-Flow, manufacturer of the PainBuster continuous infusion pump, alleging state common law claims for negligence and strict products liability. Plaintiff alleged that I-Flow negligently failed to warn that its pain pump should not be used in intra-articular spaces such as the glenohumeral joint; and that I-Flow was strictly liable for selling a product that was unreasonably dangerous due to the lack of adequate warnings. The PainBuster is regulated under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to the Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 360c(a)(1)(A)(i), (B), (C)(i). Concluding that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal where judgment was entered as to all defendants, the court concluded that the requested jury instructions regarding negligence and federal standards were not preempted by the MDA. Therefore, the court remanded and declined to reach the evidentiary issues. The court dismissed I-Flow's cross appeal as moot. View "McClellan v. I-Flow Corp." on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff was severely injured when a 2000 Dodge Neon that she was driving was struck from behind by another vehicle. In July 2010, she filed a personal-injury action against Midstate, the automobile dealer that sold her the vehicle; Chrysler Group LLC, successor-in-interest to Chrysler Corporation, which manufactured the vehicle but later declared bankruptcy; JCI, which manufactured the vehicle's driver's seat; and Autoliv ASP, Inc., which manufactured the vehicle's seatbelts. In September 2012, plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with Midstate and Chrysler Group. Based on the settlement agreement, the trial court issued an order of dismissal with prejudice in favor of Midstate and Chrysler Group. A jury trial in June 2013 on plaintiff's remaining action against JCI resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the products-liability claim. The trial court also entered a final judgment in favor of JCI and against Midstate on the cross-claim for indemnity. Midstate appealed that judgment. The issue primarily briefed by the parties on appeal was whether an indemnitee invoking common law equitable indemnity must extinguish the liability of the indemnitor to collect indemnity. The Supreme Court found no basis to distrub the judgment in favor of JCI, and affirmed. View "Heco v. Foster Motors" on Justia Law