Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Shortly after Plaintiff Mark Rimbert's father began taking Prozac, he killed his wife and himself. Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against Defendant Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of Prozac. Defendant moved for summary judgment on various grounds and to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff's sole expert witness on the question of causation. The motions were denied by the district judge initially assigned the case. Once the case was reassigned, Defendant moved for reconsideration. The second district judge granted Defendant's motion to exclude Plaintiff's expert witness. The court then entered summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that without the expert's testimony, Plaintiff had no case. Plaintiff brought this appeal to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred by excluding the testimony of his expert. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order excluding the testimony, but reversed the order granting summary judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Shortly after Plaintiff Mark Rimbert's father began taking Prozac, he killed his wife and himself. Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against Defendant Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of Prozac. Defendant moved for summary judgment on various grounds and to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff's sole expert witness on the question of causation. The motions were denied by the district judge initially assigned the case. Once the case was reassigned, Defendant moved for reconsideration. The second district judge granted Defendant's motion to exclude Plaintiff's expert witness. The court then entered summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that without the expert's testimony, Plaintiff had no case. Plaintiff brought this appeal to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred by excluding the testimony of his expert. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order excluding the testimony, but reversed the order granting summary judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Debbie and Max Walters appealed from a district court judgment that dismissed their petition for the issuance of a turnover order. In 1990, the Walters' thirteen-year-old son was killed on a hunting trip with his father when a Chinese-manufactured rifle the boy carried allegedly misfired. The Walters sued China and several entities allegedly controlled by China in the U.S. District Court on theories of products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty in connection with the manufacture of the rifle. The Walters eventually won a $10 million default judgment, and sought to enforce it by collecting China's assets in the possession of the respondent banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., Bank of China, Ltd. and China Construction Bank Corporation. Citing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), the district court dismissed the petition with prejudice. Without filing a new petition, the Walters argued on appeal that the Banks lacked standing to assert foreign sovereign immunity on behalf of China, and that China waived any immunity by its conduct underlying the default judgment and by its failure to appear. Upon review of the submitted briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Second Circuit found Plaintiffs' arguments were without merit, and affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss their case.

Plaintiffs Debbie and Max Walters appealed from a district court judgment that dismissed their petition for the issuance of a turnover order. In 1990, the Walters' thirteen-year-old son was killed on a hunting trip with his father when a Chinese-manufactured rifle the boy carried allegedly misfired. The Walters sued China and several entities allegedly controlled by China in the U.S. District Court on theories of products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty in connection with the manufacture of the rifle. The Walters eventually won a $10 million default judgment, and sought to enforce it by collecting China's assets in the possession of the respondent banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., Bank of China, Ltd. and China Construction Bank Corporation. Citing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), the district court dismissed the petition with prejudice. Without filing a new petition, the Walters argued on appeal that the Banks lacked standing to assert foreign sovereign immunity on behalf of China, and that China waived any immunity by its conduct underlying the default judgment and by its failure to appear. Upon review of the submitted briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Second Circuit found Plaintiffs' arguments were without merit, and affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss their case. View "Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd." on Justia Law

A 36 year-old schoolteacher sustained serious brain injuries when he was struck by a car while bicycling to work. His parents, appointed as his legal guardians, filed a products liability suit against the manufacturer of the bicycle helmet their son wore during the collision. The district court permitted the manufacturer to introduce expert testimony, based in part upon the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission's Safety Standard for Bicycle Helmets (16 C.F.R. 1203). Ultimately, experts for both sides agreed that the CPSC Standard forms the starting point for any bicycle helmet design, and that the helmet at issue satisfied the CPSC Standard in all respects. The court instructed the jury pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The Court also instructed the jury that, in determining whether the helmet was defective, it could consider evidence of standards or customs in the bicycle helmet industry, including the CPSC Standard. The jury returned a verdict for the defense. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the jury instructions and admission of the CPSC standard represented Pennsylvania law. View "Covell v. Bell Sports Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was unloading a railway tank car filled with sulfuric acid when its chemical contents exploded, spraying across his face and chest and inflicting severe burns. He sought damages under the common law, but the district court held that his lawsuit was preempted by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Act expressly preempts any common law requirement about the design of a package, container, or packaging component qualified for use in transporting hazardous materials in commerce. The tank car at issue is a container qualified for such use, regardless of whether what plaintiff was doing constituted transport or his employment status at the precise moment of his injury. View "Roth v. Noralfco, LLC" on Justia Law

In a pending negligence case in Philips County, the Circuit Court entered an order compelling Petitioner Cooper Tire & Rubber Company to fully and completely respond to the discovery requests made by the plaintiffs. The underlying case was a product's liability action, in which the Plaintiffs alleged the Company made defective tires that were ultimately responsible for the death of several people. The Plaintiffs made 467 specific requests for Company documents and materials. The Company alleged that many of the requested materials contained trade secrets or otherwise protected information. In all, Plaintiffs requested thousands of pages of materials that would cost the Company significant time and manpower to review, redact and produce to the Plaintiffs. The Company moved the Court to grant it time, or to limit the number of plaintiffsâ requests. The Court denied the Companyâs motions. The Company subsequently petitioned for a writ of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, or other supervisory writ for relief from the Circuit Courtâs rulings. The Supreme Court granted the Company certiorari to review the case. On review, the Supreme Court found the Circuit Court âgrossly abused its discretion,â and vacated some of the Circuit Courtâs rulings pertaining to discovery deadlines and the production of Company materials.

Appellant Carol Conwayâs son Dennis Howard, was crushed to death in 2004 by an automated log-stacking machine while working at a Weyerhaeuser sawmill facility in North Carolina. Appellant filed suit against Appellee Hi-Tech Engineering, Inc. (HTE) alleging that the company had negligently and defectively designed, manufactured and marketed the log-stacking machine that killed her son. The trial court found that North Carolina law applied to the case, and the outcome would be determined by an analysis of North Carolinaâs âstatute of repose.â The parties cited different statutes of repose that they found in North Carolina law. Characterizing Appellantâs case as a âproducts liability action,â the court found that the applicable statute gives the defendant a âvested right not to be suedâ if the plaintiff fails to file a product liability action within a six-year period. Appellant relied heavily on the date and terms of the sales contract HTE held with the sawmill to determine when the six-year period started to trigger the statute. The court found that the date that HTE first sold the log-stacker was the controlling date. Appellant alleged the date the stacker was first accepted and used was the controlling date. The court entered summary judgment against Appellant because her claim was outside of the six-year period, and she appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. The Court agreed with the trial courtâs analysis of Appellantâs claim, and affirmed the lower courtâs grant of summary judgment to HTE.