Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Appellant's decedents were passengers in a 1979 Beechcraft Baron airplane when, in 2008, the left engine lost power and the plane crashed, killing all persons on board. Appellant filed suit on behalf of his decedents' estates, claiming wrongful death based on negligence and products liability. Appellant named as defendants the manufacturers of the airplane (Appellees), among others. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Appellant's suit was barred by the eighteen-year statute of repose set forth in the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA). The circuit court granted summary judgment to Appellees, finding that Appellant's claims were barred by GARA and that neither the fraud exception nor the new-part rolling provision of GARA applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to Appellees where (1) a genuine issue of material fact did not exist with respect to whether the fraud exception to GARA applied here; and (2) Appellant's allegations that the publication of an allegedly defective flight manual were insufficient to invoke GARA's new-part rolling provision as a matter of law. View "Tillman v. Raytheon Co." on Justia Law

Mead Johnson, purchased a primary Commercial General Liability policy from National Union, with a limit of $2 million for liability for “personal and advertising injury” and an excess liability policy from Lexington, with a limit of $25 million. Mead’s main product, Enfamil infant formula, is sold worldwide. Mead’s competitor, PBM, sued Mead for false advertising and consumer fraud and Mead sued PBM for trade dress infringement. PBM claimed that Mead had falsely asserted that PBM’s generic formula lacked key fats that promote brain and eye development. The suit sought $500 million in damages for product disparagement, a tort that the policies cover as a form of “advertising injury.” Mead did not notify the insurers of the suit until December 2009, after the suit ended in the $13.5 million verdict against Mead. Mead wanted its insurers to pay that judgment, plus a $15 million settlement that it made to resolve the class action suit. The insurers obtained declaratory judgments that they were not required to pay. The Seventh Circuit reversed the summary judgment in favor of the insurers in the suit relating to the PBM litigation, but affirmed the judgment in favor of National Union in the suit arising from the class action against Mead. View "Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Parents filed a product liability action on behalf of Child, who was severely burned while attempting to start a fire in his family's fireplace with a fire starter gel. Defendants filed third-party complaints against Parents. Parents argued that the parental immunity doctrine barred Defendants from arguing that Parents' negligence caused or contributed to Child's injuries. The district court subsequently certified questions to the Supreme Court regarding the law on the parental immunity doctrine. The Supreme Court answered by holding that in a product liability action brought for injury to a child (1) the parental immunity doctrine precludes a defendant from asserting a contribution claim against the child's parents, but an allegedly negligent parent may be included as a third-party defendant for the allocation of fault; and (2) the parental immunity doctrine does not preclude a defendant from asserting the defense of abnormal product use by the parents to establish the negligence or fault of the parents or from asserting that the conduct of a parent was an intervening cause of the child's injuries. View "Landis v. Hearthmark, LLC" on Justia Law

John and Judith Valloze and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company; State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company; Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation; Freightliner, Allison Transmission, Inc. ("Allison Transmission"); and Cummins Atlantic, LLC, separately petitioned the Supreme Court for writs of mandamus to direct the Franklin Circuit Court to dismiss the declaratory-judgment actions filed against them by Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. Tiffin manufactured and sold custom-made motor homes. In its complaint in the Valloze action, Tiffin alleged that the Vallozes, who reside in Florida, purchased a Tiffin "Allegro Red" motor home that was manufactured by Tiffin in Red Bay, Florida. In 2011, the Vallozes' motor home caught fire somewhere in South Carolina and was declared a total loss. Nationwide insured the motor home, and it paid the Vallozes for their loss. Tiffin subsequently filed a complaint against the Vallozes, Nationwide, Freightliner, Allison Transmission, and Cummins in Alabama, describing Allison Transmission and Cummins as manufacturers of component parts for Tiffin that Tiffin alleged were the source of the fire. The Vallozes, Nationwide, Allison Transmission, Freightliner and Cummins filed motions to dismiss which were ultimately denied. The trial court did not provide reasons for its rulings. All parties appealed. In the Katnich action, Tiffin alleged that Karen Katnich purchased a Tiffin "Phaeton" motor home in Virginia, and somewhere in North Carolina, the motor home caught fire and suffered a total loss. Tiffin sued State Farm, Custom Automated Services, Inc., Waterway, Inc., Maxzone Auto Parts Corporation and Freightliner, alleging each manufactured parts for Tiffin that were the source of the fire. In both cases, Tiffin asserted that a real, present justiciable controversy existed between the parties as to the cause and origins of the motor home fires. Again the trial court denied motions to dismiss, and provided no reasons for its ruling. After its review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded with the conclusion of the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions that declaratory-judgment actions were not intended to be a vehicle for potential tort defendants to obtain a declaration of nonliability. Because a bona fide justiciable controversy did not exist either action, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the petitioners' motions to dismiss Tiffin's complaints. View "Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. v. Valloze " on Justia Law

Baugh suffered severe brain injury when the Cuprum ladder he was using to clean his gutters collapsed. In a suit, alleging defective design and negligence, there were no eyewitnesses, and, because of the injury, Baugh could not testify. Three months before trial, Cuprum informed plaintiff’s counsel that it intended to use an exemplar of the ladder at trial, built to the exact specifications of the ladder Baugh had been using. In a pretrial conference, the ladder was marked as an exhibit “for Demonstrative Purposes.” Plaintiff objected. Discovery had closed two years earlier, and the ladder had not been included in expert disclosures. The judge determined that since the ladder was being offered only as a demonstrative exhibit, plaintiff’s objections were irrelevant. Cuprum used the ladder during trial to argue that, contrary to plaintiff’s design defect theory, the ladder would not collapse under a normal load with all legs on the ground. Cuprum’s expert presented testimony and video in which he tested the ladder, including jumping on the ladder as if it were a pogo stick. Over plaintiff’s objection, the judge allowed the jury to inspect the ladder during deliberation. The jury returned a verdict for Cuprum. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that sending the ladder to the jury room was not harmless error. View "John Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. De C.V." on Justia Law

In 2006, while visiting relatives in Andover, 29-year-old Aleo attempted to use an inflatable swimming pool slide that had been imported and sold by Toys R Us. She slid down head first; when she reached the bottom of the slide, it collapsed, and her head struck the concrete deck of the swimming pool through the fabric of the slide. Robin's upper two cervical vertebrae fractured, resulting in quadriplegia. She died the following day, after her family, in accordance with her wishes, withdrew life support. Her estate sued, alleging negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, wrongful death, and violation of G.L. c. 93A. A jury found Toys R Us liable for negligence, breach of warranty, and wrongful death, awarding compensatory damages of $2,640,000 and punitive damages of $18 million. Under G.L. c. 229, punitive damages available for gross negligence in wrongful death action. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Toys R Us exhibited a “substantial degree of reprehensibility.” The court rejected challenges to pretrial rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the constitutionality of the $18 million award of punitive damages. View "Aleo v. SLB Toys USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against R.J. Reynolds under the Connecticut Products Liability Act (CPLA), Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 52-572m et seq., for strict liability and negligence. Plaintiff claimed that the cigarettes she smoked for 25 years caused cancer in her larynx. On appeal, R.J. Reynolds challenged the denial of its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court certified the following question to the Connecticut Supreme Court: Does Comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts preclude a suit premised on strict products liability against a cigarette manufacturer based on evidence that the defendant purposefully manufactured cigarettes to increase daily consumption without regard to the resultant increase in exposure to carcinogens, but in the absence of evidence of any adulteration or contamination. View "Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

R.J. Reynolds appealed money judgments in favor of the survivors of two smokers. At issue was whether a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in an earlier class action was entitled to full faith and credit in federal court. The court affirmed the judgments in favor of the survivors because R.J. Reynolds had a full and fair opportunity to be heard in the Florida class action and the application of res judicata under Florida law did not cause an arbitrary deprivation of property. View "Walker, et al. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

Weigle and Moore were experienced mechanics employed by Truckers 24‐Hour in Indianapolis; they undertook a job to rebuild the braking system on a semi‐truck trailer. The trailer somehow moved as both were working underneath it, causing the support stands to tip over and the trailer to come crashing down. The support stands were designed by SPX. In a suit against SPX, the mechanics alleged inadequate warnings and defective design under the Indiana Product Liability Act, Ind. Code 34‐20‐1‐1. The district court granted SPX summary judgment, finding that the warnings were adequate as a matter of law and that, as a result, the support stands were not defective under Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the inadequate‐warnings claims, but vacated with respect to the defective‐design claims. A reasonable fact finder could determine that the SPX support stands were in a defective condition that was unreasonably dangerous. That the SPX support stands differ from most others on the market tends to show that their design is not contemplated by reasonable expected users. View "Weigle SPX Corp." on Justia Law

For more than 30 years, Grace has defended itself against asbestos-related lawsuits filed by building owners seeking redress for costs involved in removing Grace products. AMH owns a hospital complex that used Grace products in its construction and filed a class action lawsuit in South Carolina state court. Before resolution of that litigation, Grace filed a petition for Chapter 11 protection. After about 10 years, most property damage claims against Grace had been settled, contingent on approval of an 11 U.S.C. 524(g) trust and an injunction channeling property damage claims against Grace to that trust for payment. AMH did not settle. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed Grace’s reorganization, including a trust and channeling injunction, over AMH’s objections. The district court and Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the reorganization plan did not meet the requirements of section 524(g), which provides a mechanism for handling overwhelming asbestos-related liabilities in Chapter 11 proceedings; that the plan failed to provide equal treatment as required by 11 U.S.C. 1123(a)(4), (C) ; that Grace did not show that the Plan was proposed in good faith under 11 U.S.C. 1129(a) and did not show that the Plan is feasible. View "In Re: W.R. Grace & Co." on Justia Law