Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Tennessee resident Lombard acquired a 1997 Lincoln Town Car in 2004. The car was partially manufactured, and its final assembly completed, in 1996 at Ford’s Wixom, Michigan plant. In March 2007, the Lincoln, which was licensed, registered, and insured in Tennessee, allegedly caught fire in Lombard’s driveway, causing damage to the car, Lombard’s residence, and personal property. Lombard’s insurers reimbursed Lombard for his losses and, as subrogees, sued Ford, asserting products liability, breach of warranty and negligence claims, alleging that the fire was due to a defective cruise control system. The district court dismissed, finding that Tennessee law governed and that Tennessee’s statute of repose for products liability actions bars the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, after examining Michigan choice of law rules. The conclusion that Michigan’s interests do not “mandate” that Michigan law be applied despite Tennessee’s interests was not erroneous.View "Std. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

This case arose when nineteen plaintiff families sought to file a single complaint, raising products liability and negligence claims against the Pharmaceutical Companies. On appeal, the Pharmaceutical Companies challenged the district court's decision to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to the Circuit Court of Wayne County, West Virginia. The court concluded that it did not have the authority to review the remand order because the Pharmaceutical Companies have failed to establish that an exception should apply here, and because the plain language of 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) barred the court's review of the case.View "E.D. v. Pfizer, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Brink, and others, claiming that he was raped while in jail when he was nineteen years old and that the rape occurred as a result of ineffective locks on cell doors. Brink argued on interlocutory appeal that the district court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations began running against plaintiff at the moment the torts occurred. The court concluded that the Mississippi Code clearly distinguished between the concepts of emancipation and the disability of infancy, as well as the implications of each, and Mississippi cases did not illustrate an intent to deviate from this clear distinction. Therefore, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against plaintiff until he reached the age of majority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Baker v. RR Brink Locking Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Shirley Gross filed suit against PLIVA after her long-term use of the generic drug metoclopramide, produced by PLIVA, caused her permanent injuries. On appeal, plaintiff, as the personal representative of the estate of Gross, challenged the district court's denial of Gross's request to amend her complaint and her state common law tort claims against PLIVA for injuries sustained as a result of her use of a drug it manufactured. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's denial of leave to amend and held that none of plaintiff's claims regarding PLIVA's alleged failure to update its warnings were before the court on appeal; the court found that the complaint did not allege any violation of the federal misbranding laws or parallel state duties, and to the extent these claims were made on appeal, they were waived; and all of Gross's causes of action were preempted by the FDCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc." on Justia Law

In a products liability matter, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether under Pennsylvania law a pharmaceutical company was immune from responding in damages for a lack of due care resulting in injury or death except for two discrete grounds: drug impurities or deficient warnings. Appellee made her primary claim against the makers of "phen-fen" as one of "negligence - unreasonable marketing of a dangerous rug and unreasonable failure to remove the drug from the market before 1997." The manufacturer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the appellee failed to assert a cognizable cause of action. The court of common please granted the company's motion. The Superior Court reversed, and both parties appealed, challenging respectively the Superior Court's holdings that pharmaceutical companies were not immune from claims of negligent drug design, and that claims of negligent marketing, testing, and failure of remove the drugs from the market were unviable claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings: "there has been no supported presentation here which would persuade us to immunize companies from the responsibility to respond in damages for such a lack of due care resulting in personal injury or death." View "Lance v. Wyeth" on Justia Law

Mylan manufactures generic Duragesic, a drug to treat pain. It consists of fentanyl (active ingredient) and a “transdermal system” (patch that delivers the drug). Kelly’s estate claimed that the patch caused Kelly’s death by delivering an excessive amount of fentanyl, alleging strict products liability, negligence, misrepresentation, fraud, warranty, and violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act. The district court dismissed, based on Mich. Comp. Laws 600.2946(5), which provides that “drug” manufacturers are immune from suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Michigan defines “drug” using the federal definition, 21 U.S.C. 321: (A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use as a component of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C). Michigan’s definition provides that a “drug” is not a “medical appliance or device.” Immunity might not apply to a product, like the patch, that has mechanical (rather than chemical) effect on the body. Under the federal definition a product might be neither “drug” nor “device” but a “combination product.” Whether a combination product is regulated as a drug or a device is left to the Secretary’s discretion. View "Miller v. Mylan, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Bre’Annah Banks, Ladarius Harp, Kimberly Norris, Zerlanzeia Lambouths, and Lakedrick Reed filed suit against the Sherwin-Williams Company claiming products liability and negligence. After both sides elicited evidence from lay and expert witnesses supporting their arguments, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment for Sherwin-Williams based on the plaintiffs’ failure to establish product identification, an essential element of their claim. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that, under the applicable standard for the consideration of summary judgment, the plaintiffs presented enough evidence to create an issue of material fact as to whether the paint in question came from Sherwin-Williams. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Banks v. Sherwin-Williams Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Novartis alleging that Novartis negligently failed to provide adequate warnings for two drugs she took, Aredia and Zometa, after having two of her teeth extracted. Plaintiff developed osteonecrosis of the jaw (ONJ) after the extraction. Plaintiff was awarded $225,000 in compensatory damages and Novartis appealed. The court concluded that a jury could reasonably find that plaintiff's injury was the natural and probable consequence of Novartis's behavior and rejected Novartis's arguement that plaintiff did not establish that her injuries were proximately caused by inadequate warnings; the district court did not err in applying Missouri law where Missouri had the most significant relationship to the punitive damages claim; and Novartis correctly reasoned that the MedWatch checkmarks were inadmissible hearsay, out-of-court assertions offered for their truth but Novartis failed to demonstrate the prejudice required for a new trial. The court concluded, however, that the district court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff full costs for depositions conducted as part of multi-district litigation. Accordingly, the court affirmed in Case No. 12-3121 and vacated in Case No. 12-3409. View "Winter v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp." on Justia Law

OMJP appealed from the district court's denial of its motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) and (3). In Levaquin I, the court upheld a jury award in compensatory damages against OMJP for Achilles tendon injuries plaintiff suffered while taking OMJP's prescription antibiotic Levaquin. In this appeal, OMJP contended that the district court abused its discretion in denying OMJP relief under Rule (60)(b)(2) based on the delinquent and belated disclosure of an expert's calculation regarding the relative risk of Achilles tendon rupture to certain patients. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief based on OMJP's claim of "newly discovered evidence" where the evidence was merely cumulative or impeaching and OMJP had not demonstrated that it was probable it would produce a different result. In regards to OMJP's misconduct claim under Rule 60(b)(3), the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the lack of the expert's calculation did not prevent OMJP from mounting a vigorous defense and that any misconduct did not warrant a new trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Schedin v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a products liability action against TI after her son died from cardiac arrest when he was struck by a taser. A jury found in favor of plaintiff, awarding her $10 million in compensatory damages, which the district court remitted to about $6.15 million before deducting certain offset amounts received by plaintiff, resulting in a final award of about $5.5 million. TI appealed. The court held that the district court did not err in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff on the liability aspect of the negligence claim in accordance with the jury's verdict. However, the damages award was not supported by the evidence and the court remanded on that issue. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fontenot v. Taser Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law