Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Novartis, manufacturer of Zometa, alleging products liability, negligent manufacture, negligent failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranty, and loss of consortium. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court erred by excluding the causation testimony offered by her expert when it found the testimony to be irrelevant and unreliable. The court concluded that the expert's testimony was relevant because it indicated that plaintiff's bisphosphonate use was a substantial factor in her development of bisphosphonate-related osteonecrosis of the jaw. The court also concluded that the expert's testimony was reliable where he used a differential diagnosis grounded in significant clinical experience and examination of medical records and literature. Accordingly, the court concluded that the expert's testimony created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the specific causal link between plaintiff's bisphosphonates treatment and her development of osteonecrosis of the jaw. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Novartis and remanded. View "Messick v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the city and several police officers after her son was shot in the chest with an electronic control device (ECD). After the case settled, plaintiff filed suit against TASER for products liability and negligence. The court concluded that plaintiff's failure to warn claim failed as a matter of law because she did not establish on the record that an additional warning would have changed the behavior of the officers involved; the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding plaintiff's expert's testimony on the issue of whether a different or additional warning would have altered the officer's actions under the existing circumstances; even if the court were to conclude that there was a legitimate jury question as to whether the officer had been made aware of the specific risk of cardiac danger when the ECD was fired directly at the subject's chest, such a conclusion would be rebuttable by undisputed evidence in the record that he had not been instructed on available warnings and did not heed the limited training he had received; there was no genuine dispute on the record that the officer would not have read any additional warning TASER may have added as to the cardiac danger of the ECD in any of its product warnings or bulletins, or in any training materials prepared after January 1, 2005; even if an adequate warning had appeared, the officer would not have heeded it; and therefore, TASER was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's negligence and failure to warn claims where she failed to establish that an additional warning would have altered the behavior of the officer. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to present evidence that the ECD device used by the officer was unreasonably dangerous as designed. Plaintiff's design defect claim failed as a matter of law where plaintiff failed to demonstrate any "specific design choices" that rendered the model unreasonably dangerous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and dismissed plaintiff's remaining claims as moot. View "Bachtel v. TASER Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old Jessica Bowers sustained severe injuries when she was dragged into the rotating driveline of a tractor-driven post hole digger that was operated by her stepfather, who had borrowed the digger from Peter Smith. Smith had previously removed a plastic safety shield from the machine after years of use had left the shield damaged beyond repair. Plaintiff sued the digger’s seller, distributor, manufacturer, component maker, and others, asserting claims sounding in negligence and strict products liability. Defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment based on the substantial modification defense articulated in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Company because Smith made post-sale modifications to the digger that rendered the digger defective and proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Supreme Court denied summary judgment with regard to the design defect claims. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff raised triable issues of fact regarding the defective design of the safety shield that were sufficient to defeat summary judgment based on substantial modification. View "Hoover v. New Holland N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Saul Morales was fleeing from the police when one of the police officers left his Ford vehicle, then pursued and apprehended Morales. The officer’s vehicle began rolling backward toward the pair while the officer attempted to handcuff Morales. The vehicle ran over and came to rest on top of Morales, injuring him. Morales sued Ford Motor Company and the car’s seller (collectively, “Ford”), alleging that the vehicle had a design defect. After deposing two of Ford’s expert witnesses, Morales sought to depose a corporate representative of each expert’s employer to expose potential bias. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that on the facts of this case, the Rules of Civil Procedure did not permit such discovery. View "In re Ford Motor Co. & Ken Stoepel Ford, Inc." on Justia Law

M.L. was born in 2003. At his 15-month well-child visit, his pediatrician noted that M.L. was walking and generally developing normally but did not “want to talk.” In 2005, M.L. received several immunizations, including the DTaP vaccination. Hours later, M.L. allegedly began experiencing an abnormally high fever and swelling. He was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of “vaccine adverse reaction with secondary fever, angiodema, and anaphylactoid reaction.” The morning after his discharge, M.L.’s mother called an ambulance because M.L. was exhibiting signs of hypothermia and seizure-like episodes. In the months that followed, M.L.’s vocabulary allegedly decreased. An MRI of M.L.’s brain with and without contrast was normal. After observing M.L.’s developmental delays and repetitive behaviors, a pediatric neurologist placed M.L. in the autism spectrum disorder category. A special master rejected claims under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to -34, and the Claims Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. While the DTaP vaccination likely caused the initial anaphylactic reaction, there was no reliable medical theory that the M.L.’s anaphylaxis caused a focal brain injury. View "LaLonde v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, after being diagnosed with tardive dyskinesia (TD), filed suit against Lilly, manufacturer of the antipsychotic drug, Zyprexa, alleging personal injury and product liability claims. The district court concluded that Lilly adequately warned plaintiff's treating and prescribing physicians of the risk of developing movement disorders like TD. On appeal, plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the district court erred in excluding his expert opinion testimony that 15% of Zyprexa users will develop TD after three years of use. The court concluded that the district court was well within its substantial discretion to conclude that plaintiff had not provided sufficient scientific support for the opinion and to exclude the opinion. The court also concluded that the district court properly applied the learned intermediary doctrine in dismissing the failure-to-warn claim. Finally, assuming Arkansas law recognized an overpromotion exception, the exception would not apply in this case because plaintiff presented no evidence that any representation by a salesperson affected a prescribing doctor's decision to continue plaintiff on Zyprexa and because there was no reliable evidence that Zyprexa had significantly more risk of movement disorders than the drug reps allegedly said it had. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. View "Boehm v. Eli Lilly & Co." on Justia Law

On July 28, 2012, Michael Becker was injured when a Ford truck driven by his son, Phillip Becker, struck a light pole. Michael and his wife filed suit against Ford Motor Company. On August 26, 2013, Ford filed an answer claiming that the accident was caused by a person other than Ford. On October 1, 2013, the Beckers filed a motion to join Phillip as a party to whom fault could be apportioned and a motion to file an amended complaint. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether, after a defendant asserts a comparative fault claim against a non-party tortfeasor who was known to the plaintiff when the original suit was filed, Tenn. Code Ann. 20-1-119 permits the plaintiff to amend its complaint to assert a claim directly against the tortfeasor named by the defendant. The Court held (1) application of section 20-1-119 is not restricted to tortfeasors who were unknown to the plaintiff when its original complaint was filed; and (2) therefore, the statute permits a plaintiff to file an amended complaint against the tortfeasor named by the defendant within ninety days after the filing of the answer in which the defendant first asserts a comparative fault claim against the tortfeasor. View "Becker v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

A three-year-old child found a cigarette lighter in his father’s truck and used it to loosen a button on his shirt. His shirt caught fire and he spent three weeks in the hospital, where he was treated for second and third degree burns to his face and chest and underwent several skin graft surgeries. A BIC cigarette lighter was found at the scene and delivered to the police. Who found the lighter, and where, is unclear. In a suit against the manufacturer, the jury found the lighter was not defective or unreasonably dangerous in a way that causally contributed to the injuries. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court allowed inadmissible evidence of the failure of the Consumer Product Safety Commission to take action concerning the lighter and that the court erred by permitting BIC’s counsel to argue that the parents were to blame and refusing to instruct the jury to disregard such arguments. The court noted that the lighter admitted in evidence is presumed to be the one that caused the fire; it was worn, and the child safety guard had been removed.View "Cummins v. Bic USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Stollings lost his index finger and portions of other fingers in a table saw accident and sued Ryobi, the saw’s manufacturer, alleging defective design because it failed to equip the saw with either a riving knife, a small blade that holds the wood cut open to prevent kickbacks, or braking technology that automatically stops the saw blade upon contact with human tissue. Stollings contends either feature would have prevented the accident. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Ryobi. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the court erred in failing to stop Ryobi’s counsel from arguing that Stollings’s counsel brought the case as part of a joint venture with the inventor of an automatic braking technology to force saw manufacturers to license the technology, and in admitting hearsay evidence to support that improper argument. The court also erred in excluding the testimony of one of Stollings’s expert witnesses and in giving the jury a sole proximate cause instruction where Ryobi was not asserting a comparative fault defense or blaming a third party.View "Stollings v. Ryobi Techs., Inc." on Justia Law

Elliot, which provides construction and maintenance services, owns and leases bucket trucks. In 1996, Elliot entered into a lease with TECO, a manufacturer of such trucks, agreeing agreed to hold TECO harmless from liability arising from injuries resulting from use, operation, or transportation of the vehicle or its location or condition. In 2000, Large was injured while operating a truck, which his employer, Elliot, had leased from TECO. Large sued TECO. TECO’s successor in interest (Mobile) filed a third-party complaint against Elliot, seeking defense and indemnification pursuant to the lease. Mobile later settled with Large without Elliot’s participation, leaving the third-party complaint against Elliot as the only outstanding issue. After a change in Virginia law, Mobile again moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, holding Elliot responsible to defend and indemnify Mobile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Elliot’s argument that a later invoice superseded the terms of the lease, eliminating Elliot’s duty to defend and indemnify except in the case that Elliot violated obligations under the invoice by failing to either adequately train Large in the use of the truck or to provide him with copies of the truck’s operation and maintenance manuals. View "Large v. Mobile Tool Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law