Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Marquise Johnson was injured when his friend, André Lewis, accidentally shot him while attempting to disassemble a handgun in a car. Lewis believed the gun could not fire without the magazine, but it discharged, hitting Johnson in the legs. Johnson sued the gun's manufacturer, importer, and seller, alleging the gun was defective for lacking certain safety features.The Lyon District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, citing the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which provides immunity to firearm manufacturers and sellers from lawsuits when their products are misused criminally. The court found that Lewis' act of pulling the trigger was volitional and constituted a criminal offense under Kansas law, specifically the strict-liability crime of discharging a firearm on a public road.The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, interpreting the PLCAA to require an intentional discharge for immunity to apply. The majority held that because Lewis did not intend to fire the gun, the PLCAA did not bar Johnson's lawsuit. A dissenting judge argued that the PLCAA should apply because Lewis' act of pulling the trigger was volitional.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the PLCAA bars product-liability actions if a volitional act causes the gun to discharge and the shooting constitutes a criminal offense. The court found that Lewis' deliberate trigger pull was a volitional act and that discharging a firearm on a public road is a strict-liability crime under Kansas law. Therefore, the PLCAA provided immunity to the defendants, and the district court's summary judgment was affirmed. The case was remanded to the district court. View "Johnson v. Bass Pro Outdoor World " on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence following his guilty-plea conviction of felon in possession of a firearm. He argued that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), which applies only when a defendant’s firearm “had an altered or obliterated serial number,” because there is no evidence that his rifle ever had a serial number.   The Fifth Circuit agreed and vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded. The court explained that it agreed that Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) does not apply when there is no evidence that the firearm ever had a serial number. The text of Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) is clear that it only applies when the firearm “had an altered or obliterated serial number.” U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). And in ordinary parlance, something cannot be “altered or obliterated” if it never existed in the first place. Consequently, to apply an upward enhancement under the provision, the government must present evidence showing that Defendant’s rifle once had a serial number. Because there was no such evidence, the court held that the district court erred in applying a four-level enhancement under Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). View "USA v. Sharp" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of domestic violence assault, domestic violence stalking, and endangering the welfare of a child. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of conviction as to the charge of domestic violence assault and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal on that charge, holding that the record contained insufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant’s conduct forming that basis for domestic violence assault occurred within the relevant limitations period. The Court also remanded to determine whether resentencing was necessary as to the stalking and endangering the welfare of a child charges. View "State v. Lacourse" on Justia Law

In the late 1990s, people who had taken the prescription diet-drug combination Fen-Phen began suing Wyeth, claiming that the drugs caused valvular heart disease. A 2000 settlement included creation of the Fen-Phen Settlement Trust to compensate class members who had sustained heart damage. Claims required medical evidence. Attorneys who represented certain claimants retained Tai, a board-certified Level 2-qualified cardiologist, to read tests and prepare reports. Tai read 12,000 tests and asserted that he was owed $2 million dollars for his services. Tai later acknowledged that in about 10% of the cases, he dictated reports consistent with the technicians’ reports despite knowing that the measurements were wrong, and that he had his technician and office manager review about 1,000 of the tests because he did not have enough time to do the work. A review of the forms Tai submitted found that, in a substantial number of cases, the measurements were clearly incorrect and were actually inconsistent with a human adult heart. Tai was convicted of mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343, was sentenced to 72 months’ imprisonment, and was ordered to pay restitution of $4,579,663 and a fine of $15,000. The Third Circuit rejected arguments that the court erred by implicitly shifting the burden of proof in its “willful blindness” jury instruction and applying upward adjustments under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of a position of trust and use of a special skill, but remanded for factual findings concerning whether Tai supervised a criminally culpable subordinate, as required for an aggravated role enhancement. View "United States v. Tai" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Brink, and others, claiming that he was raped while in jail when he was nineteen years old and that the rape occurred as a result of ineffective locks on cell doors. Brink argued on interlocutory appeal that the district court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations began running against plaintiff at the moment the torts occurred. The court concluded that the Mississippi Code clearly distinguished between the concepts of emancipation and the disability of infancy, as well as the implications of each, and Mississippi cases did not illustrate an intent to deviate from this clear distinction. Therefore, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against plaintiff until he reached the age of majority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Baker v. RR Brink Locking Systems, Inc." on Justia Law