Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

A patient with a long history of severe depression and multiple suicide attempts underwent 95 electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) treatments at a Nebraska hospital between 2014 and 2016. The ECT was administered using a device manufactured by Somatics, LLC. After the treatments, the patient experienced significant memory loss and was diagnosed with a neurocognitive disorder. In 2020, he filed suit against Somatics in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging negligence, strict product liability, breach of warranties, violation of Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act, and fraudulent misrepresentation, primarily claiming that Somatics failed to adequately warn of the risks associated with ECT.The district court dismissed the claims under Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act and for fraudulent misrepresentation, merged the strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims, and granted summary judgment to Somatics on the design defect, manufacturing defect, and breach of express warranty claims. The remaining claims for negligence and strict liability, both based on failure to warn, were merged for trial. The jury found that while Somatics failed to provide adequate warnings, this failure was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and awarded no damages. The district court denied the plaintiff’s post-trial motions, including for a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions de novo for summary judgment and for abuse of discretion on evidentiary and procedural rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the design defect claim, correctly merged the negligence and strict liability claims, gave an appropriate jury instruction on proximate cause, and did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence and expert testimony. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Thelen v. Somatics, LLC" on Justia Law

Several individuals from five different states purchased ovens with front-mounted burner knobs manufactured by a major appliance company. They allege that these ovens have a defect causing the stovetop burners to turn on unintentionally, sometimes resulting in gas leaks. The plaintiffs claim they were unaware of this defect at the time of purchase, but that the manufacturer had prior knowledge of the issue through consumer complaints sent to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and reviews posted on the company’s website. The plaintiffs assert that, had they known about the defect, they would have paid less for the ovens or not purchased them at all.The plaintiffs filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, alleging violations of federal warranty law, fraud by omission, breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and violations of state consumer protection statutes. The district court found that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, as they alleged a concrete injury, but dismissed all claims for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their state common law fraud and statutory consumer protection claims, while the manufacturer argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because they plausibly alleged economic injury from overpaying for a defective product. The court further held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged the manufacturer’s knowledge of the defect and its safety risks, particularly because the CPSC had sent incident reports directly to the manufacturer. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of most state law fraud and consumer protection claims, except for the Illinois common law fraud claim, which failed for lack of a duty to disclose under Illinois law. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Tapply v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

Two minor boys, referred to as John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, were coerced by a trafficker into producing pornographic content, which was later posted on Twitter. Despite reporting the content to Twitter, the platform did not immediately remove it, leading to significant views and retweets. The boys and their mother made multiple attempts to have the content removed, but Twitter only acted after being prompted by the Department of Homeland Security.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, primarily based on the immunity provided under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The court found that Twitter was immune from liability for most of the claims, including those under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and California product-defect claims, as these claims treated Twitter as a publisher of third-party content.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Twitter is immune from liability under § 230 for the TVPRA claim and the California product-defect claim related to the failure to remove posts and the creation of search features that amplify child-pornography posts. However, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims for negligence per se and their product-liability theory based on defective reporting-infrastructure design are not barred by § 230 immunity, as these claims do not arise from Twitter's role as a publisher. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the TVPRA and certain product-defect claims, reversed the dismissal of the negligence per se and defective reporting-infrastructure design claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "DOE 1 V. TWITTER, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves Eastern Maine Medical Center and eight other Maine hospitals (the Hospitals) who filed a 509-page complaint against various businesses and individuals (the Opioid Sellers) involved in the marketing and distribution of prescription opioids. The Hospitals alleged that the Opioid Sellers created illegitimate demand for opioids and unlawfully increased supply, leading to an opioid epidemic that caused the Hospitals to incur high costs for treating patients with opioid misuse, addiction, and dependency, with only partial reimbursement from insurance.The Business and Consumer Docket (Duddy, J.) dismissed the Hospitals' complaint. The court found that the complaint did not comply with the requirement for a "short and plain statement" of the claim but chose to dismiss it based on the legal insufficiency of the claims. The court concluded that the Hospitals could not recover under any of their legal theories, including negligence, public nuisance, unjust enrichment, fraud and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and civil conspiracy. The court also denied the Hospitals' request for leave to amend their complaint.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's dismissal. The court held that the Hospitals' claims were legally insufficient. Specifically, the court found that the Hospitals did not have a direct negligence claim, as they did not suffer harm directly caused by the Opioid Sellers. The fraud and misrepresentation claims failed due to lack of reliance by the Hospitals on the Opioid Sellers' misrepresentations. The unjust enrichment claim was dismissed because the Hospitals did not confer a benefit on the Opioid Sellers. The public nuisance claim failed as the Hospitals did not suffer a special injury different in kind from the public. Lastly, the civil conspiracy claim was dismissed as it required an underlying tort, which was not present. The court concluded that the deficiencies in the complaint could not be remedied by amendment. View "Eastern Maine Medical Center v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

The case involves the plaintiffs, including the estate of Carson Bride and three minors, who suffered severe harassment and bullying through the YOLO app, leading to emotional distress and, in Carson Bride's case, suicide. YOLO Technologies developed an anonymous messaging app that promised to unmask and ban users who engaged in bullying or harassment but allegedly failed to do so. The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against YOLO, claiming violations of state tort and product liability laws.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) immunized YOLO from liability. The court found that the claims sought to hold YOLO responsible for third-party content posted on its app, which is protected under the CDA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' misrepresentation claims, holding that these claims were based on YOLO's promise to unmask and ban abusive users, not on a failure to moderate content. The court found that the misrepresentation claims were analogous to a breach of promise, which is not protected by Section 230. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' product liability claims, holding that Section 230 precludes liability because these claims attempted to hold YOLO responsible as a publisher of third-party content. The court concluded that the product liability claims were essentially about the failure to moderate content, which is protected under the CDA. View "Estate of Bride v. Yolo Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

David Schaffner, Jr. and Theresa Sue Schaffner filed a lawsuit against Monsanto Corporation, alleging that Monsanto violated Pennsylvania law by failing to include a cancer warning on the label of its weed-killer, Roundup. The Schaffners claimed that this omission caused Mr. Schaffner to develop non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma due to his exposure to Roundup. The case was initially filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, and was later removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (JPML) then transferred the case to the Northern District of California for consolidated pretrial proceedings.In the Northern District of California, the MDL Court had previously ruled in similar cases that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) did not preempt state-law tort duties to include a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. Following this precedent, the MDL Court denied Monsanto’s motion for summary judgment on preemption grounds. The case was subsequently remanded to the Western District of Pennsylvania, where the parties stipulated to a judgment in favor of the Schaffners, reserving Monsanto’s right to appeal the preemption issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether FIFRA preempted the Pennsylvania duty to warn. The court held that FIFRA’s preemption provision, which prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements different from those required under federal law, did preempt the state-law duty to include a cancer warning. The court reasoned that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had approved Roundup’s label without a cancer warning, and FIFRA regulations require pesticide labels to conform to the EPA-approved label. Therefore, the Pennsylvania duty to warn was not equivalent to the federal requirements and was preempted by FIFRA. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court. View "Schaffner v. Monsanto Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff RSD Leasing Inc., a company that leases and, eventually, resells trucks to other commercial entities, appealed from a district court decision, granting in relevant part summary judgment to Defendants Navistar International Corp. and Navistar, Inc., the manufacturer of several allegedly substandard trucks in RSD’s fleet. The sole question on appeal is whether, for purposes of its purchase of those trucks, RSD qualifies as a “consumer” under the Vermont Consumer Protection Act and therefore is eligible to invoke the Act’s protections. In the absence of any on-point Vermont caselaw signaling whether the statute extends “consumer” protections to a business that purchases a good intending exclusively to lease that good to a third party and then to resell it at the end of the lease term, the district court relied in substantial part on two brief passages from the Act’s legislative history, holding that RSD was not acting as a “consumer” when it purchased the trucks at issue.   The Second Circuit wrote that it is unable to confidently predict how the Vermont Supreme Court would decide the matter. Therefore, the court certified to the Vermont Supreme Court the following question: Does a business that purchases goods intending first to lease those goods to end users and then to resell them at the termination of the lease term qualify as a ‘consumer’ under the VCPA? View "RSD Leasing, Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Corp." on Justia Law

Mark Kielar challenged a superior court’s decision to grant Hyundai Motor America’s (Hyundai) motion to compel arbitration of his causes of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, and fraudulent inducement arising from alleged mechanical defects in the condition of his 2012 Hyundai Tucson. The superior court’s ruling followed Court of Appeal's earlier decision in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC, 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (2020) and concluded Hyundai, a nonsignatory manufacturer, could enforce the arbitration provision in the sales contract between Kielar and his local car dealership under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The Court of Appeal joined recent decisions that have disagreed with Felisilda and concluded the court erred in ordering arbitration. Therefore, it issued a preemptory writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its June 16, 2022 order and enter a new order denying Hyundai’s motion. View "Kielar v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Two putative class actions are at issue in these appeals: Nacarino v. Kashi Co., No. 22-15377, and Brown v. Kellogg Co., No. 22-15658. The complaints were filed in the Northern District of California, and they asserted materially identical state-law consumer protection claims for unfair business practices, unjust enrichment, and fraud. Both complaints alleged that the front labels on several of Defendants’ products are “false and misleading” under state and federal law. At issue is whether food product labels that advertise the amount of protein in the products are false or misleading.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed on different grounds the district court’s dismissal of the two complaints. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the protein claims on Defendants’ labels were false because the nitrogen method for calculating protein content overstated the actual amount of protein the products contained. The panel held that FDA regulations specifically allow manufacturers to measure protein quantity using the nitrogen method.   The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the protein claims on Defendants’ labels were misleading because the “amount of digestible or usable protein the Products actually deliver to the human body is even lower” than the actual amount of protein the products contain. The panel held that Defendants’ protein claims could be misleading under FDA regulations if they did not accurately state the quantity of protein or if the products did not display the quality-adjusted percent daily value in the Nutritional Facts Panel. However, Plaintiffs’ complaints did not allege that the challenged protein claims were misleading within the meaning of the federal regulations. View "ELENA NACARINO, ET AL V. KASHI COMPANY" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a dispute about CoolSculpting, a medical device intended to minimize the appearance of fat. When Plaintiff tried CoolSculpting, he developed a rare condition called Paradoxical Adipose Hyperplasia (“PAH”), which enlarges the targeted fat tissue. Needless to say, Plaintiff was unhappy that CoolSculpting maximized the fat he wanted to minimize. So Plaintiff sued Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc., the manufacturer of the CoolSculpting system, for failure to warn and design defects under Florida law. The district court granted Zeltiq summary judgment. On failure to warn, the district court concluded that Zeltiq’s warnings about PAH were adequate as a matter of law. On design defect, the court determined that Plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony that the risk of CoolSculpting outweighed its utility. Plaintiff challenged both of the district court’s rulings on appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Zeltiq warned medical providers in its user manual and training sessions about the exact condition Plaintiff experienced: PAH is an increase of adipose tissue in the treatment area that may require surgery to correct. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded Zeltiq’s warnings were adequate as a matter of law. Further, the court held that it is convinced that Plaintiff’s defect claim fails under either test. View "Terrance Nelson Cates v. Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc." on Justia Law