Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Appellants are individuals who bought or leased a vehicle with an emissions defeat device, and they filed individual suits that were consolidated before the same judge who presided over the multidistrict litigation and class action settlements. The jury awarded four of Appellants various amounts in compensatory damages and $25,000 each in punitive damages. The district court reduced the punitive damages award to exactly four times the amount of the compensatory damages suffered by each Plaintiff.   The Ninth Circuit vacated punitive damages awards to appellants (who are Plaintiffs who opted out of the class action) and remanded with instructions that the district court recalculate punitive damages. The panel held that the district court erred by holding that a punitive damages ratio calculation of four times the value of the compensatory damages award was the maximum punitive damages award permitted by the Constitution’s Due Process Clause. Because the panel concluded that the district court erred in applying the Gore factors, the panel next considered what award of punitive damages comported with due process for each party. The panel also concluded that it would be arbitrary and incorrect to set a different ratio between punitive damages and actual compensatory damages as to each of the Plaintiffs under the circumstances of this case. The panel, therefore, vacated the punitive damages awards to each appellant and remanded with instructions that the district court recalculate punitive damages in an amount equal to eight times the actual compensatory damages determination. View "TIMOTHY RILEY V. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, I" on Justia Law

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Monsanto Company and BASF Corporation began developing dicamba-tolerant seed and sued each other over intellectual property. When the USDA deregulated Monsanto’s dicamba-tolerant soybean seed that year, Monsanto began to sell it. BASF’s lower-volatility dicamba herbicide was approved in 2017. Bader Farms, Inc. sued Monsanto and BASF for negligent design and failure to warn, alleging its peach orchards were damaged by dicamba drift. The jury awarded compensatory damages and punitive damages based on Monsanto’s acts.   The district court denied Defendants’ motions for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law but reduced punitive damages to $60 million. The district court’s judgment also held Monsanto and BASF jointly and severally liable for the punitive damages.   Defendants appealed, arguing that Bader failed to prove causation, the measure of actual damages is the value of the land rather than lost profits, Bader’s lost profits estimate was speculative, and the punitive damages award was unwarranted under Missouri law and excessive under the United States Constitution.   The Eighth Circuit held that Bader established causation by showing Defendants' conduct was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of Bader's injury. Further, the district court properly refused to find intervening cause as a matter of law or to give an affirmative converse on the issue. However, the evidence established different degrees of culpability between BASF and Monsanto, and the district court should have instructed the jury to separately assess punitive damages against each of them; therefore, the court remanded with directions to hold a new trial only on the issue of punitive damages. View "Bader Farms, Inc. v. BASF Corporation" on Justia Law

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Defendants’ businesses focused on large diesel trucks and related parts, merchandise, and media. In 2017 Defendants were sued by Plaintiff Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment (UPHE), a nonprofit organization that alleged, among other things, that Defendants were tampering with required emission-control devices and installing so-called “defeat devices” in violation of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and Utah’s State Implementation Plan. After a bench trial the court entered judgment in favor of UPHE, finding Defendants collectively liable for hundreds of violations of the CAA and Utah’s plan and assessing over $760,000 in civil penalties. On appeal Defendants challenged UPHE’s Article III and statutory standing, the district court’s inclusion of certain kinds of transactions in its tabulation of violations, and the court’s penalty analysis. Although the Tenth Circuit rejected most of Defendants’ arguments, it felt compelled to remand this case back to the district court for additional proceedings because: (1) UPHE lacked Article III standing to complain of conduct by Defendants that had not contributed to air pollution in Utah’s Wasatch Front; and (2) the district court needed to reevaluate the seriousness of Defendants’ violations of the Utah plan’s anti-tampering provision. View "Utah Physic. for Healthy Env't v. Diesel Power Gear, et al." on Justia Law

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The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider one of its holdings in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Klein, 422 SE2d 863 (1992). In Klein, the Court held that Georgia courts could exercise general personal jurisdiction over any out-of-state corporation that was “authorized to do or transact business in this state at the time a claim arises.” Although Klein’s general-jurisdiction holding was in tension with a recent line of United States Supreme Court cases addressing when state courts may exercise general personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations in a manner that accords with the due process requirements of the United States Constitution, the Georgia Court held Klein did not violate federal due process under Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917), a decision that the U.S. Supreme Court has not overruled. "Thus, we are not required to overrule Klein as a matter of binding federal constitutional law. We also decline to overrule Klein as a matter of statutory interpretation. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision, which followed Klein." View "Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall" on Justia Law

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Essure--permanent birth control for women--originally was manufactured and developed by Conceptus, a California corporation. Bayer bought Conceptus. Bayer marketed Essure as safer and more effective than other birth control. Two residents of Madison County, Illinois, filed personal injury complaints, alleging that Essure caused debilitating pain, heavy bleeding that necessitated medication, and autoimmune disorders. including 179 plaintiffs from at least 25 states. Months later, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its “Bristol-Myers” decision. Bayer argued that, following Bristol-Myers, a court cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant as to the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs when the conduct giving rise to the claims did not occur in the forum state. The plaintiffs argued Illinois courts had specific personal jurisdiction over Bayer because it “created the Essure Accreditation Program and the marketing strategy for Essure in Illinois,” conducted clinical trials in Illinois, and used Illinois as a testing ground for its physician training program. The appellate court affirmed the denials of motions to dismiss: Bayer “conducted a part of its general business in Illinois, and [p]laintiffs’ claims arose out of" trials conducted, in part, in Illinois.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The nonresident plaintiffs identified no jurisdictionally relevant links between their claims and Illinois. The nonresidents have not explained how Illinois could be a convenient location for this litigation; they were not implanted with their devices here and have identified no other activity that would connect their specific claims to Illinois. Many nonresident plaintiffs initiated duplicate actions in California, indicating that the interests of judicial economy are not furthered by permitting their claims to proceed in Illinois. A corporation’s continuous activity of some sort within a state is not enough to render the corporation subject to suits unrelated to that activity. View "Rios v. Bayer Corp." on Justia Law

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Defendant Double Press Manufacturing, Inc. petitioned for review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming a trial court judgment against defendant that included an award of noneconomic damages to plaintiff Zeferino Vasquez, in the amount of $4,860,000. In the course of his employment with a feed dealer, plaintiff was responsible for operating and cleaning a machine used in hay baling. One day in 2010, plaintiff did not follow the machine's shut-down procedure; to remove jammed material, plaintiff climbed into an area of the machine where a hydraulic ram was located. The machine, still in automatic mode, pinched plaintiff between a hydraulic ram and the frame of the machine, crushing his spine and causing other injuries. As a result of those injuries, plaintiff was rendered paraplegic. Defendant contended the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution precluded a reduction of plaintiff’s noneconomic damages to $500,000 in accordance with the statutory damages cap set out in ORS 31.710(1). Plaintiff requested review of another aspect of the decision, arguing that the Court of Appeals erroneously rejected his statutory argument that his claim was exempt from the damages cap. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds, namely, that plaintiff’s claim fell within a statutory exception to the damages cap for “claims subject to * * * ORS chapter 656.” View "Vasquez v. Double Press Mfg., Inc." on Justia Law

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Federal tobacco laws do not preempt state tort claims based on the dangerousness of all the cigarettes manufactured by the tobacco companies. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the jury verdicts of negligence and strict liability in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (Engle III), and decertified the class to allow individual actions about the remaining issues. In this case, R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris challenged the jury verdict against them in one of the individual actions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed its holding in Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 734 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2013), and concluded that giving full faith and credit to the Engle jury findings of negligence and strict liability does not deprive R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris of property without due process of law, and that federal law does not preempt the Engle jury findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments against R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris. View "Graham v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco" on Justia Law

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This appeal stems from multi-district litigation involving transvaginal mesh medical devices used to treat pelvic organ prolapse and other pelvic issues. The jury awarded plaintiff $250,000 in compensatory damages, and the punitive damages award was split pursuant to a Georgia statute, with seventy-five percent going to the State of Georgia and twenty-five percent going to plaintiff. Both parties appealed. The court affirmed the district court's exclusion of evidence that Bard had complied with the FDA's 510(k) product safety process under F.R.E. 402 for lack of relevance; affirmed the district court's decision to admit evidence of a material data safety sheet pertaining to polypropylene, a material used in the construction of the Avaulta Plus implanted in plaintiff's body, as non-hearsay, finding that any use of the evidence by plaintiff that went beyond the limited purpose for which it was admitted as non-hearsay resulted in harmless error and was not prejudicial to Bard’s defense; and concluded that the district court did not err in giving the Georgia pattern jury instruction, in denying Bard’s request for a modified instruction, or in upholding the jury’s causation finding. The court also concluded that the punitive award was not constitutionally excessive. In regard to plaintiff's challenges, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Georgia's split-recovery statute garnishing seventy-five percent of any punitive damages award arising from a product liability judgment does not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cisson v. C. R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendants challenged a district court order requiring that they add two statements to their cigarette packages and advertisements: an announcement that a federal court has ruled that they “deliberately deceived the American public” about the dangers of cigarettes; and a declaration that they “intentionally designed cigarettes” to maximize addiction. The court concluded that given its earlier decisions in this case, the manufacturers’ objection to disclosing that they intentionally designed cigarettes to ensure addiction is both waived and foreclosed by the law of the case. Those decisions make equally clear that the district court, in ordering defendants to announce that they deliberately deceived the public, exceeded its authority under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, to craft remedies that “prevent and restrain” future violations. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a). The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against I-Flow, manufacturer of the PainBuster continuous infusion pump, alleging state common law claims for negligence and strict products liability. Plaintiff alleged that I-Flow negligently failed to warn that its pain pump should not be used in intra-articular spaces such as the glenohumeral joint; and that I-Flow was strictly liable for selling a product that was unreasonably dangerous due to the lack of adequate warnings. The PainBuster is regulated under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to the Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 360c(a)(1)(A)(i), (B), (C)(i). Concluding that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal where judgment was entered as to all defendants, the court concluded that the requested jury instructions regarding negligence and federal standards were not preempted by the MDA. Therefore, the court remanded and declined to reach the evidentiary issues. The court dismissed I-Flow's cross appeal as moot. View "McClellan v. I-Flow Corp." on Justia Law