Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Class Action
A.S. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp
A.S., who suffers from a congenital birth defect, and his mother, Miller, who ingested Paxil while pregnant, sued GSK in the Philadelphia County Court, alleging that all parties were citizens of Pennsylvania. GSK removed the case based upon diversity. On plaintiffs’ motion, the case was consolidated with other Paxil cases before a district court judge who had previously held that GSK was a citizen of Pennsylvania and who remanded A.S.’s case and the other consolidated cases to state court. The case returned to state court on January 4, 2012. On June 7, 2013, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Johnson, which held that GSK was a citizen of Delaware. Less than 30 days after the Johnson decision, GSK filed a second notice of removal in A.S.’s case and in eight other cases with the same procedural posture. The district court denied the motion and certified its order for interlocutory review. The Third Circuit directed remand to state court, holding that the second removal request was untimely under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b) because there had been a final order. View "A.S. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp" on Justia Law
Zanetti v. IKO Mfg Inc.
Purchasers of organic asphalt roofing shingles in many states sued IKO and affiliated firms, contending that it falsely told customers that the shingles met an industry standard (ASTM D2250 and that compliance had been ascertained by use of a testing protocol (ASTM D228). What distinguishes an “organic” asphalt tile is inclusion of a layer made from felt or paper; tiles that include a fiberglass layer are not called organic, even though asphalt itself has organic components. In 2009 the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of the federal suits to the Central District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 1407. Plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class that would cover IKO sales in eight states since 1979. The court declined. After determining that subject matter jurisdiction existed despite the district court’s error in transferring the matter to a judge without approval of the Panel, the Seventh Circuit vacated, While not required to certify the proposed class, the district court denied class certification under a mistaken belief that “commonality of damages” is legally indispensable. View "Zanetti v. IKO Mfg Inc." on Justia Law
Riva v. Pella Corp.
A 2006 class action against Pella, a window manufacturer, alleged that certain windows had a design defect that allowed water to enter behind exterior aluminum cladding and damage the wooden frame and the house itself. The district judge certified a class for customers who had already replaced or repaired their windows, seeking damages and limited to six states, and another for those who had not, seeking only declaratory relief nationwide. Initially, there was one named plaintiff, Saltzman. His son-in-law, Weiss, was lead class counsel. Weiss is under investigation for multiple improprieties. The Seventh Circuit upheld the certifications. Class counsel negotiated a settlement in 2011 that directed Pella to pay $11 million in attorneys’ fees based on an assertion that the settlement was worth $90 million to the class. In 2013, before the deadline for filing claims, the district judge approved the settlement, which purports to bind a single nation-wide class of all owners of defective windows, whether or not they have replaced or repaired the windows. The agreement gave lead class counsel “sole discretion” to allocate attorneys’ fees; Weiss proposed to allocate 73 percent to his own firm. Weiss removed four original class representatives who opposed the settlement; their replacements joined Saltzman in supporting it. Named plaintiffs were each compensated $5,000 or $10,000 for their services, if they supported the settlement. Saltzman, as lead class representative, was to receive $10,000. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reversed, referring to “eight largely wasted years,” the need to remove Saltzman, Weiss, and Weiss’s firm as class representative and as class counsel, and to reinstate the four named plaintiffs. View "Riva v. Pella Corp." on Justia Law
Greenberg v. Procter & Gamble Co.
In 2010, P&G began marketing Pampers disposable diapers with “Dry Max technology.” Two months later, the Consumer Product Safety Commission began investigating whether the diapers caused severe diaper rash. The district court consolidated several law suits. In August 2010, the CPSC and Health Canada released reports, finding no connection between the diapers and diaper rash. Despite a pending motion to dismiss and before any formal discovery, the parties reached a settlement agreement, under which they agreed to seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(2), so that absent class members could not opt out. P&G agreed: to reinstate a refund program; to add to its label a sentence suggesting that consumers consult Pampers.com or call; to add basic diaper rash information to its website; and to contribute $300,000 to a pediatric resident training program and $100,000 to fund a program “in the area of skin health.” Named plaintiffs would release all of their Pampers-related claims and receive $1000 “per affected child.” Unnamed class members would not receive any award, would benefit only from the one-box refund, but would release “equitable” claims against P&G, and be permanently barred from future class actions against P&G. Class counsel would receive $2.73 million. The district court certified the class. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the per-child payments provided a disincentive for named plaintiffs to care about the adequacy of relief afforded unnamed class members.
View "Greenberg v. Procter & Gamble Co." on Justia Law
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Class Action, Products Liability
Atwell, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corp.
This case arose when groups of plaintiffs filed product liability actions against four manufacturers of transvaginal mesh devices, including Boston Scientific. Three groups filed similar motions proposing that the state court assign each group to a single Judge for purposes of discovery and trial. Two district judges granted plaintiffs' motions and remanded to state court on the ground that no case included more than 100 plaintiffs and plaintiffs had not proposed to the state court that the actions be tried jointly. The court granted Boston Scientific leave to appeal and vacated the order remanding to state court where the three groups of plaintiffs have already proposed to try their cases jointly within the meaning of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), because plaintiffs' counsel urged the state court to assign the claims of more than 100 plaintiffs to a single judge. View "Atwell, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corp." on Justia Law
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Class Action, Products Liability
Walker, et al. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
R.J. Reynolds appealed money judgments in favor of the survivors of two smokers. At issue was whether a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in an earlier class action was entitled to full faith and credit in federal court. The court affirmed the judgments in favor of the survivors because R.J. Reynolds had a full and fair opportunity to be heard in the Florida class action and the application of res judicata under Florida law did not cause an arbitrary deprivation of property. View "Walker, et al. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law
In re: W.R. Grace & Co.
Grace has manufactured and sold specialty chemicals and construction materials for more than 100 years. The company began facing asbestos-related lawsuits in the 1970s, based on several products and activities, including operation of a Montana vermiculite mine that released asbestos-containing dust into the atmosphere and sale of Zonolite Attic Insulation (ZAI). Montana and the Crown (Canada) have been sued for alleged failure to warn citizens of the risks posed by Grace’s products and activities. Montana settled its cases for $43 million in 2011. The Crown is a defendant in lawsuits arising from the use of ZAI. Montana and the Crown sought indemnification from Grace. Grace sought protection under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 524(g), which allows a company to establish a trust to handle such liabilities. Montana and the Crown objected to confirmation of a Plan of Reorganization that will send all asbestos claims to two trusts, allowing protected parties to be “unconditionally, irrevocably and fully released.” The personal injury trust is funded by $ 1.5 billion from settlements with Grace’s insurers and former affiliates, an initial payment from Grace of $ 450 million, a warrant to acquire 10 million shares of Grace common stock at $ 17 per share, and annual cash payments from Grace of $100-110 million through 2033. The property damage trust is funded by an initial payment of 180 million dollars, and a subsequent payment of 30 million dollars. The two trusts have separate mechanisms for resolving claims. The bankruptcy court, the district court, and the Third Circuit confirmed the plan. View "In re: W.R. Grace & Co." on Justia Law
Empire Abrasive Equipment Corp. v. Morgan
Henry Morgan, Sr. filed a personal-injury suit against eighty-eight defendants, claiming injuries related to silicosis. Morgan, Sr., died while the personal-injury case was pending, and the case eventually was dismissed. More than three years after Morgan, Sr.'s death, his son, Henry Morgan, Jr., filed a wrongful-death suit individually and on behalf of all wrongful-death beneficiaries of Morgan, Sr. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion. Because the wrongful-death suit was filed more than three years after the death of Morgan, Sr., the statute of limitations barred any wrongful-death and survival claims. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and render judgment in favor of the defendants.View "Empire Abrasive Equipment Corp. v. Morgan" on Justia Law
Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.
Appellant Kia Motors America, Inc. unsuccessfully defended a class action lawsuit for breach of express warranty. It appealed a superior court's decision to affirm certification of the class by the trial court, and the amount of damages and litigation costs awarded to the class. Costs included a significant legal fee, entered pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act (MMWA). Appellee Shamell Samuel-Bassett, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated filed this class action lawsuit in January 2001, alleging that her Kia had an unsafe manufacturing defect in the braking system. In 2005, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the class for breach of express warranty, and awarded damages in the amount of $600 per class member. The court molded the verdict to account for the 9,402 class members to which the parties had stipulated and recorded a $5.6 million verdict. Represented by new counsel, Kia filed an unsuccessful post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the class was properly certified; (2) whether evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict and whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (3) whether the jury’s verdict was properly molded to account for the 9,402 members of the class; (4) whether the trial court had authority to award attorneys’ fees after Bassett entered judgment on the class verdict; and (5) whether the risk multiplier was properly applied to an award of counsel fees under the MMWA. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the trial court's decision. The Court reversed the trial court to the extent that its order provided for enhancement of the attorneys' fees award beyond the amount permitted in the MMWA.View "Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law
Watkins v. Vital Pharmaceuticals
Plaintiff filed a class action suit against Vital for its distribution of ZERO IMPACT protein bars that were erroneously marketed and labeled as having little to no impact on blood sugar. On appeal, Vital challenged the district court's sua sponte order remanding the suit to state court for failure to establish the amount in controversy requirement under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1). The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the undisputed Cimino declarations were sufficient to establish that CAFA's $5 million amount in controversy requirement was met. View "Watkins v. Vital Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law