Justia Products Liability Opinion Summaries

The trial court in this case ruled that under the Washington courts' application of "Frye v. United States," there must be general acceptance in the relevant scientific community that a particular type of in utero toxic exposure can cause a particular type of birth defect before expert testimony on causation is admissible. Plaintiff Julie Anderson worked for Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., from 1998 until she filed a safety complaint with the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) and was fired. While it was not officially part of her job, Plaintiff regularly mixed paint. Employees were required by official company policy to wear respirators when mixing paint, but there was reason to believe that the policy was not rigorously enforced and may have been actively undermined by management. Plaintiff gave birth to a son in January 2000. By 2003, it was clear the child suffered from "medical abnormalities." He was diagnosed with a neuronal migration defect, congenital hemiplegia, microcephalus, and a multicystic dysplastic kidney, among other things, along with "delays in motor, communication, cognitive, and adaptive behavior." Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's interpretation and subsequent ruling on the issue. The Court held that the Frye test is not implicated if the theory and the methodology relied upon and used by the expert to reach an opinion on causation is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. The Court affirmed the trial court's rulings on comparative fault and wrongful discharge. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings.View "Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Delta International Machinery Corporation (Delta) sought a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate an order that granted Respondent Brandon Landrum access to "certain technology" in its control. Respondent was operating a portable bench saw manufactured by Delta. His hand came into contact with the sawblade and ended with injuries to his hand and amputation of his index finger. In 2007, Respondent sued Delta alleging the saw was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Though the parties agreed to a protective order which forbade certain confidential materials from being released to Respondent's expert witness who happened to be employed by one of Delta's competitors, the trial court allowed Respondent's expert to review certain technology in Delta's possession pertaining to design of safety features of the saw. The technology Respondent sought to discover had pre-dated technology that had been developed by a joint venture of all saw manufacturers, of which Delta was a part. Delta claimed that its "flesh-sensing" technology was not discoverable because it did not exist at the time Respondent's saw was manufactured, and pre-dated the joint venture. Delta objected to Respondent's discovery request as "irrelevant" and "confidential." The trial court granted Respondent's motion to inspect. Delta subsequently filed its petition to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the flesh-sensing technology was both a trade secret and was not relevant to Respondent's claims. As such, the Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in allowing discovery of that technology and in allowing access to the technology by Delta's competitor. The Court granted Delta's request for the writ, and directed the trial court directed the trial court to vacate its order granting Respondent's motion to inspect.View "Landrum v. Delta International Machinery Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Fourth Circuit concerned commercial arbitration of insurance disputes in foreign tribunals. Appellant-Cross-Appellee ESAB Group, Inc. contended that South Carolina law "reverse preempts" federal law (namely, a treaty and its implementing legislation) pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. ESAB Group faced numerous products liability suits arising from alleged personal injuries caused by exposure to welding consumables manufactured by ESAB Group or its predecessors. These suits presently were proceeding in numerous state and federal courts in the United States. ESAB Group requested that its insurers defend and indemnify it in these suits. Several, including Zurich Insurance, PLC (ZIP), refused coverage. As a result, ESAB Group brought suit against its insurers in South Carolina state court. The district court then found that ZIP had the requisite minimum contacts with the forum to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction and that the exercise of jurisdiction over ZIP was otherwise reasonable. Because it had referred to arbitration all claims providing a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. ESAB Group timely appealed the district court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction. ZIP filed a cross-appeal, challenging the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction and its authority to remand the nonarbitrable claims to state court. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed as to the district court’s exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction, and found no error in the district court's order compelling arbitration. Likewise, the Court rejected ZIP's arguments that the district court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over it and in remanding nonarbitrable claims to state court. View "ESAB Group, Incorporated v. Zurich Insurance PLC" on Justia Law